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1. Introduction 
By ‘bringing capital back in’, the political scientist Peter A. Swenson returned business to the 
forefront of academic analysis on the development of labour market institutions.1 After his 
critique, research into the factor of employers in the establishment of such arrangements 
flourished.2 Despite several decades of increased attention, the role that employers have played 
in the formation of collective bargaining arrangements remains widely disputed. The main point 
of this ongoing discussion is whether employers have displayed a genuine interest in the 
creation of such systems, and if so, why. Testing the different theories in this debate with new 
empirical cases contributes to the discussion by shedding new light on the relative explanatory 
power of the perspectives on employers’ role in the establishment of collective bargaining 
systems.            
 To conduct such a test, new and theoretically relevant empirical material is required. In 
this regard, the establishment of centralised bargaining in the Netherlands has not yet been 
researched from the theoretical perspective of the genuine interest of Dutch employers. The 
inattention for this instance of collective bargaining creation in this academic debate is 
remarkable due to the relatively high level of centralisation, institutionalisation and durability 
of the resulting arrangement.3 Next to its theoretical relevance, the accessibility and 
completeness of the archival sources of the Dutch employers’ associations make the formation 
of centralised bargaining in the Netherlands a great empirical case to test the different 
perspectives in the theoretical framework. Another reason to study the Dutch case is the 
understanding that this may provide to the labour market trajectory of that country. While the 
operation of the socio-economic arrangement once established has recently received more 
 
1 Peter A. Swenson, ‘Bringing Capital Back In, or Social Democracy Reconsidered: Employer Power, Cross-Class 
Alliances, and Centralization of Industrial Relations in Denmark and Sweden’, World Politics 43:4 (1991) 513–
544, there 513. 
2 See for example: Thomas Paster, The role of business in the development of the welfare state and labor markets 
in Germany. Containing social reforms (London 2014); Cathie J. Martin and Duane Swank, The Political 
Construction of Business Interests: Coordination, Growth, and Equality. Cambridge Studies in Comparative 
Politics (Cambridge 2012); Peter A. Swenson, Capitalists against markets: the making of labor markets and 
welfare states in the United States and Sweden (Oxford 2010); Pepper D. Culpepper, ‘The Politics of Common 
Knowledge: Ideas and Institutional Change in Wage Bargaining’, International Organization 62:1 (2008) 1–33; 
Margarita Estévez-Abe, David W. Soskice and Torben Iversen, ‘Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A 
Reinterpretation of the Welfare State’, in: Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice ed., Varieties of Capitalism: the 
institutional foundations of comparative advantage (Oxford 2001) 145-183. 
3 Sociaal-Economische Raad, Advies algemeen-verbindendverklaring (Den Haag 1992) 25-27; Drimmelen and 
Van Hulst, Loonvorming en loonpolitiek, 16-17; John P. Windmuller ‘The bargaining structure’, in: John P. 
Windmuller ed., Collective bargaining in industrialised market economies: a reappraisal (Geneva 1987) 81–119, 
there 107. 
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attention,4 there are still gaps in the historical study of its creation process. The establishment 
of centralised bargaining in the Netherlands in the first half of the twentieth century, from a 
system of firm-level negotiation to economy-wide collective bargaining, took place in two 
relatively distinct steps with separate policy dilemmas and contexts. The first step was the shift 
from firm-level negotiation to sectoral collective bargaining between 1918 and 1937 via the 
adoption of the legal mechanism of statutory extension.5 The second and subsequent change 
was the centralisation and institutionalisation of this collective bargaining system between 1944 
and 1954.6 The factor of business in the first step has received some attention in academic 
scholarship, especially in the case of Liberal employers, but the field misses a comprehensive 
study into the attitudes of employers towards the creation of centralised bargaining that 
systematically accounts for internal differences, both between and within employers’ 
associations. Meanwhile, the role of employers in the second stage of centralisation has been 
generally understudied. Although the step is a vital part of the development of Dutch industrial 
relations, the theme is relatively unexplored and requires more research.     
 With these considerations in mind, this thesis aims to study to what extent the Dutch 
employer community has shown a genuine interest in the shift from firm-level negotiation to 
sectoral collective bargaining and the subsequent step of national centralised bargaining during 
the first half of the twentieth century.       
 To answer this question, the thesis follows a dualistic within-case research design of 
causal-process tracing and congruence analysis.7 The process-tracing approach follows an 
inductive logic and identifies the causal mechanisms behind employers’ positions towards the 
creation of centralised bargaining from the empirical material of the study. After that, the 
current academic debate on the role of employers in the creation of centralised bargaining is 
contested using a deductive test of the causal mechanisms of the preference formation of the 
employers in the theoretical framework with the empirical findings. The study uses a diverse 
 
4 See for example: Jeroen Touwen, Coordination in Transition: The Netherlands and the World Economy, 1950-
2010 (Leiden 2014); Jelle Visser and Anton Hemerijck, A Dutch miracle: job growth, welfare reform and 
corporatism in the Netherlands (Amsterdam 1999). 
5 Bruggeman and Camijn, Ondernemers verbonden, 179, 187; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, 
Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 74, 76; Adriaan Kouwenhoven, De dynamiek van christelijk sociaal denken 
(Nijkerk 1989) 139; Fase, Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid, 26, 129, 134. 
6 Drimmelen and Van Hulst, Loonvorming en loonpolitiek, 16-17; Windmuller ‘The bargaining structure’, 107; 
Maarten van Bottenburg, “Aan den arbeid!”: in de wandelgangen van de Stichting van den Arbeid, 1945-1995 
(Amsterdam 1995) 90; Willem Albeda, Willem J. Dercksen and Frank H. Tros, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland 
(sixth edition; Alphen aan den Rijn 1998) 74-75. 
7 Joachim Blatter and Markus Haverland, Designing case studies: explanatory approaches in small-n research. 
Research methods series (London 2012) 27-29; Patrick Emmenegger, The Power to Dismiss: Trade Unions and 
the Regulation of Job Security in Western Europe (Oxford 2014) 19. 
 
5 
 
corpus of sources consisting of literature, academic articles and archival files of the main peak 
employers’ associations as well as the relevant consultative institutions of which they are part.8
 The introduction of the study proceeds with the conceptualisation of collective 
bargaining and a critical discussion of the historiography on the role of employers in the 
creation of centralised bargaining in the Netherlands separating for both steps in the 
establishment process. A review of the academic debate regarding the role of employers in the 
creation and sustainment of collective bargaining systems ensues these sections. This 
theoretical discussion occurs in such a way that it leads to a clear overview of the potential costs 
and benefits of the two stages towards centralised bargaining from an employer point of view 
which allows for a systematic test of these mechanisms in the empirical chapters. After this, the 
introduction is finalised with the operationalisation section that explores the most appropriate 
research design given the challenges of the study and an examines the sources of the thesis. 
Following these introductory sections, two empirical chapters form the analysis which 
separately addresses both steps in the creation of centralised bargaining. These sections are 
themselves divided in a part focused on causal-process tracing and a subsection where the 
congruence analysis is conducted. After that, the research findings are brought together in the 
conclusion.   
1.1 Conceptualisation 
The analysis of collective bargaining regimes unavoidably involves the use of several concepts 
that have been interpreted in different ways in the academic literature. Before the analysis can 
be conducted, it is, therefore, necessary to provide some conceptual clarification first. This 
study uses John P. Windmuller’s definition of collective bargaining as ‘a process of decision-
making between parties representing employers and employee interests. Its overriding purpose 
is the negotiation and continuous application of an agreed set of rules to govern the substantive 
and procedural terms of the employment relationship, as well as to define the relationship 
between the parties to the process’.9         
 This definition shows that collective bargaining is a relatively broad phenomenon which 
allows for many variations between countries. In practice, it is never the sole way of negotiation 
between employees and employers. The collective bargaining regimes in countries vary in 
 
8 Touwen, Coordination in Transition, 112; Jan Bruggeman and Aart J. W. Camijn, Ondernemers verbonden: 100 
jaar centrale ondernemingsorganisaties in Nederland (Wormer 1999) 293. 
9 John P. Windmuller, ‘Origins and nature of collective bargaining’, in: John P. Windmuller ed., Collective 
bargaining in industrialised market economies: a reappraisal (Geneva 1987) 3-16, there 3. 
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terms of the legal structure of the bargaining process, the scope of the conditions under the 
agreements, the extent of employees covered by its arrangements, the level of bargaining 
(sectoral or economy-wide as opposed to negotiation with a single employer), the 
institutionalisation of the system and the role of the government.10 For the period and country 
of this study, by far the most important point of debate in industrial relations was the bargaining 
level, notwithstanding that the other characteristics of bargaining systems played an important 
role as well.            
 After the establishment of the legal embeddedness of collective labour agreements in 
1907,11 the debate about the creation of a collective bargaining regime in the Netherlands really 
took off when the Dutch government announced in 1918 in its yearly Troonrede that it 
considered introducing statutory extension.12 Although ever ongoing, the discussion about the 
industrial system eventually led to a provisional ending in 1954 when employers accepted that 
wages would be allowed to rise with productivity increases and thereby, de facto, complied 
with a durable system of national centralised bargaining.13 This year, therefore, serves as the 
ending point of the analysis. In this period, the scope and coverage of the centralised bargaining 
system gradually increased to comparatively high levels during the midst of the twentieth 
century, leaving the disruption of the Second World War aside.14 In addition, the role of the 
government in industrial relations greatly varied over this timeframe.15 One of the major reasons 
for this was that the Dutch administration was coordinating wages to a relatively extraordinary 
degree in the first decades after the Second World War.       
 Analysing the discussion between employers about the bargaining level over the 
timeframe makes it necessary to make a distinction between two relatively distinct debates 
which have separate contexts and policy dilemmas. After the announcement of the government 
in 1918, the first discussion was about the adoption of statutory extension which would later 
 
10 OECD, Employment outlook 1994, 170-172, 174. 
11 Fernhout, ‘Incorporatie van belangengroeperingen’, 125; Taco van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het 
loonvormingsrecht (Nijmegen 1985) 111. 
12 Bruggeman and Camijn, Ondernemers verbonden, 179; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, 
Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 74; Adriaan Kouwenhoven, De dynamiek van christelijk sociaal denken 
(Nijkerk 1989) 139; Bouwe Bölger, Organisatorische verhoudingen tusschen werkgevers en arbeiders (Haarlem 
1929) 133-4; Fase, Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid, 129. 
13 Van Baalen e.a., Het kabinet-Drees III , 467-8; Scholten, De Sociaal-Economische Raad, 280, 286; Windmuller, 
De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 181-2; Harmsen and Reinalda, Voor de 
bevrijding van de arbeid, 334; Bruggeman and Camijn, Ondernemers verbonden, 222; Van Bottenburg, “Aan den 
arbeid!”, 126; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, 10 jaar C. S. W. V., 22, 24; Van Zanden,, Een klein land, 
112; Fase, Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid, 256. 
14 Sociaal-Economische Raad, Advies algemeen-verbindendverklaring, 25-27. 
15 Albeda, Dercksen and Tros, Arbeidsverhoudingen, 74-75; Drimmelen and Van Hulst, Loonvorming en 
loonpolitiek, 16. 
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form the legal foundation for the Dutch collective bargaining system after its introduction in 
1937.16 This mechanism extends the applicability of collective labour agreements to a wider 
scope of (similar) institutions and their workers than fall under the signatory parties.17 
Essentially, the debate about the introduction of statutory extension was about a bargaining 
level shift from firm-level or single-employer negotiation to multi-employer or collective 
bargaining on the sectoral level. In the remainder of this thesis, multi-employer or collective 
bargaining on the sectoral level is meant when discussing sectoral bargaining.   
 After this discussion, the second bargaining level debate among employers was about 
the centralisation of this sectoral collective bargaining model after the Second World War. Due 
to the Nazi rule and its direct aftermath, the bargaining system had become heavily centralised 
and institutionalised with very limited sectoral flexibility. The main point of this discussion 
from the liberation of the South of the Netherlands in 1944, therefore, was to what extent this 
created economy-wide or national centralised type of multi-employer bargaining had to be 
sustained. In 1954, this debate ended with the decisions of employers to agree with centrally 
constrained wage compensation for productivity increases (real wage increases), thereby de 
facto accepting an economy-wide multi-employer bargaining model with restricted possibilities 
for sectoral differentiation.18 For simplicity’s sake, the concept of economy-wide multi-
employer or national centralised bargaining is referred to as centralised bargaining in the rest 
of this thesis.        
1.2 Research question 
In essence, the research question of this thesis, to what extent the Dutch employer community 
has shown a genuine interest in the shift from firm-level negotiation to sectoral collective 
bargaining and the subsequent step of national centralised bargaining during the first half of the 
twentieth century, is about explaining the attitudes of employers in these two relatively distinct 
 
16 John P. Windmuller, ‘The role of government’, in: John P. Windmuller ed., Collective bargaining in 
industrialised market economies: a reappraisal (Geneva 1987) 121–148, there 134; Drimmelen and Van Hulst, 
Loonvorming en loonpolitiek, 14-15; Bruggeman and Camijn, Ondernemers verbonden, 179, 187; Windmuller, 
De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 74, 76; Adriaan Kouwenhoven, De dynamiek 
van christelijk sociaal denken (Nijkerk 1989) 139; Fase, Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid, 26, 129, 134. 
17 Franz Traxler and Birgit Woitech, ‘Transnational Investment and National Labour Market Regimes: A Case of 
`Regime Shopping’?’, European Journal of Industrial Relations 6:2 (2000) 141–159, there 146; John P. 
Windmuller, ‘The role of government’, 134; Windmuller, ‘Origins and nature of collective bargaining’, 7. 
18 Van Baalen e.a., Het kabinet-Drees III , 467-8; Scholten, De Sociaal-Economische Raad, 280, 286; Windmuller, 
De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 181-2; Harmsen and Reinalda, Voor de 
bevrijding van de arbeid, 334; Bruggeman and Camijn, Ondernemers verbonden, 222; Van Bottenburg, “Aan den 
arbeid!”, 126; Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, 10 jaar C. S. W. V., 22, 24; Van Zanden,, Een klein land, 
112; Fase, Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid, 256. 
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bargaining level discussions. The formulation of the question should be interpreted as such that 
it addresses both to what degree employers have shown a genuine interest in the establishment 
of the centralised bargaining system and why they have adopted this position. An important 
theoretical underpinning of the formulation of the research question is that the establishment of 
institutions and their operation once established should be distinguished to prevent a confusion 
of causes and consequences.19 As the operation once established has been analysed more 
extensively in academic research, the focus of this study is strictly on the creation process.20 
Importantly, the thesis does not only address whether the employer community had a genuine 
interest in bargaining with workers but especially on whether they showed a genuine interest in 
the institutionalisation of this process.      
 Although analysing the precise impact of business on the creation of centralised 
bargaining is methodologically problematic and not feasible considering the resources of the 
research project, research on the (genuine) attitudes of employers towards collective bargaining, 
necessarily has to pay some attention to their influence over events. The reason for this is that 
instances of employer support for collective bargaining (or state measures to develop collective 
bargaining) do not have to be genuine but could also have been a strategic response to 
environmental circumstances, e.g. as a result of labour’s increased bargaining power. Taking 
strategic behaviour into account when uncovering genuine interests does not necessitate an 
exact measurement of the impact of business’ positions, however, which makes the research 
goal achievable while keeping the significant contributions to the theoretical and 
historiographical debates intact. 
1.3 Historiography 
To clarify these historiographical contributions, it is needed to provide a more elaborate 
discussion of current historical scholarship on the role of employers in the creation of 
centralised bargaining in the Netherlands. As this formation process consists of two relatively 
distinct steps, the role of employers in these different cases has also been studied separately, 
leading to distinct historiographies. In contrast with the theoretical framework, both of these 
are strictly organised along national lines and generally filled with publications that are written 
in the Dutch language.  
 
19 Johannes Lindner and Berthold Rittberger, ‘The Creation, Interpretation and Contestation of Institutions — 
Revisiting Historical Institutionalism’, Journal of Common Market Studies 41:3 (2003) 445–473, there 446; 
Pierson, ‘The Limits of Design’, 475, 478. 
20 See for example: Touwen, Coordination in Transition; Visser and Hemerijck, A Dutch miracle. 
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1.3.1 The creation of sectoral bargaining 
There are several studies which have previously analysed business positions in the discussion 
on statutory extension. As part of his doctoral research, Bouwe Bölger has extensively studied 
the stances of different employers’ associations towards statutory extension but only from the 
First World War until the law on collective labour agreements of 1927, and not up to the 
establishment of statutory extension.21 More briefly, Harry Hoefnagels and Van Peijpe have 
also shed some light on business positions regarding collective bargaining in the same period.22 
Additionally, Jan Bruggeman and Aart J.W. Camijn have analysed the stances of the peak 
employers’ associations up to the establishment of the law in 1937, particularly for the main 
Liberal employers’ association (VNW).23 These analyses are largely based on external 
publications rather than internal minutes, however, and merely provide limited insight in 
internal discussions and opposition against the viewpoints of the business institutions required 
to test the different arguments in the theoretical framework.  
1.3.2 The shift to centralised bargaining 
The shift to centralised bargaining has received way less attention in the Dutch historiography 
than the statutory extension debate. Maarten van Bottenburg and, to a lesser extent, Van Peijpe 
have provided insight in the viewpoints of different employers on the role of the government 
and social partners in the newly created bargaining system through an analysis of the creation 
of the Labour Foundation,24 but these investigations examine who is in charge of the bargaining 
system rather than the bargaining level. Additionally, Van Peijpe has shed some light on the 
positions of political parties and societal organisations on the wage formation process in the 
post-war period.25 His analysis gives little insight into the debate between and within the 
business organisations on this topic before 1954, though, as it has a wider scope and is largely 
based on external publications. The current debate, therefore, lacks a study which 
systematically accounts for the different business positions of peak employers’ associations on 
the shift to the centralised bargaining level between 1944 and 1954.  
 
21 Bouwe Bölger, Organisatorische verhoudingen tusschen werkgevers en arbeiders (Haarlem 1929). 
22 Harry Hoefnagels, Een eeuw sociale problematiek: van sociaal conflict naar strategische samenwerking. 
Bouwstenen voor de Kennis der Maatschappij 23 (Assen 1957); Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het 
loonvormingsrecht. 
23 Jan Bruggeman and Aart J. W. Camijn, Ondernemers verbonden: 100 jaar centrale ondernemingsorganisaties 
in Nederland (Wormer 1999). 
24 Van Bottenburg, “Aan den arbeid!”; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht. 
25 Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht. 
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1.3.3 Contribution of this study 
The fact that the creation of centralised bargaining in the Netherlands is made up of two 
relatively separate steps is also reflected in the historiographies on the role of employers in 
these cases. The historiography shows that the role of employers in the establishment of sectoral 
bargaining has already received quite some attention in academic scholarship but is lacking a 
comprehensive study which accounts for the attitudes of the different peak employers’ 
associations over the whole study period and addresses the variation within these organisations. 
Meanwhile, the shift to centralised bargaining from the system of sectoral bargaining has 
received less attention and is relatively unexplored. By conducting a comprehensive study into 
the attitudes of employers in both cases, this thesis contributes to the historical understanding 
of the role of employers in both historiographies and the process at large.  
1.4 Theoretical framework 
1.4.1 Why support collective bargaining? 
As this thesis studies to what extent employers have shown a genuine interest in supporting the 
establishment of a centralised type of collective bargaining, the vital theoretical question is why 
(parts of) business would back or oppose the replacement of a single-employer arrangement 
with an economy-wide multi-employer bargaining structure. With this research problem, it is 
essential to make a distinction between the move from single-employer negotiation to sectoral 
bargaining and the shift from the sectoral to the centralised collective bargaining model, since 
they involve different theoretical dilemmas and considerations for employers. Table 1 shows 
the theoretical explanations for employers’ attitudes concerning both steps in the academic 
literature, which are roughly based on three overarching theoretical approaches to preference 
formation.              
1.4.1.1 Power 
The first perspective, consisting of followers of the power-resources approach (PRA), 
postulates that business’ main motivation is power. These authors argue that the extent of 
collective bargaining and social policies in a country is dependent upon the power of the labour 
class, for example in the form of labour unions or socio-democratic political parties, and its 
capability to make coalitions with other parties of interest, such as agrarian and Christian 
democratic parties.26 The underlying assumption of this argument is that employers and trade 
 
26 Michael Shalev, ‘The Social Democratic Model and Beyond: Two “Generations” of  Comparative Research 
on the Welfare State’, Comparative Social Research 6 (1983) 315–351, there 317, 320; Gøsta Esping-Andersen, 
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unions want exactly the opposite.27 While trade unions strive for the decommodification of 
workers, which means pursuing policies that reduce the dependency of workers on markets and 
employers, e.g. by government involvement, employers oppose such agreements out of fear of 
losing control on workers.28  
Table 1 Motivations behind employers’ stances towards sectoral and centralised bargaining 
 Sectoral bargaining Centralised bargaining 
Power Support: Support: 
 Strategic accommodation 
- Industrial peace 
 
Strategic accommodation 
- Industrial peace 
 Opposition: 
Control over labour 
- Formal recognition of 
trade unions 
- Industrial citizenship for 
workers 
 
Opposition: 
Control over labour 
 
Business interests Support:  Support: 
 Specific-skills investments 
Administrative efficiency 
Wage moderation 
 
Opposition: 
Wage increases 
Wage differentiation 
Flexibility              
Wage moderation 
Administrative efficiency 
 
 
Opposition: 
Wage differentiation 
Flexibility 
Ideational commitment Support: 
Solidarity and subsidiarity  
 
 
 
 
The three worlds of welfare capitalism (Cambridge 2013), 17-8, 147; Paster, The role of business, 7, Walter Korpi, 
‘Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare States and Varieties of 
Capitalism: Protagonists, Consenters, and Antagonists’, World Politics 58:2 (2006) 167–206, there 168, 172, 202; 
Philip Manow, ‘Electoral rules, class coalitions and welfare state regimes, or how to explain Esping-Andersen 
with Stein Rokkan’, Socio-economic Review 7:1 (2009) 101–121, there  103, 108-109; Walter Korpi, The 
democratic class struggle (London 1983) 18-19; Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Politics against markets: the social 
democratic road to power (Princeton legacy library edition; Princeton 2017) 36-37; John D. Stephens, The 
transition from capitalism to socialism. New studies in sociology (London 1979) 99-100. 
27 Shalev, ‘The Social Democratic Model’, 320; Isabela Mares, The Politics of Social Risk: business and welfare 
state development (Cambridge 2003) 5. 
28 Paster, The role of business, 15; Swenson, Capitalists against markets, 6; Korpi, The democratic class struggle, 
18-19; Esping-Andersen, The three worlds, 22; Mares, The Politics of Social Risk, 5, 25. 
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1.4.1.1.1 Control over labour 
From this perspective, the move from firm-level negotiation to sectoral bargaining is portrayed 
as an extension of workers’ rights delivering them ‘industrial citizenship’ which recognises 
their role in the shaping of industrial relations and socio-economic policies.29 This process often 
coincides with the formal acknowledgement of trade unions.30 Both of these factors would 
reduce employers’ bargaining advantage and, therefore, their control over labour which 
explains why labour is presumed to propagate sectoral bargaining, while employers are 
assumed to play a solely negative role and oppose the change in this direction. Consequently, 
collective bargaining generally has a wider scope, coverage, deeper government involvement 
and is more centralised when labour unions and left parties have more power and employers’ 
associations have less. It follows that employers would also oppose the shift from sectoral 
negotiation to centralised collective bargaining as it would further harm their power position. 
1.4.1.1.2 Strategic accommodation 
In more recent years, the assumption that employers play a solely negative role in both steps of 
centralised bargaining creation has been revised by several PRA scholars. These authors argue 
that business is also capable of promoting the two steps of centralised bargaining creation due 
to accommodation strategies. The main argument of these authors is that, despite genuinely 
opposing the policy change, business can make the strategic decision to support (an extension 
of) collective bargaining to constrain more radical policy changes which is relevant for both 
sectoral and centralised bargaining establishment.31 Employers, for example, may propose a 
system of collective bargaining which is more moderate in terms of scope, centralisation or 
coverage to prevent the realisation of a further reaching bargaining system. The differentiation 
between strategic and genuine preferences is an essential part of this argument and has 
important methodological implications which are discussed in the methodology section of this 
introduction.32           
 In industrial relations theory, one of the most influential applications of strategic 
accommodation has been the argument of industrial peace. According to this argument, (the 
 
29 Korpi, The democratic class struggle, 8, 20; OECD, Employment outlook 1994 (Paris 1993) 169.  
30 Paster, The role of business, 78-79 
31 Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, ‘Business Power and Social Policy: Employers and the Formation of the 
American Welfare State’, Politics & Society 30:2 (2002) 277–325, there 299-300; Patrick Emmenegger and Paul 
Marx, ‘Employer Preferences and Social Policy: Business and the Development of Job Security Regulations in 
Germany since World War I’, IZA Discussion Thesis 5043 (2010) 3; Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens, 
Development and crisis of the welfare state: parties and policies in global markets (Chicago 2001) 33; Paster, The 
role of business, 2, 13, 78-79. 
32 Paster, The role of business, 17; Huber and Stephens, Development and crisis, 33. 
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threat of) labour unrest motivates employers to break radical opposition by incorporating 
workers in the decision-making process via a collective bargaining model in exchange for 
labour rest.33 In the case of sectoral bargaining, employers can grant trade unions formal 
recognition and employees industrial citizenship, while labour gives up (part of) its right to 
strike, for example on already established collective labour agreements, by adopting no-strike 
clauses. As the centralisation of bargaining and the likelihood of strikes are inversely related, 
industrial peace may also play a role in the shift from sectoral to centralised collective 
bargaining. In the light of strong labour opposition, being further removed from the negotiation 
process may be attractive to employers as it can decrease the perceived accountability of 
individual employers and limits unrest within the firm.34  
1.4.1.2 Business interests 
The labour-centred PRA approach triggered a response by authors who argued that it 
undervalued the pro-active importance of business in the creation of socio-economic regulation 
when it is in its economic interest, the business interest thesis (BI).35 Proponents of this 
perspective have postulated a wide variety of economic interests that can motivate employers 
to pro-actively support the shift from firm-level negotiation to sectoral bargaining and the move 
from sectoral bargaining to centralised collective bargaining.   
1.4.1.2.1 Wage effects 
The most apparent economic motivation behind employers’ attitudes towards collective 
bargaining in the literature has to do with the perceived wage effects that such a policy would 
entail. In this regard, Swenson’s study of the role of Swedish employers in the creation of 
solidaristic wage bargaining has been an important contribution. He found that a part of 
 
33 OECD, Employment outlook 1994, 169; Franz Traxler, ‘Collective Bargaining in the OECD: Developments, 
Preconditions and Effects’, European Journal of Industrial Relations 4:2 (1998) 207–226, there 208. 
34 Torgeir Aarvaag Stokke and Christer Thornqvist, ‘Strikes and Collective Bargaining in the Nordic Countries’, 
European Journal of Industrial Relations 7:3 (2001) 245–267, there 245, 252; Anke Hassel and Britta Rehder, 
‘Institutional change in the German wage bargaining system: the role of big companies’, MPIfG Working Paper 9 
(2001) 4-5. 
35 Korpi, ‘Power Resources’, 168-169, Swenson, Capitalists against markets, 21-22, 120; Paster, The role of 
business, 7, 9; Isabela Mares, ‘The Sources of Business Interest in Social Insurance: Sectoral versus National 
Differences’, World Politics 55:2 (2003) 229–258, there 249; Susan Pedersen, Family, dependence, and the origins 
of the welfare state Britain and France, 1914-1945 (Cambridge 1993) 226; Mares, The Politics of Social Risk, 23, 
250; Theda Skocpol and Gilford J. Ikenberry, ‘The Road to Social Security’, in: Theda Skocpol ed., Social policy 
in the United States: future possibilities in historical perspective. Princeton studies in American politics (Princeton 
1995) 157-158; Monika Breger, ‘Der Anteil der deutschen Großindustriellen an der Konzeptualisierung der 
Bismarckschen Sozialgesetzgebung’, in: Lothar Machtan ed., Bismarcks Sozialstaat: Beiträge zur Geschichte der 
Sozialpolitik und zur sozialpolitischen Geschichtsschreibung (Frankfurt am Main 1994) 25–60, there 25; Colin 
Gordon, ‘New Deal, Old Deck: Business and the Origins of Social Security, 1920-1935’, Politics & Society 19:2 
(1991) 165–207, there 168. 
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Swedish employers played a pro-active role in the establishment of solidaristic wage bargaining 
as it aligned with their economic interests. The companies in the export sector of the countries 
formed a cross-class alliance with labour to introduce a centralised wage bargaining system and 
prevent employers in other sectors from attracting workers with higher wages.36   
 This case is also used as evidence of the argument that employers are no monolithic 
group. In this view, business is made up of groups with diverging incentives and policy 
positions. In the example of the creation of solidaristic wage bargaining in Sweden, the export-
sector had an interest in low wages to remain internationally competitive and the removal of 
the possibility of wage differentiation that would allow other firms to attract high-skilled 
workers with higher wages.37  The sector that produced for the domestic market, however, was 
less concerned about wage levels and had no interest in restricting the flexibility of wage 
differentiation. The consequence of the finding is that the creation of collective bargaining can 
no longer be viewed as a simple struggle between labour and capital. Rather these authors 
portray it as a complex process in which employers in a certain sector build a ‘cross-class 
alliance’ with employees to establish a certain type of labour market regulation.38 This argument 
has the methodological implication that the analysis should address the possibility of internal 
variation of employers’ preferences and its correspondence with diverging economic interests.
 Swenson’s finding that links centralised bargaining with wage moderation is in line with 
economic theory, although the causal mechanism behind the relationship is disputed. The 
cartelisation argument focuses on the role of employers in industrial relations by stating that 
the centralisation of bargaining, either from firm-level to sectoral negotiations or from sectoral 
to centralised collective bargaining, leads to lower wages as it reduces the competition among 
employers in attracting their workforce.39 Furthermore, collective bargaining may be a way to 
keep newcomers out of the market while not necessarily being beneficial to the employer 
community as a whole. Following this line of reasoning, both steps are in the economic interest 
of employers. More influential in current days, though, is the theory that postulates that the 
relationship between bargaining level and wages is hump-shaped as illustrated in figure 1 which 
is extracted from the book The economics of imperfect labor markets of the economists Tito 
Boeri and Jan C. van Ours.               
 
36 Peter A. Swenson, ‘Bringing Capital Back In’, 517, 543-544. 
37 Swenson, Capitalists against markets, 77, 131-133. 
38 Swenson, Capitalists against markets, 22; Paster, The role of business, 9-10; Peter A. Swenson, ‘Bringing 
Capital Back In’, 514, 517. 
39 Traxler, ‘Collective Bargaining in the OECD’, 208; Sociaal-Economische Raad, Welvaartsgroei door en voor 
iedereen: Themadocument Arbeidsverhoudingen (Den Haag 2006) 7. 
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According to this perspective, two effects play a role at the same time which explains the 
complex relationship. In the figure, line I represents the effect that is established by the 
internalisation of negative bargaining externalities. The economic logic behind this influence is 
that unions turn out to be more aware of the macroeconomic impact of their bargaining terms 
as the bargaining level becomes more centralised, especially in terms of the impact on inflation 
and unemployment.40 Line II combines the influence of the internationalisation of negative 
externalities with the second effect of the additional bargaining power that trade unions retrieve 
from centralisation. In the move from firm-level negotiation to sectoral bargaining, the 
bargaining power effect outweighs the impact of the internalisation of externalities leading to 
higher wages and unemployment.41 As this system becomes more centralised, however, the 
relative importance of both effects turns around creating wage moderation and lower 
unemployment. The result is the hump-shaped curve. Furthermore, line III of the figure shows 
that the effect of the centralisation of bargaining on wage outcomes is more moderate in both 
phases when the process is taking place in markets under the pressure of product market 
competition.42 
Figure 1 Relationship between bargaining level and wage outcomes43 
  
On the one hand, this economic approach supports Swenson’s theory that the shift from sectoral 
negotiation to centralised bargaining is beneficial to employers as it leads to wage moderation. 
On the other hand, it implicates that the move from firm-level bargaining to sectoral bargaining 
 
40 Lars Calmfors and John Driffill, ‘Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance’, 
Economic Policy 3:6 (1988) 14–61, there 15, 35; Tito Boeri and Jan C. van Ours, The economics of imperfect labor 
markets (second edition; Princeton 2013) 84. 
41 Boeri and Van Ours, The economics of imperfect labor markets, 84; Calmfors and John Driffill, ‘Bargaining 
Structure’, 35-36. 
42 Ibidem. 
43 Boeri and Van Ours, The economics of imperfect labor markets, 84. 
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is not in the interest of employers as it causes higher wages and may be well a reason for 
opposition. As the economic theory is ambiguous about the wage effects of the shift from firm-
level negotiation to sectoral bargaining, both the option of wage rises and decreases should be 
taken into account as a motivational factor for employers to support or oppose this policy step. 
1.4.1.2.2 Specific-skills investments 
Proponents of the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach argue that changing an industrial 
relations system of firm-level negotiation into one of sectoral bargaining can also be in the 
employers’ economic interest as a stimulator of specific-skills investments.44    
 To explain the argument, it is necessary to take a small step back to the fundamentals of 
the approach. The main proposition of the VoC perspective is that there are two types of national 
political economies: Liberal market economies and coordinated market economies. While 
Liberal market economies are characterised by coordination via the market and the need for 
general skills, specific skills and coordination via non-market relationships and networks are 
typical of coordinated market economies.45 Within this view, labour market policy is closely 
linked to specific-skills investments and therefore more apparent in coordinated market 
economies as spending time and money on increasing skills that are specific to a certain job and 
not easily transferrable, raises the risk of losing employment and income for workers.46 Within 
the approach, collective bargaining is portrayed as a system of labour coordination that 
compensates workers for their risks and stimulates them to conduct the asset-specific 
investments that the economic model requires.47      
 Initially, the VoC literature aimed to explain current support of employers for collective 
bargaining systems without the ambition to make significant, functionalist claims about their 
creation process, but as the perspective became widely used, explanations of the school for 
states of socio-economic stability were also presented as its historical cause.48  In 2007, for 
 
44 Estévez-Abe, Soskice and Iversen, ‘Social Protection’, 145; Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice, ‘Introduction’, 
in: Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice ed., Varieties of Capitalism: the institutional foundations of comparative 
advantage (Oxford 2001) 1–68, there 8; Korpi, ‘Power Resources’, 169-170; Torben Iversen, Capitalism, 
democracy, and welfare. Cambridge studies in comparative politics (Cambridge 2006) 10-11.  
45 Hall and Soskice, ‘Introduction’, 8, 50-51; Peter A. Hall, and Kathleen Thelen, ‘Institutional change in varieties 
of capitalism’, Socio-economic Review 7:1 (2009) 7–34, there 1; Kathleen Thelen, ‘Beyond Comparative Statics: 
Historical Institutional Approaches to Stability and Change In the Political Economy of Labor’, in: Glenn Morgan 
e.a. ed., The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Institutional Analysis (Oxford 2010) 42-62, there 46. 
46 Estévez-Abe, Soskice and Iversen, ‘Social Protection’, 150-151; Paster, The role of business, 12; Hall and 
Soskice, ‘Introduction’, 50-51; Iversen, Capitalism, democracy, and welfare, 10-11; Korpi, ‘Power Resources’, 
169-170; Thelen, ‘Beyond Comparative Statics’, 47. 
47 Estévez-Abe, Soskice and Iversen, ‘Social Protection’, 153-154; Iversen, Capitalism, democracy, and welfare, 
19. 
48 Paster, The role of business, 11-12; Hall and Thelen, ‘Institutional change’, 2. 
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instance, Thomas R. Cusack, Torben Iversen and David Soskice argued that the varieties of 
capitalism and logic of skills investments heavily influenced the establishment of electoral 
systems within countries.49 Currently, the usage of the VoC approach to explaining the creation 
process of institutions is still highly controversial, which means that its application to the 
establishment of collective bargaining systems should be addressed with great carefulness in 
the analysis.  
1.4.1.2.3 Other economic interests 
Additionally, there are some other suggestions in the literature on how the introduction of 
collective bargaining is related to the economic interest of employers.    
 The first element that is mentioned concerns wage differentiation which also constituted 
an important part of Swenson’s theory on the creation of centralised bargaining in Sweden. In 
the Swedish example, export-oriented employers supported centralised bargaining to moderate 
wages while preventing domestic-oriented businesses from attracting high-skilled workers with 
higher wages by restricting wage differentiation.50 The introduction of the bargaining structure 
harmed the position of domestic employers who depended on wage differentiation to attract 
certain workers. Wage differentiation was, therefore, a motivation for this group to oppose 
collective bargaining. Just as this dynamic can play a role between sectors in the shift from 
sectoral negotiation to centralised collective bargaining as is shown by Swenson’s example, it 
is also relevant for the competition between firms for workers during the move from firm-level 
negotiation to sectoral bargaining.        
 The second motivational factor consists of concerns about the flexibility of the labour 
market after the introduction of sectoral bargaining and centralised bargaining.51 The severity 
of this issue depends on the scope of labour conditions under collective bargaining system, but 
it is clear that collective bargaining generally makes it more difficult for firms to adapt to 
changing circumstances in the market, e.g. limiting labour costs in difficult economic times.52 
Another concern for some employers is market inflexibility in the sense of barriers to entry. 53  
Adherents to this position, argue that collective bargaining can make it difficult for new players 
to enter the market. Dispensation rules can be used to accommodate these concerns.                 
 
49 Thomas R. Cusack, Torben Iversen and David Soskice, ‘Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral 
Systems’, American Political Science Review 101:3 (2007) 373–391, there 374. 
50 Swenson, Capitalists against markets, 77, 131-133. 
51 Hassel and Rehder, ‘Institutional change in the German wage bargaining system’, 5-6. 
52 OECD, Employment outlook 1994, 169. 
53 Sociaal-Economische Raad, Welvaartsgroei door en voor iedereen: Themadocument Arbeidsverhoudingen (Den 
Haag 2006) 77. 
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Finally, the third argument in the academic debate is that centralisation of the bargaining level 
reduces the transaction costs of employers that are related to the regulation of the employment 
conditions of their labour force.54 These administrative efficiency benefits are most clearly in 
the shift from firm-level to sectoral bargaining but may play a role in the centralisation step as 
well. 
1.4.1.3 Ideational commitment 
A commonality of the PRA and BI approach is that they both assume that business consists of 
rational decision-makers in the narrow sense.55 Employers are portrayed as self-interested 
actors that pursue the strategic optimisation of their own rational goals to increase their 
economic and political position. Such arguments are remarkable in comparison to the wider 
field of rational choice theory which generally assumes that individuals are instrumentally 
rational.56 Followers of this interpretation of rationality state that actors use their means in the 
most effective possible way to optimise the fulfilment of their preferences. These goals 
themselves are not necessarily rational, though.      
 The consequence of the narrow focus of the current debate on the support of employers 
for collective bargaining is that it misses preferences that are non-rational. Employers may also 
adhere to ideas that are not (directly) aimed at increasing or consolidating their economic and 
political position. In other words, they may have an ideational commitment, meaning that they 
‘promote norms or ideas because they believe in the ideals and values that embodied in the 
norms, even though the pursuit of the norms may have no effect on their well-being’.57 By 
pursuing these ideational preferences, employers may still behave rationally in the instrumental 
sense, optimising the fulfilment of their non-rational goals.  
 
54 Traxler, ‘Collective Bargaining in the OECD’, 208. 
55 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Analyzing politics: rationality, behavior, and institutions. The new institutionalism in 
American politics series (second edition; New York, NY 2010) 14, 17; Andrew Hindmoor, Rational choice. 
Political analysis (second edition; London 2015) 1. 
56 Hindmoor, Rational choice, 2; Shepsle, Analyzing politics, 15, 17; ‘Old Questions and New Answers about 
Institutions. The Riker Objection Revisited’, The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy (2008) 1031–1049, there 
1034; Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, Political 
Studies 44:5 (1996) 936–957, there 944-945; Vivien A. Schmidt, ‘Taking ideas and discourse seriously: explaining 
change through discursive institutionalism as the fourth “new institutionalism”’, European Political Science 
Review 2:1 (2010) 1–25, there 5. 
57 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International 
Organization 52:4 (1998) 887–917, there 887-888, 898. 
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1.4.1.3.1 Solidarity and subsidiarity  
In the literature on welfare state development and industrial relations, the Christian democracy 
with its cross-class structure constitutes an eminent example of the importance of such 
dedication. The ideology of the parties and organisations that are part of Christian democracy 
is primarily based on a set of religiously inspired principles that are largely founded on social 
Catholicism.58 Concerning socio-economic policies, the tension between solidarity and 
subsidiarity constitutes the core of the doctrine. Solidarity in Christian democratic thought is 
defined as a concern about other social groups.59 Where the Catholic social part of Christian 
democracy is more influential, these other groups are defined as those sets of people that are 
less well off.  Policies that are motivated by concerns solidarity tend to lead to a more collective 
approach with more state intervention. The Christian democratic principle of subsidiarity, 
however, points to quite the opposite, namely that government intervention should only take 
place when ‘lower social organs’ are unable to conduct the activities.60 Such an approach tends 
to lead to policy options that place responsibility closer to the individual. These contradictory 
principles and the cross-class nature of Christian democracy meant that organisations that 
adhered to this ideology always had to take positions that were the result of compromise, which 
the political scientist Kees van Kersbergen has called ‘the politics of mediation’.61  
 Considering the political nature of these institutions, supporting sectoral bargaining is 
attractive as it is the industrial relations system that constitutes the middle ground in the tension 
between solidarity and subsidiarity. Under firm-level bargaining, there is a relative lack of 
solidarity between workers, while a system of centralised collective bargaining, as opposed to 
sectoral negotiations, conflicts with the principle of subsidiarity. These conflicting ideological 
elements put Christian democracy in the centre of the left-right spectrum on socio-economic 
 
58 Kees van Kersbergen, ‘Contemporary Christian Democracy and the Demise of the Politics of Mediation’, in: 
Herbert P. Kitschelt e.a. ed., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (Cambridge 1999) 346–370, 
there 352; Philip Manow and Kees van Kersbergen, ‘Religion and the Western Welfare State – The Theoretical 
Context’, in: Philip Manow and Kees van Kersbergen ed., Religion, Class Coalitions, and Welfare States 
(Cambridge 2009) 1–38, there 13-14. 
59 Van Kersbergen, ‘Contemporary Christian Democracy’, 352-353; G. J. M. van Wissen, De christen-
democratische visie op de rol van de staat in het sociaal-economische leven (Amsterdam 1982) 11; Manow and 
Van Kersbergen, ‘Religion and the Western Welfare State’, 14; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het 
loonvormingsrecht, 67-8; Wilhelmus J.P.M Fase, Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid in Nederland: terugblik en 
perspectief (Alphen aan den Rijn 1980) 121.  
60 Van Kersbergen, ‘Contemporary Christian Democracy’, 353, 356; Van Wissen, De christen-democratische 
visie, 39; Lawrence R. Cima and Thomas L. Schubeck, ‘Self-Interest, Love, and Economic Justice: A Dialogue 
Between Classical Economic Liberalism and Catholic Social Teaching’, Journal of Business Ethics 30:3 (2001) 
213–231, there 224; Fase, Vijfendertig jaar loonbeleid, 121; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het 
loonvormingsrecht, 68. 
61 Manow and Van Kersbergen, ‘Religion and the Western Welfare State’, 13; Van Kersbergen, ‘Contemporary 
Christian Democracy’, 356. 
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policies which explains its importance for the establishment of political majorities in countries 
where these organisations had a significant size.62 
1.4.1.3.2 State involvement 
Interestingly, the role of Protestant parties and organisations concerning Christian democracy 
has been somewhat ambiguous. Often their policy positions coincided with the Catholics to 
form a Christian democratic block, but sometimes they also emphasised the importance of self-
regulation over solidarity and subsidiarity which placed them in between Catholic and 
economic Liberal positions.63 This notion of self-regulation in Protestant thinking points to 
another important ideational element behind the positions of employers towards collective 
bargaining: the attitudes of employers towards state involvement. In the PRA-approach, state 
involvement is presented as a power consideration as decommodification of workers leads to a 
worse power position for employers. Next to the opposition towards state involvement 
motivated by power, though, there is also an ideational aversion of state intervention and 
limitation of private initiative which is significant in Protestant thinking and even more eminent 
in economic Liberalism.64          
 Although there is a clear ideational aversion of state involvement in industrial relations 
in Protestant and economic Liberal ideologies, the link between preferences towards state 
involvement and positions concerning collective bargaining is not straightforward. As 
discussed in the conceptualisation section of this introduction, the bargaining level and role of 
the government are separate characteristics of industrial relations systems. Whether collective 
bargaining, either sectoral or centralised, is perceived as a limitation or extension of government 
involvement depends on the nature and context of the concrete proposal, which is also the 
reason that it is not included in the motivations in Table 1. By and large, the bargaining level 
and government involvement are positively related suggesting that Protestant and Liberal 
employers are generally expected to oppose the centralisation of bargaining. In the academic 
debate, the introduction of collective bargaining has also been shown to be used to avoid 
 
62 Manow and Van Kersbergen, ‘Religion and the Western Welfare State’, 22-23. 
63 Kees van Kersbergen, ‘Religion and the Welfare State in the Netherlands’, in: Philip Manow and Kees van 
Kersbergen ed., Religion, Class Coalitions, and Welfare States (Cambridge 2009) 119–145, there 131-132; Van 
Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 68. 
64 Van Kersbergen, ‘Religion and the Welfare State in the Netherlands’, 132, 138; Cima and Schubeck, ‘Self-
Interest, Love, and Economic Justice’, 224; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 65-6. 
 
21 
 
(further reaching) government intervention, though.65 Although the relationship is complex, it 
is important to take the factor of government involvement into account. 
1.4.2 The context of preference formation 
Even a rational choice model that allows for the possibility of pursuing non-rational goals has 
some problematic aspects that have been pointed out in the academic debate on the preference 
formation of actors, however. The main issue is that such theories focus on the agency of actors 
by looking at individual decision-making but ignore how the context shapes this process as is 
indicated by systems-based theories. To avoid such mistakes, the preference formation of 
employers towards collective bargaining should be analysed in its context by taking a more 
holistic approach. Roughly categorised, the most relevant contextual factors for the positions 
of business towards collective bargaining are knowledge, the political environment and 
historical regularities. 
1.4.2.1 Knowledge 
Knowledge plays a major role in two ways.      
 Firstly, the available information for employers at the time influences their preferences 
as it shapes the range of policy alternatives and their effects. This factor is particularly important 
when considering functionalist arguments, e.g. those that are part of the VoC literature, that 
presume full availability of information. In his article on the ‘limits of design’, the political 
scientist Paul Pierson criticised such functionalist arguments for explaining things by their 
(intended) consequences rather than by their causes.66 According to Pierson, such an approach 
is problematic since policymakers do not always act based on long term effects as they do not 
have the required information.  Functionalist thinkers assume a full or sufficient availability of 
information concerning policy effects, but, in practice, information is often scarce which leads 
to unanticipated results of policy decisions.67 This limitation makes it problematic to think that 
actors act according to their interests of years or decades ahead and that the function once 
established, therefore, is also the reason why a certain institution such as collective bargaining 
 
65 Calmfors and Driffill, ‘Bargaining Structure’, 25; Sociaal-Economische Raad, Themadocument 
Arbeidsverhoudingen, 74. 
66 Paul Pierson, ‘The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change’, Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy and Administration 13:4 (2000) 475–499, there 475, 478. 
67 Pierson, ‘The Limits of Design’, 483; Theda Skocpol and Paul Pierson, ‘Historical Institutionalism in 
Contemporary Political Science’, in: Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner ed., Political Science: State of the 
Discipline (New York 2002) 693–721, there 709.  
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emerged.68           
 Also, the policy alternatives that are part of employers’ preferences are not a given and 
have to be generated which is not an evident process. Individuals have to come up with ideas 
and have to present them in such a way that they are attractive to the business’ representatives, 
e.g. by linking them to some principles of employers’ associations.69 As indicated by the 
previous section, they can do so either by showing how collective bargaining is beneficial to 
the economic and political position of employers, e.g. causing wage moderation, or by showing 
that the system is an expression of certain ideals and values that correspond with the employers’ 
principles, such as solidarity and subsidiarity.        
 The second way in which knowledge plays a role is via the shared beliefs of the actors 
that are part of the policy process. The political scientist Pepper D. Culpepper has illustrated 
the importance of this point with the creation of wage bargaining systems in Ireland and Italy. 
He tries to explain how these labour market institutions were established, even though 
employers had the upper hand in industrial relations and structurally opposed it.70 According to 
Culpepper, this can be explained by a change in ‘common knowledge’ which is triggered by 
political events.71  The underlying argument is that a move of representatives of employers or 
employees towards a new shared understanding of the macroeconomic situation in a country 
and the consequential policy boundaries for industrial relations can shift the preferences of trade 
unions and employers’ associations, e.g. in terms of collective bargaining.   
 In Italy, for example, Culpepper finds that trade unions moved from an understanding 
of the economy that promoted wage bargaining based on automatic inflation adjustment to a 
model that implicated negotiations about (partial) compensation for the forecast inflation.72 As 
both parties now agreed that the old bargaining system based on automatic adjustment was not 
able to control inflation levels, the forecast inflation appeared to be the only realistic alternative 
norm to enable firm-level wage bargaining and was, therefore, eventually accepted by the trade 
unions as a second-best option. Under these circumstances, it was no longer viable for 
employers to oppose firm-level wage coordination as it became possible to establish a certain 
amount of wage restraint with negotiations about (partial) compensation for the forecast 
inflation instead of the old automatic adjustment system while maintaining industrial peace. 
 
68 Hall and Thelen, ‘Institutional change’, 14; Skocpol and Pierson, ‘Historical Institutionalism’, 708; Hall and 
Taylor, ‘Political Science’, 937, 942. 
69 Schmidt, ‘Taking ideas and discourse seriously’, 14-5. 
70 Pepper D. Culpepper, ‘The Politics of Common Knowledge: Ideas and Institutional Change in Wage 
Bargaining’, International Organization 62:1 (2008) 1–33, there 1-2. 
71 Culpepper, ‘The Politics of Common Knowledge’, 2. 
72 Idem, 25-26. 
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Therefore, the common knowledge shift by trade unions, accepting that automatic adjustment 
was unsustainable, also moved employers away from their first preference of no firm-level 
bargaining and led them to accept the system based on the inflation forecast.   
1.4.2.2 Political environment 
The political environment is another vital element of the context of employers’ preference 
formation. The balance of power determines which policy options are politically viable for 
employers at a given moment in time and therefore how their strategic preferences are 
structured as these positions change under different political challenges.73 When employers 
have relatively less power and face difficulty building coalitions, their strategic preferences 
tend to diverge from their genuine ones. As described in the section on power, the power-
resource approach emphasises the importance of this contextual element. Thomas Paster, for 
example, political scientist and proponent of the PRA perspective, has demonstrated how 
German employers changed their strategic preferences concerning collective bargaining due to 
the political challenges in the country after the First World War.74    
 Furthermore, the balance of power is partly determined by how business’ influence on 
the political process takes place. Here, academic scholarship makes a distinction between 
instrumental and structural power. Instrumental power is exercised by installing people who 
back the interests of employers in important governmental positions and by influencing 
politicians with donations and lobbying.75 Initially, research on business’ influence on politics 
emphasised the importance of the instrumental power of employers, but the dominance of this 
school of thought was eroded by several authors who argued that business mainly influences 
political decisions via structural power.  Charles E. Lindblom, political scientist and the most 
influential proponent of the structural power thesis, argued that the central role of business in a 
market system gives it a ‘privileged’ position in impacting political decision-making.76 Much 
like governmental administrators, employers play a public role in society by controlling a large 
share of the allocation of the factors of production. Business’ decisions concerning investments 
heavily impact economic growth, the living standard and wages which determine the resources 
of most citizens. As public policies may impact the choices of employers, politicians take this 
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‘prospective punishment’ into account in their decision-making.77 Both the instrumental and 
structural power approach have proven to be relevant in explaining business’ influence on 
policy-making, although the relative explanatory power differs between countries and over 
time.78  
1.4.2.3 Historical regularities 
Historical regularities also play an important role in the preference formation of employers 
towards collective bargaining. In the academic debate, path dependence is used as a core 
concept to illustrate the importance of this factor. In vague terms, the notion means that 
institutional development is affected by the fact that ‘the past affects the future’ by structuring 
the policy process over a long period via complex macro-historical regularities which can be 
created by people themselves.79 The precise conceptualisation of path dependence is widely 
debated, however. It is not necessary for this study to contribute to this debate as the previous 
research on collective bargaining has already shown that path dependence is the most relevant 
for this subject in two concrete ways.       
 Firstly, policy feedback loops are the most relevant expressions of path dependence for 
this study. These mechanisms shape the preferences of employers by shaping the alternative 
policy options that are available to them as well as their relative costs and benefits.80 In practice, 
employers calculate the benefit of certain policies in comparison with the current status quo 
rather than purely following their genuine preferences. In the case of collective bargaining, for 
example, it is easier to switch to a centralised bargaining system based on statutory extension 
from a sectoral one with the same foundation than to shift to a completely different system, 
such as solidaristic wage bargaining. Meanwhile, assuming the dynamics of the PRA approach, 
a move to sectoral bargaining also makes a shift to centralised bargaining more likely as it gives 
trade unions a better position of power which in turn increases their demands.81   
 Secondly, several authors have also argued in favour of the importance of macro-
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historical political and socio-economic structures, such as electoral systems or societal 
traditions, for employers’ preference formation.82 To illustrate, the political scientists Cathie J. 
Martin and Duane Swank have shown the importance of such historical regularities for 
business’ positions concerning the creation of collective bargaining systems.83 They argue that 
the political structure of a country has a large influence on the organisation of employers’ 
associations as the decision for a certain system of industrial relations is political. In a 
multiparty system, politicians would have more incentives to build coalitions and transfer 
power to a centralised collective bargaining process of labour unions and employers. At the 
same time, it is more attractive for employers to affect policies via centralised bargaining 
instead of party representation, as single political parties generally face difficulty to get 
majorities in multiparty systems. When the political system is centralised, the same tends to be 
the case for employers’ associations in their ability to influence politics.84 After that, Martin 
and Swank state that the organisation of employers itself has effects on their preferences and 
actions concerning collective bargaining.85 Centralised employers’ associations tend to be more 
cognitive of the benefits of a degree of policy coordination than their decentralised 
counterparts.86  
1.4.3 Contribution of this study 
The theoretical framework of this thesis shows that the support of employers for collective 
bargaining is still widely debated. Although there have been numerous studies propagating new 
causal mechanisms, the debate lacks a study that analyses the wide spectrum of proposed 
theories and tests for which causal mechanisms hold up under the scrutiny of a thorough 
empirical test. With this, the analysis also takes the importance of the ideational commitment 
of employers into account which has been negated in the current theoretical approaches on 
employers and their support for collective bargaining. The study fills this gap with a thorough 
within-case analysis. This method enables the study to follow a holistic approach in testing 
these theories that also looks at the most important contextual factors concerning the preference 
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formation of employers towards collective bargaining instead of solely focusing on the actors 
themselves.  
1.5 Operationalisation 
1.5.1 Research method 
By analysing how employers’ positions concerning collective bargaining came about, the study 
aims to contribute to the understanding of causal mechanisms behind the preferences of 
business towards the creation of centralised bargaining in the Netherlands. To get a deep 
retrospective understanding of the complex preference formation of employers and test the 
underlying causal mechanisms that are postulated by the approaches in the theoretical 
framework, a within-case analysis is the most appropriate research design.87 More than other 
research designs, a case study gives the possibility of testing a complex and diverse theoretical 
framework, such as the theoretical debate on the support of employers in the creation of 
collective bargaining systems, in a single analysis.88 By analysing the support of employers for 
centralised bargaining in its context, the case study enables a  comparison of both agency-based 
and systems-based theories, of regularities, norms and preferences, and, therefore an empirical 
test of the causal mechanisms behind the different theories of the related theoretical debates. At 
the same time, the relatively holistic approach reduces the risk of missing major explanatory 
factors while still allowing for comparison to a certain degree as this thesis analyses the 
relatively distinct cases of the creation of sectoral and modification towards centralised 
bargaining involving different contexts and policy dilemmas.     
 There are different methodological ways of conducting a case study on these instances, 
however. In their methodological work on case studies, the political scientists Joachim Blatter 
and Markus Haverland distinguish three explanatory case study designs: co-variational 
analysis, causal-process tracing and congruence analysis. The general overview of these 
approaches is presented in Table 2 which is a combination of the table in the methodological 
book of Blatter and Haverland and the modified version of Emmenegger in his academic work 
on job security regulation.89          
 Firstly, the co-variational analysis looks across cases to study the causal effect of a 
single independent variable.90 Secondly, the causal-process tracing design is much more 
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concerned with the dependent variable. The analysis focuses on a single case and studies what 
causal mechanisms can account for the outcome.91 Thirdly, the congruence analysis critically 
assesses theoretical debates to evaluate the relative explanatory power of the different 
perspectives. This method can be conducted with both within-case and cross-case analysis.   
Table 2 Three types of within-case designs92 
 Co-variational design Causal-process tracing 
design 
Congruence analysis design 
    
Research goal Does variable X make a 
difference? 
What makes the outcome 
(Y) possible? 
Which explanatory 
approach provides more 
insights? 
Focus  Independent variables Causal mechanisms Comprehensive theories 
Variation Cross-case variation Within-case variation Both cross-case and within-
case variations 
Case selection Variation on the 
independent variable and 
scope conditions (controlled 
comparison) 
Theoretical relevance of 
cases with regard to 
outcome 
Likeliness of cases in 
respect to the selected 
theories (most likely cases) 
Observations Information corresponding 
to the indicators specified 
for the variables 
– Information on the 
temporal unfolding of the 
causal process; 
– information on spatial–
temporal distance and 
proximity between 
causes and consequences; 
– information on 
perceptions and motivations 
of important actors 
Information corresponding 
to the expectations 
(propositions, hypotheses, 
predictions) deduced from 
theories 
Generalisation Drawing conclusions about 
the causal effect of X on Y 
from sample to population 
Drawing conclusions about 
the set of proven causal 
mechanisms 
Drawing conclusions about 
the relevance of theories in 
the scientific discourse 
Conclusions X has a causal effect on Y Identification of causal 
mechanisms that are 
necessary and together 
sufficient for the 
outcome 
– Relative importance of 
selected theories 
– Comprehensive 
explanation through a 
combination of theories 
The research design decision of this thesis is based on current academic progress and feasibility 
concerns. The theoretical framework and historiography of this study showed the existence of 
two gaps in the current academic field.        
 In the first place, the literature review showed that the academic debate misses a study 
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that the relative importance of the current theories by studying if their causal mechanisms hold 
up under the scrutiny of a thorough within-case analysis. A thorough, congruence analysis is 
the most effective way to fill this gap. Secondly, the historiography of the creation of centralised 
bargaining in the Netherlands lacks an analysis that provides a systematic, thorough analysis of 
the positions of employers in the process. A congruence analysis alone is not enough to 
significantly contribute to this debate. This study, therefore, also conducts a causal-process 
tracing design that analyses the factor of employers in the causal mechanisms that underlie their 
preferences concerning the creation of centralised bargaining. The combination of these 
approaches is both effective and efficient, maximising internal validity and contributions to the 
academic field, given the available resources of the research project. Firstly, the causal 
mechanisms behind the preference formation of employers concerning centralised bargaining 
are reconstructed using an inductive process-tracing approach which is relatively context-
sensitive.93 Secondly, these causal mechanisms are compared to the theoretical framework 
using a deductive approach to analyse to what extent these correspond with the mechanisms of 
the different theories, measuring their relative explanatory power.    
 The co-variation design is less suitable than the other approaches in the light of the gaps 
that were indicated by the historiography and complex theoretical framework as it focuses on 
the autonomous effect of a single independent variable.94 Since it is not feasible to add the 
approach on top of the other designs given the resources of this thesis, this study makes no use 
of this research design. Although the thorough within-case nature of the analysis is the most 
valid way to uncover the underlying mechanisms of the preference formation of employers 
concerning the establishment of centralised bargaining in the Netherlands and contribute to the 
theoretical debate about business support for collective bargaining systems, the methodological 
decisions to focus on a single country unavoidably limit the external validity of the study’s 
results.95 By analysing the causal mechanisms behind the theoretical framework, the thesis 
contributes to a debate that consists of more general claims, however.  
 Furthermore, the choice for process-tracing and congruence analysis also implicates a 
certain way of data analysis, as is shown in Table 2. Case studies are characterised by a focus 
of effort on the generation of data due to the complexity of the empirical phase.96  In the case 
of congruence analysis, the focus is on information that is related to the expectations that are 
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implicated by the different theories in the overarching framework. After that, the observations 
can be compared to the implications of the theories to analyse their relative explanatory power. 
The observations that process-tracing requires are quite different. The analysis focuses on 
information about the development of the relevant causal mechanisms behind the preference 
formation of employers in relation to the case of the creation of the centralised bargaining 
system in The Netherlands.97 
1.5.2 Problem of revealed preferences 
This operation is one of the major methodological challenges of the study because of the 
‘revealed preferences problem’.98 Since this thesis analyses the positions of employers towards 
centralised bargaining, it has to identify their genuine preferences. Directly observing these is 
problematic as employers may choose to formulate their policy preferences strategically in 
anticipation of certain reactions, for example, by propagating moderate reforms to prevent more 
radical ones.99 The study, therefore, must distinguish between genuine and strategic 
preferences.           
 Here, the method of causal-process tracing comes in. This analysis traces back the 
positions of business in the whole period of the creation process of centralised bargaining in the 
Netherlands. Analysing agenda-setting, initial viewpoints and the diachronic variation of 
preferences in the light of changing strategic environments, both sudden and structural, gives 
the ability to reconstruct the genuine and strategic preferences as near as possible.100 Consistent 
changes in positions show a genuine shift, while sudden swifts during the policy-making 
process point to strategic preferences. Analysing such diachronic variation requires a relatively 
long timeframe, though, which should be considered in the case selection.101  
 After that, the next step is to establish the causal mechanisms between these preferences 
and outcomes.102 This study analyses (the causal mechanisms behind) the genuine and strategic 
preferences towards the creation of centralised bargaining by studying the debates and voting 
behaviour of employers in the overarching consultative institutions (1), the discussions between 
the employers’ associations themselves (2) and the minutes and publications of the employers’ 
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associations, both internal and external (3). Although it is never possible to reconstruct 
preferences with absolute certainty, the holistic process-tracing strategy consisting of minutes 
of meetings, publications and the hard data of voting behaviour is the best available method to 
approach this level of certainty and make reasonable claims.103 
1.5.4 Sources 
As Table 2 shows, causal-process tracing requires a case that is accessible over a long period 
and theoretically relevant to the dependent variable.104 Furthermore, the congruence analysis 
design needs a case which is likely to be relevant to the theoretical debate. The theoretical 
relevance of the creation of centralised bargaining regime in the Netherlands was already 
discussed in the introduction. From the perspective of sources, the case of the Netherlands is 
also an ideal case to test the theoretical debate, however, as the archives of the relevant 
employers’ associations and consultative institutions are available over a long period of time, 
relatively complete and easily accessible. This empirical material includes minutes, 
publications, correspondence and information about voting behaviour. These sources enable the 
structural comparison of internal and external discussions within and between employers’ 
associations with the relatively hard data of voting behaviour to reconstruct genuine and 
strategic preferences. The result is a methodological contribution to the academic field as the 
study investigates new primary sources with its thorough approach and analyses earlier studied 
sources from a new theoretical and methodological perspective. In this way, this thesis adds 
new empirical data and analysis to the historiographical and theoretical debates.   
 For this study, the employer community is operationalised as the main peak employers’ 
associations as they are the main representatives of business in socio-economic discussions, 
decision-making and the execution of the collective bargaining process within the Dutch 
case.105 The main peak employers’ associations in the Netherlands in the timeframe of this study 
are presented in Figure 2 which is based upon the scheme of Bruggeman and Camijn and 
extracted from Touwen’s book Coordination in transition. The years in the figure show when 
the associations were founded, whereas the arrows give a picture of organisational development 
of the institutions. The limitation of the business community to these most important employers’ 
associations is necessary to keep the research project feasible but necessarily impedes on the 
external validity of the research findings to the broader group. The extensive analysis of the 
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positions of the (members of) main peak employers’ associations concerning the two collective 
bargaining steps through a study of literature, academic articles and the archival files of all of 
these peak employers’ associations as well as the consultative institutions of which they were 
part during the temporal framework of the thesis reduces the influence of limitation as far as 
possible, however, as it allows the comparison of these business organisations with the wider 
community of employers.          
 The relevant consultative institutions in the study period are the Supreme Council of 
Labour (Hoge Raad van Arbeid), the Board of Directors for Labour Affairs (Raad van Bestuur 
in overleg arbeidszaken), the Labour Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid), the Contact 
Commission (Contactcommissie) and the Social and Economic Council (Sociaal-Economische 
Raad). The most important sources are the archival files of the associations themselves, though.  
Figure 2 Main peak employers’ associations in the first half of the twentieth century106 
 
Despite the completeness, organisation and accessibility of the sources, some limitations in the 
empirical material have come to the fore during the research process. Of these shortcomings, 
there are four instances of major importance. Firstly, there are no minutes for several meetings 
of the Supreme Council of Labour for the first case on statutory extension. Particularly relevant 
for this study, the minutes of an important meeting of the council on 17 March 1923 are missing. 
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This event is, therefore, reconstructed with the use of secondary sources. Secondly, some of the 
relevant peak employers’ associations had only recently been founded when the discussion on 
statutory extension started. The documentation for the initial positions regarding statutory 
extension of some of these associations, particularly of the Protestant employers, is, therefore, 
less extensive and sometimes based on correspondence with or discussion by one or more of 
the other business institutions. Due to the comprehensive nature of this research project, the 
impact of these limitations is relatively small, though, as there was enough material left to 
retrieve the positions of the different peak employers’ associations as well as the most relevant 
lower-level business organisations structured along sectoral, socio-cultural and geographical 
lines.            
 Thirdly, there is comparatively little empirical material in the archive of the Roman 
Catholic Confederation of Employers’ Associations for both cases. As the archive of the 
General Catholic Employers Association which had a very influential role in the Confederation 
is relatively extensive, including a well-preserved common external publication of these two 
organisations, it is still possible to reconstruct the stances of the Confederation, however, albeit 
with a bit less insights in the underlying, internal dynamics that led to these viewpoints. 
Fourthly, there is relatively little empirical material available on the viewpoints of the wider 
employer community concerning the initial, relatively sudden creation of the centralised 
bargaining system at the start of the second case through the introduciton of the BBA. By 
combining a direct analysis of the limited sources on these stances during the establishment of 
the model with a indirect investigation of the much more well-documented attitudes regarding 
the system in the period after its creation, this thesis still aims to reconstruct the business 
positions on the initial creation of the Dutch centralised bargaining system with as much detail 
as possible.  
1.5.5 Contribution of this study 
This study uses a comprehensive research method that combines a causal-process tracing and 
congruence analysis design to analyse new empirical data and already used sources from a new 
methodological and theoretical approach. In contrast with the dominant methods in the current 
academic field, the study focuses on an in-depth study of a single country to enable a more 
thorough reconstruction of the causal mechanisms behind the preference formation of 
employers concerning the creation of centralised bargaining in the Netherlands and to test the 
related theories on the support of business for the creation of collective bargaining systems.  
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The thesis now proceeds with the separate, subsequent analysis of both steps in the creation of 
centralised bargaining. 
2. Statutory extension (1918-1937) 
The first empirical chapter analyses the debate among business’ representatives on the 
establishment of sectoral bargaining through statutory extension. Although the creation of such 
a mechanism became relevant through the issues caused by the Law on the labour agreement 
in 1907 which legally embedded collective labour agreements without a clear, comprehensive 
framework,107 the societal discussion really took off after the First World War.108 During the 
conflict, Catholic employers had pro-actively promoted the statutory extension mechanism. In 
1916, L.G. Kortenhorst, Secretary of the newly created Roman Catholic peak employers’ 
association (ARKWV), openly argued in favour of statutory extension which led to an official 
advice from the ARKWV to the main Roman Catholic political party with the same message 
one year later.109 The issue only became of major importance in the wider employer community, 
however, when the government announced in the yearly Troonrede that it wanted to regulate 
collective labour agreements more thoroughly and considered to create a mechanism of 
statutory extension as part of this effort.110 This chapter provides an elaborate analysis of the 
business side of this discussion but first proceeds with a brief evaluation of the relevant 
institutional, political and socio-economic developments in the period up to this government 
statement.    
2.1 The new landscape of industrial relations 
One of the major drivers of the statutory extension debate was the increasing role of collective 
interest groups in industrial relations and expansion of labour regulation before the First World 
War. In these years, the increasingly organised nature of labour, extension of social policy and 
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attempts to structure industrial relations triggered a response of business mobilisation.111 
 The creation of the Chambers of Labour (Kamers van Arbeid) 1897 to solve local labour 
disputes with collective representatives which consisted of and were elected by employers and 
employees was one important early initiative .112 Although these institutions were not at all as 
influential in industrial relations as the name might suggest, they were a relevant experiment of 
functional representation where workers were incorporated. In consecutive years, the 
organisation of capital and labour expanded. Initiated by businesses in Twente, the first peak 
employer association was created in 1899 which had a Liberal orientation: the Association of 
Dutch Employers (Vereeniging van Nederlandsche Werkgevers; VNW).113 Initially, the Dutch 
employers’ associations were primarily active in the opposition against the continuously rising 
labour organisation. In 1906, the Socialist trade unions merged to create a large Socialist trade 
union (NVV) and the Roman Catholic trade unions followed with a merger to a peak 
organisation in 1909 as well.114        
 As mentioned earlier, the Law on the labour agreement (Wet op de 
arbeidsovereenkomst) in 1907 created an important but rough legal foundation for collective 
labour agreements and limited the discretionary space for employers to shape labour 
conditions.115 Under this law, there was no clear framework for the rights and duties of the 
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parties under the collective labour agreement and the creation, enforcement and external 
validity of these contracts.116  Still,  the reform was typical of a wider policy agenda to increase 
workers’ rights after the change of the millennium, e.g. with the introduction of insurance 
against accidents in the workplace.117 Interest groups of workers and employers were part of 
the execution of health care provisions, but their role remained relatively limited whereas many 
business’ representatives were unwilling to recognise trade unions formally.118 An important 
cause of the limited role of collective representatives of workers and employers was the fact 
that employers were relatively unorganised before the First World War.119   
 This changed during the course of the war, however, as new peak employers’ 
associations were established.120 The pillarised landscape of social, economic and political life 
along ideological lines between 1917 and 1968 also applied to interest groups which explains 
the existence of a separate Protestant Association of Christian Employers and Wholesalers 
(Vereeniging van Christelijke Werkgevers en Groothandelaren; VCWG) created in 1918 and 
General Roman Catholic Employers Association (Algemeene Roomsch Katholieke 
Werkgeversvereeniging; ARKWV) established in 1915, quickly complemented by the 
federative Roman Catholic Confederation of Employer Associations (Roomsch Katholiek 
Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen; RKVW) in 1919 in addition to the associations of 
Liberal employers.121 The ARKWV was a major part of this federation which often represented 
the Roman Catholics pillar concerning the negotiations surrounding collective labour 
agreements.122           
 In the same period, the Liberal representation of employers expanded with two 
additional peak employers’ organisations although part of the members overlapped with the 
VNW. The Confederation of Dutch Manufacturers (Verbond van Nederlandsche Fabrikanten 
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Vereenigingen; VNF) was founded in 1917 and the Central Industrial Confederation (Centraal 
Industrieel Verbond; CIO) in 1920.123 More importantly, these three Liberal peak employer 
organisations established a common Liberal consultative institution in 1920 which was called 
the Central Consultative Platform in Labor Affairs for Employer Organisations (Centraal 
Overleg in Arbeidszaken voor Werkgeversbonden; COAW) and merged into one overarching 
institution in 1926, the Confederation of Dutch Employers (Verbond van Nederlandsche 
Werkgevers, which used the same abbreviation (VNW) as the first employer association.124 
Figure 3 gives an overview of these organisational changes.  
Figure 3 Main peak employers’ associations between 1907 and 1937125 
 
The establishment of the COAW was an expression of the distinction between ‘social’ and 
‘economic’ affairs that became increasingly popular with Liberal employers. As a response to 
the rise of the organisation of labour, these business’ representatives argued that labour’s 
involvement in the determination of wages and labour conditions, which they labelled as social, 
was legitimate while they should not be involved in economic affairs such as taxes and trade 
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policy.126 Following this separation of issues, the COAW was created for discussions about 
social topics while the VNW would focus on economic affairs.127 The leadership of the VNW 
played a major role in the COAW as well, though.      
 In the newly created landscape of employers’ associations, the organisation of business 
was now clearly divided along different ideological lines. In terms of size, Liberal employers 
were by far the largest force, followed by the now relatively well-organised and cohesive 
Catholic business’ representatives, and the still relatively small and unorganised Protestant 
structure of employers’ associations.128  Despite the ideational differences, there was generally 
more of a consensus between employers’ associations than between the similarly separated 
labour unions.129 The smaller confessional employers’ associations tended to follow their major 
Liberal counterparts, especially when opposition to labour was concerned. The fact that the 
chairs and secretaries of the employers’ associations started to engage in regular meetings from 
1921 onwards in an institute called the Council of peak employers’ associations (Kring van 
Werkgeverscentralen) underlines this cohesion.130       
 As part of a wide institutionalisation process, these employers also began to meet labour 
formally and state representatives as the tripartite Supreme Council of Labour was founded in 
1919.131 The council of about 40 to 50 members consisted of the minister of social affairs, 
representatives of the labour movement and employers’ associations as well as civil servants 
and independent experts. Importantly, the share of members installed by the government was 
relatively high, while small- and medium-sized business’ representatives took a comparatively 
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large share of employers’ seats.132  In practice, the influence of large enterprises was, therefore, 
relatively limited when compared to later consultative institutions in the Netherlands. While the 
Supreme Council of Labour is generally presented as the predecessor of the influential Labour 
Foundation and the Social and Economic Council, a preliminary investigation of consensus-
building between representatives of workers and business and thereby an important motivator 
of mutual trust between representatives of capital and labour,133 the policy effectiveness of the 
Supreme Council of Labour in its own time is disputed. Although former members of the 
council such as A.W. Quint have argued in favour of its effectiveness on the basis that roughly 
eighty per cent of its official advice (partly) turned into actual policy results between 1919 and 
1939,134 a critical evaluation of the archival material of the council by Coen Helderman suggests 
that the institution itself was not at all that influential.135 Helderman argues that the social 
partners often circumvented the Supreme Council and consensus within the institution generally 
did not lead to an immediate follow-up in the political process.     
 As trade unions and employers’ associations grew, collective bargaining also became 
increasingly normalised. Before the 1910s, the importance of collective labour agreements had 
been minimal, covering less than thirty-thousand workers.136 Business’ organisations and 
individual employers often refused to engage in collective negotiations as it would establish the 
recognition of the trade unions involved.137 In the 1910s, this changed, however. A strike in the 
cigar industry in 1913 that ended in a collective labour agreement was an important event in 
this regard. Due to such results, Dutch employers became convinced that opposition to the 
demand by trade unions for a collective labour agreement was only effective when a firm’s 
position was strong and could sustain the threat of strikes since trade unions now were 
increasingly organised and used striking funds to increase their bargaining position.138 
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Otherwise, it was the better choice to engage in collective bargaining and promote industrial 
peace.    
Table 3 Number and percentage of workers under collective labour agreements in the Netherlands139 
Date Number of workers % of employed labour force 
1 January 1911 23,000 1.0 
1 January 1917 83,000 3.3 
1 January 1920 274,000 10.4 
1 June 1924 286,000 10.4 
1 June 1930 386,000 12.8 
1 June 1934 259,000 9.1 
1 June 1939 323,000 10.1 
Notes: the number of workers is rounded up to thousands of people; the employed labour force consists of those 
people between 15 and 65 years of age that work at least 15 hours per week. 
In a sense, the establishment of collective labour agreements itself also had a self-reinforcing 
influence as the bargaining process of these contracts required the technical expertise of 
employers’ associations and trade unions which in turn increased the role of these interest 
groups and led to more collective negotiations.140 The consequence was a sharp increase of 
collective labour agreements until 1920 which ensured that trade unions were generally 
recognised by employers when the statutory extension debate took off.141 The expansion of the 
number of workers under collective labour agreements came to a halt in the fifteen years before 
the Second World War due to the large disruption caused by the Great Depression as is 
demonstrated in Table 3. The table shows that a large portion of Dutch workers did not fall 
under a collective labour agreement as well. The collective contracts largely applied to small 
firms, whereas white-collar workers and employees of large corporations were no part of such 
labour agreements before the Second World War.142 Firms produced for the external market 
were generally more worried about increases in labour costs that would be caused by such 
agreements.              
 
139 For the number of workers under collective labour agreements, see Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 
Jaarcijfers voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 1920 (Den Haag 1921) 98; Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 
Jaarcijfers voor Nederland 1930 (Den Haag 1931) 95; Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Jaarcijfers voor 
Nederland 1935 (Den Haag 1936) 109; Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Jaarcijfers voor Nederland 1940 (Den 
Haag 1942) 295; for the labour force statistics, see Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, ‘Beroepsbevolking; vanaf 
1800 (12-uursgrens), 1800-2013’ (version 4 April 2014)  
https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/71882NED/table?fromstatweb (28 July 2019). 
140 Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 339. 
141 Drimmelen and Van Hulst, Loonvorming en loonpolitiek, 13; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, 
Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 51; Prak and Van Zanden, Nederland en het poldermodel, 246; Bruggeman 
and Camijn, Ondernemers verbonden, 179; Van Bottenburg, “Aan den arbeid!”, 19; Brug and Peer, Collectief 
geregeld, 15; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling van het loonvormingsrecht, 138. 
142 Brug and Peer, Collectief geregeld, 15; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in 
Nederland, 51. 
 
40 
 
Next to the upsurge in the prominence of employers’ associations, trade unions and the usage 
of collective labour agreements, the economic and political conditions in 1918 also moved the 
government to improve the regulation surrounding these contracts. Although the physical 
damage of the conflict to the Netherlands was limited due to the country’s neutrality status, the 
First World War still had some significant effects on the Dutch economy as world market prices 
rose, real wages decreased and unemployment slightly expanded.143 Given these economic 
circumstances, the government and employers cooperated to keep as much of trade intact as 
possible.144 Meanwhile, the emancipation of the working class increased social tensions based 
on the economic inequalities in society combined with the reduced purchasing power of 
workers which led to strikes and isolated demands for the nationalisation of industries.145 
Inspired by the revolutionary mobilisation in Russia and Germany, the Dutch parliamentarian 
Pieter Jelles Troelstra decided to call for a Socialist revolution in November 1918, but his 
attempt failed.146 This famous episode of Dutch political history is now known as ‘Troelstra’s 
mistake’. Whereas revolutionary groups had widely received support in neighbouring countries, 
revolutionary sentiment in the Netherlands turned out to be relatively limited and the counter-
campaign by the government which partly relied on loyalty to the Dutch royal house relatively 
successful.147 The state cooperated with the trade unions to prevent social unrest with minimal 
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intervention by employers.148 A clear example of this collaboration is the government subsidy 
for the unemployment funds of the trade unions that existed until the Second World War.  
 Although government intervention decreased relatively quickly after the war, the 
economic tide and social unrest were an important reason for the government to announce its 
willingness for labour market regulation.149  Kortenhorst and the recently created ARKWV as a 
whole, in particular, pushed statutory extension as a way to promote industrial peace and 
consolidate the weight of collective labour agreements between the social partners.150 The 
Roman Catholic workers’ representatives, as well as the MPs Kuiper and van Rijzewijk from 
the same pillar, supported their efforts.151 Still, the Roman Catholic RKSP party initially took 
a stance in favour of a new law on collective labour agreements without a clear reference to 
statutory extension, though, as did the left-leaning Liberal party (VDB) and the main Protestant 
trade union (CNV).152 
2.2 The early statutory extension debate 
From the moment the post-war government Ruijs de Beerenbrouck I (1918-1922) consisting of 
a coalition of the Roman Catholic (RKSP) and Protestant (ARP and CHU) political parties also 
adopted this viewpoint, however, by announcing that it wanted to address these gaps through 
introducing more detailed regulation and that it considered the statutory extension instrument 
as part of this agenda, the societal debate really took off and this mechanism also became one 
of the major topics debated among the employers’ associations in the other pillars.153 As a next 
step, Minister Aalberse requested the newly established Commission XII of the Supreme 
Council of Labour in 1920 for recommendations on the regulation of the labour market with 
the use of questions which among other things addressed the desirability of a statutory extension 
mechanism.154 Concretely, question 1A of the Minister addressed the desirability of a 
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mechanism to determine binding rules for all workers and employers in a certain sector, while 
question 2 focused on the form and conditions of this mechanism as well as the institution that 
should be in charge of this process. Noteworthy, the peak employers’ associations were 
severely underrepresented in Commission XII with only two representatives, L.G. Kortenhorst 
(AKWV) and F.G. Waller (VNW; later replaced by Mr Verkade), on a total of twenty 
members.155           
 A group of progressive Catholics led by law professor J.A. Veraart who also took part 
in Commission XII created an important ideational foundation for the post-war promotion of 
sectoral bargaining. These scholars presented an alternative to the revolutionary, Socialist 
agenda by suggesting that the competitive capitalist system which was inherently based on 
conflict could be reformed to an order based on mutually beneficial collaboration between 
representatives of capital and labour.156 Following the subsidiarity principle, industrial relations 
was the domain of employers and workers, not the government.157 Primarily, the systemic 
change was a plea for the introduction of the Public Industrial Organisation (Publiekrechtelijke 
bedrijfsorganisatie; PBO), consisting of councils which represented the common interests of 
employers and employees and would be in charge of a sectoral bargaining process on collective 
labour agreements, inspired by Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Rerum Novarum.158 Collective 
labour agreements would constitute the foundation of the regulatory framework of the PBO and 
statutory extension an important mechanism to spread these agreements.159 Importantly, the 
councils would involve employees in the management of the companies and economic sectors 
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as a whole, thereby not solely limiting the influence of workers on social affairs.  
 Despite the magnitude of Veraart’s ideas in the Roman Catholic pillar,160 Roman 
Catholic employers responded with doubt to the idea of the PBO. In this regard, the central 
player was Kortenhorst, Secretary of the ARKWV and the Roman Catholic employers’ 
association of the metal sector as well as a member of the Commission XII. While he was a 
clear proponent of collective labour agreements and statutory extension, he was relatively 
critical of the PBO and, therefore, proposed an adjusted different collective bargaining system 
method in 1919 that gave the Minister of Labour the power of statutory extension after 
convening with the Supreme Council of Labour.161 After advising the RKSP to promote 
statutory extension in 1917, the ARKWV consolidated its position in favour of the mechanism 
in  1921.162 On 29 December 1921, the ARKWV was also successful in convincing a majority 
in the wider RKVW to take a similar stance on the issue, which re-confirmed its support for the 
introduction of the instrument in July 1922 and 1923.163     
 From an ideational perspective, one might expect that Protestants evaluated the PBO 
and statutory extension proposals more critically. Both Protestant employers and the broader 
pillar generally positioned themselves in between Liberals and Roman Catholics concerning 
the shaping of the socio-economic order, being more critical of government interference and 
more valuing of particular initiative than their Christian counterparts but more encouraging of 
worker representation than economic Liberals.164 Whereas Roman Catholic thought depicted 
the different socio-cultural pillars as part of the state, Protestant thinking pictured the state as 
something different, next to these elements, which should be kept from dominating the societal 
sphere.165 Conceptually, Abraham Kuyper had defined this as ‘soevereiniteit in eigen kring’ at 
the end of the nineteenth century, referring to the sovereignty of every socio-cultural pillar. This 
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philosophy was more critical of governmental interference than the Roman Catholic 
subsidiarity principle as it scrutinised top-down public force onto the different socio-cultural 
groups and promoted self-regulation by every pillar.166    
 Interestingly, Protestants generally used the same dichotomy between economic and 
social affairs as Liberals to explain the role of workers and employers in the socio-economic 
order.167 Protestant business’ representatives mostly portrayed economic affairs as the sole 
domain of employers while workers had a necessary and legitimate role to play in decisions in 
the social realm, although the final decision remained the privilege of employers.168 Following 
this thought, Protestant employers generally saw the PBO as too far-reaching in the economic 
affairs of business and too top-down in its structure to support it, while they agreed with Roman 
Catholics that collective labour agreements were generally a positive, bottom-up development 
which promoted industrial peace in the social domain.169 Building upon the enthusiasm 
regarding collective labour agreements, the Protestant peak employers’ associations were 
remarkably positive towards statutory extension. The Board and General Assembly of the 
Protestant peak employers’ association (VCWG) already adopted a stance in favour of the 
mechanism in 1921 given that a great majority of workers and employers in the sector would 
already be part of the collective labour agreement,170 although one of its members, Mr Woldring 
representing the beverage manufacturer Woldring & Idema, objected fiercely as he viewed the 
instrument as an intolerable impediment on his freedom.171 The statutory extension case shows 
that Protestant employers did not simply oppose every form of government interference. With 
statutory extension, the VCWG supported government intervention through a mechanism of 
statutory extension as they framed it as facilitating rather than limiting consultation between 
workers and employers on labour conditions.172       
 For economic Liberals, the aversion towards government interference was even more 
fundamental, however, and this proved to be relevant for the statutory extension mechanism as 
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well. On 26 January 1922, representatives the Board of the COAW already formulated their 
negative stance towards statutory extension.173 The debate showed that Mr P.W.J.H. Cort van 
der Linden, son of the famous, right-leaning liberal prime minister and a VNW-Secretary 
without a sectoral affiliation himself, was fundamentally opposed to statutory extension, while 
most of the COAW members refuted the mechanism on more practical concerns and repeatedly 
demonstrated some sympathy for the argument that the instrument would prevent the 
undercutting of contracts by unorganised employers.174 In this meeting, Mr F.L. van der Bom, 
representative of an association for the book publishing sector, stood alone in explicitly 
favouring statutory extension. He argued that the instrument was desirable as it would promote 
industrial peace. There was a wider circle of representatives who had sympathy for the 
instrument, though. In the vote upon the motivation for the public statement of the association’s 
negative stance, a small minority supported Van der Bom in his refusal of the proposal.175 A 
clear majority of the meeting was still in favour of the announcement, however. Despite the 
significant minority with sympathy for the mechanism, the COAW, therefore, decided to 
oppose statutory extension as collective labour agreements were not yet sufficiently regulated 
and their effects still unclear, while the economic circumstances for industry were already 
difficult and could be made worse due to the yet unclear impact of the introduction of statutory 
extension. The statement left an opening for revaluation of the position when these conditions 
would change, though.176          
 The archives of its association indicate that the Liberal and relatively export-oriented 
manufacturers of the VNF were even more strongly opposed to collective bargaining than Cort 
van der Linden of the VNW as they not only took a stance against statutory extension but were 
also (internally) questioning the desirability of collective labour agreements themselves.177 On 
10 January 1922, the Central Board of the VNF discussed sectoral bargaining. Here, Mr A.H. 
Baron van Hardenbroek van Ammerstol, representative of the limestone industry, demonstrated 
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that he was one of the heaviest critics of statutory extension and collective labour agreements 
in general. In the discussion, he first used the slippery slope argument that statutory extension 
would be the first step in a more general socialisation process and proceeded with a broader 
critique on the inflexibility of a system of collective labour agreements in adjusting to fast 
changes in the economic tide.178 The second point of this speaker eventually resulted in a vote 
in which a majority of the meeting deemed collective labour agreements problematic due to 
their rigidity.179 Still, the minutes of the meeting also give indications that a small minority in 
the meeting had a more positive stance towards collective bargaining. Mr J. Zwaardemaker of 
the Association of Dutch fruit processors, for example, showed his sympathy for the 
undercutting argument for statutory extension, but he was immediately countered by the Chair 
of the Central Board, Simon A. Maas, affiliated with the distillery sector who argued that this 
was a lesser evil compared with the inflexible and sometimes untenable labour conditions which 
would be forced upon unwilling individual firms.180 Additionally, he alluded to the general 
wage-increasing tension of collective labour agreements. Although the Central Board chose not 
to oppose collective labour agreements in general, it was clearly strongly against a statutory 
extension mechanism.181          
 On 8 Juni 1922, there was another meeting by the Central Board of the VNF on the 
subject. The complete board except for Mr W.B. Dresselhuys, former Chair of the Verbond van 
Vereenigingen van Sigarenfabrikanten in Nederland, now agreed on public opposition against 
statutory extension, while collective labour agreements themselves were also widely 
criticised.182 Dresselhuys used the cigar industry as an example to argue that statutory extension 
may be useful in particular circumstances to prevent the undercutting of collective labour 
agreements by a small, unorganised minority of employers, which was countered by Van 
Hardenbroek van Ammerstol with the argument that would be an unallowable impediment on 
the free development of these businesses.183 
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2.3 Business’ positions after Commissions XII’s response 
After the war, the economy had recovered relatively quickly because of an enormous increase 
in external demand and continued to grow despite the international economic downturn from 
1920 to 1923.184 Whereas the international recession heavily hit the financial sector of the 
Netherlands, the effects on the rest of the economy were relatively limited as the vital export to 
Germany remained largely intact.185 Still, employers tried to lower wages and workers’ rights 
under these economic circumstances which resulted in more limited collective agreements and 
more extensive labour conflict, while social democracy was under pressure in the political 
sphere.186 Due to the backlash against the expanding social agenda, labour was once more on 
the defensive and the government played a smaller role. Under these conditions, the plans of 
Veraart for a PBO failed in 1922.187 Regardless of the changing momentum for social change, 
political rule by Christian democratic parties was remarkably stable in this period.188 In 1922, 
1925, 1926 and 1929, the election results enabled the same political parties (RKSP, ARP and 
CHU) to remain in power through the cabinets Ruijs de Beerenbrouck II (1922-1925), Colijn I 
(1925-1926), De Geer I (1926-1929) and Ruijs de Beerenbrouck III (1929-1933). Interestingly, 
however, there was no consistent stance of these seemingly similar coalitions towards statutory 
extension. In 1922, the Troonrede of the government merely mentioned that they were 
considering a more detailed regulation of the collective labour agreements, but there was little 
discussion in parliament as politicians awaited the Commission XII’s report.189  
 During the financial crisis, the Commission XII had been working on its response to 
Minister Aalberse’s questions. In 1922, the Commission XII published its reply by means of a 
provisional advice which included statutory extension as its most urgent proposal.190 The 
Commission proposed a system of statutory extension in which the Minister of Labour would 
get the privilege to declare collective labour agreements universally applicable after a request 
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by an industrial party and the consultation of an independent commission. The main criterion 
would be that statutory extension would be in the common interest and constitute no 
unreasonable impediment on particular interests. A majority of the commission supported this 
provisional advice on statutory extension.191 Only the representative of the VNW in the 
commission strictly opposed the measure, while a few members wanted more fundamental 
changes and others wanted to leave the choice whether to adopt a firm-level or collective 
bargaining system including statutory extension to firms themselves.     
 Under the conditions of the Commission XII’s statutory extension proposal, a major 
concern for business’ representatives, above all for those from the VNF and VNW, was to what 
extent the Minister needed their consent to declare collective labour agreements universally 
applicable.192 On 8 November 1922, the Board of the VNW discussed the general provisional 
advice of the Commission XII and showed its approval of the diverging critical stance of the 
VNW representative in the commission.193 Afterwards, the VNW held a General Assembly of 
members in 1923 which also focused on the advice and the provisional position of the Board of 
the association. The consensus in the General Assembly was to support the proposal of the 
Board to publicly oppose statutory extension although there was some disagreement on the 
exact motivation of this viewpoint for strategic purposes.194 This strategic discussion focused 
on whether the economic circumstances should be used as an argument against the instrument 
since this would open up a possibility when the economic downturn would be over.195 
Interestingly, the Board also explained in this meeting that the position of VNW explicitly 
called statutory extension a limitation of freedom to convince Christian employers who were 
sensitive to this argument.196         
 The VNW’s negative stance towards sectoral bargaining was in alignment with the 
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small-sized CIV which had close ties with the larger liberal peak employers’ association as is 
demonstrated by their common monthly external publication: De Werkgever. In the first volume 
of this journal, the critique of Van der Linden on the proposal for statutory extension was 
published in accordance with the outcome of the assembly.197 He argued that the government 
should only be allowed to intervene in the formation of labour conditions under special 
circumstances and, therefore, should not get the permanent right to declare collective labour 
agreements universally applicable. These specific conditions for government intervention were 
that it merely was to correct misuses of collective labour agreements and followed a just 
purpose which had not to be confused with a goal favoured by the majority. Van der Linden 
explicitly refuted the idea that the government intervention through statutory extension would 
promote industrial peace, e.g. through the prevention of undercutting by the unorganised. 
Rather the government had to allocate itself a minimal role in promoting industrial peace as the 
focus of establishing such peace had to be pursued on the firm- rather than the sectoral level. 
After this, he finalised his argument with an economic argument, arguing that it would be 
‘criminal’ to introduce statutory extension during the economic tide of the time because of its 
negative effect on the international competitiveness of industry implying that the mechanism 
would lead to increased costs for these companies and may lead to problems as they cannot 
compensate this with higher prices.198       
 The Central Board of the VNW also strongly opposed the proposal as shown by its 
meeting on Thursday 7 December 1922. Here, VNF-Chair Simon A. Maas argued that the 
representation of employers in the Supreme Council was too weak. The other board members 
supported his position and stated that the report was excessively one-sided.199 Additionally, the 
Board confirmed a position paper in which it opposed a statutory extension mechanism 
concerning collective labour arguments or prices as well as the PBO.200 The criticism of Maas 
himself on the Council and Commission was more explicit in a statement in the General 
Assembly of the VNF later that month. Here, he strongly criticised the large and biased role of 
the Minister in the determination of the members of the Supreme Council of Labour and its 
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commissions and the relatively small influence of the business’ representatives of industry.201 
Due to the limited representativeness of the council as well as its commissions, Maas questioned 
the meaningfulness of the proposals of its Commission XII. Interestingly, he put people such 
as ARKWV-Secretary Kortenhorst under the category of sociologists rather than business’ 
representatives.202           
 In response to the advice of this commission, Maas underlined the importance of the 
criticism of the VNW representative in the commission that the mechanism may force firms to 
allocate more resources to attracting the necessary labour than they can bear.203 Maas stated 
that the harm inflicted upon the contract freedom of the minority of employers which would 
force all employers to abide by the collective labour agreements that would largely be 
determined by ever more powerful trade unions was more eminent than the benefits gained 
through preventing the undercutting of these contracts which was the Commission XII’s main 
argument.204 Additionally, he pointed out that the mechanism would reduce the price 
competition between employers which was an important stimulator of the increased Dutch 
export position.205 Furthermore, the discussion about the PBO and statutory extension was 
deemed far too theoretical, missing the reality of the decrease in the number of collective labour 
agreements in the last years and the economic difficulties that firms face.206 Under these 
circumstances, free negotiations between workers and firms, whether individual or collective, 
would be needed without any government interference.207      
 A speech by the VNF-Secretary A.N. Molenaar, who had no sectoral affiliation, in the 
General Assembly confirmed this view on statutory extension and its call to focus on practical 
arguments rather than vague theoretical sketches.208 Additionally, the speaker used the slippery 
slope argument  that statutory extension would constitute the first step towards a Socialist state 
and would quickly be followed by the PBO.209 Although some businesses had good experiences 
with collective labour agreements, some had not or were not able to abide by such rules which 
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showed the problems of statutory extension as a limiting force of flexibility and free 
competition.210 The crux of his argument regarded the fundamental contract freedom of 
individual employers, though. According to Molenaar, the undercutting argument missed the 
point as individual employers, whether part of a majority or not, always need to have the 
fundamental freedom to negotiate their own labour conditions.211 An impediment of this 
freedom would hurt rather than promote industrial peace.      
 Interestingly, however, there was also some disagreement within the Central Board of 
the VNF on the statutory extension position.212 Board member W.B. Dresselhuys argued that 
the statutory extension had practically proved its necessity in the Cigar industry where 
collective labour agreements of businesses in large cities proved untenable as firms in other 
areas where workers were willing to work for significantly lower wages undercut these 
contracts. This positive stance was an isolated viewpoint, though. Additionally, two other board 
members, G.F. Evelein, Director of social affairs at lighting company Koninklijke Philips N.V., 
and M.J. van Löben Sels, with a background in the stone industry, pointed to the problematic 
nature of introducing the law across all sectors.213  Due to the important difference between 
firms that produced for the domestic and international market, the latter were far more 
constrained by international competition and, therefore, would be harmed by statutory 
extension.          
 Following the VNW, the COAW also took a stance against the proposal. On 15 February 
1923, all the sectoral organisations under the COAW explicitly indicated their position on 
statutory extension through a formal vote. Eleven of the fourteen votes were against the 
mechanism, while the representatives of the bakeries (Vereniging van Werkgevers in het 
Bakkersbedrijf) and book publishers (Nederlandsche Bond van Boekbinderspatroons) were in 
favour, and the electro-technical business association was not able to choose between the two 
options.214  Although the liberal peak employers’ associations and a large majority of their 
members were, thus, in favour of the proposed mechanism, there was also a significant minority 
who backed the proposal of Commission XII, particularly when considering Roman Catholic 
and Protestant employers as Table 4 illustrates.                    
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Table 4 Proponents of statutory extension as proposed by Commission XII in 1923
215
 
Level  Employers’ association Sector Pillar 
Peak Roomsch Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversverenigingen 
Algemeene Roomsch Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging 
x 
x 
Catholic 
Catholic 
 Vereeniging van Christelijke Werkgevers en Groothandelaren x Protestant 
    
Sectoral Nederlandsche Bond van Boekbinderspatroons Publishing Liberal 
 Vereeniging van Chemigrafische Inrichtingen Chemigraphy Liberal 
 Nederlandsche Bond van Steendrukkerijen Lithography Liberal 
 Vereeniging van Cartonnagefabrikanten Cardboard Liberal 
 R.K. Bond van Klei- en Aardewerkindustrie Clay Catholic 
 R.K. Bond van Metaalfabrikanten 
R.K. Bond van Waalsteenfabrikanten 
Metal 
Brick 
Catholic 
Catholic 
 R.K. Bond van Bouwpatroons Construction Catholic 
 Patroonsbond voor de bouwbedrijven in Nederland Construction Liberal 
 Bond van Smedenpatroons in Nederland Blacksmith Liberal 
 R.K. Bond van Stucadoorspatroons Plasterwork Catholic 
 Nederlandsche Stucadoorspatroonsbond Plasterwork Liberal 
 Bond van Loodgieterspatroons in Nederland Plumming Liberal 
 Bond van Nederlandsche Schilderspatroons Painting Liberal 
 Christelijke Schilderspatroons Painting Protestant 
 R.K. Bond van Schilderspatroons Painting Catholic 
 R.K. Bond van Meubelmakerspatroons Furniture Catholic 
 Nederlandsche Bond van Meubelfabrikanten Furniture Liberal 
 R.K. Bond van Lederindustrie Leather Catholic 
 Nederlandsche Bond van Werkgeversvereenigingen in het 
Heerenkleedingbedrijf 
Textile Liberal 
 R.K. Bond van Kleermakerspatroons Textile Catholic 
 R.K. Bond van Textielfabrikanten Textile Catholic 
 R.K. Bond van Confectie-industrie Textile Catholic 
 Vereeniging van Werkgevers in het Bakkersbedrijf Bakery Liberal 
 R.K. Bond van Brood-, Koek- en Banketbakkerspatroons Bakery Catholic 
 Verbond van Vereenigingen van Sigarenfabrikanten in Nederland Cigar Liberal 
 Bond van Kleinfabrikanten in het Sigarenbedrijf Cigar Liberal 
The Commission Hellebrekers assigned by the Roman Catholic peak employers’ associations 
requested the Supreme Council to accept the proposals of its Commission XII in 1923.216 After 
this, the different organisations that were part of the Roman Catholic Confederation of 
Employer Associations also adopted this stance including the ARKWV except for its 
department in Den Bosch which primarily opposed the instruments.217 Meanwhile, the peak 
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employers’ association of the Protestant pillar also supported the proposal. These positions were 
confirmed by the meeting of the Supreme Council of Labour on 17 March 1923 that discussed 
the Commission XII’s proposals. While most of the commission’s proposals including the PBO 
were refused, a large majority (23-6) was for the recommendation of statutory extension.218 In 
the vote, four of fourteen business’ representatives opposed the proposal representing an 
association for the export-oriented industry (Maatschappij voor Nijverheid en Handel; part of 
the COAW), the coalmine industry (Vereeniging tot behartiging van de belangen der 
Limburgsche mijnindustrie), shipping companies (Scheepsvaart Vereeniging Noord en Zuid) 
and the VNW.           
 Table 4 shows the proponents of the Commission XII’s statutory extension proposal in 
1923. This overview enables the investigation of the relative importance of economic and 
ideational factors for the positions of the different employers’ associations. Unfortunately, the 
archives provide no possibility to reconstruct a similar list of opponents but it is clear that they 
were in the majority. The table of proponents suggests that there was no perfect division on the 
statutory extension proposal across either economic or ideational lines. Although most of the 
employers’ associations in favour of statutory extension represented small- and medium-sized 
enterprises which produced for the domestic market, this is no exact distinction as the list also 
contains organisations which were dominated by export-oriented companies.219 At the same 
time, the proponents tend to come from the Roman Catholic and Protestant pillar, but the 
significant representation of Liberal associations indicates that this is no absolute distinction as 
well. Although it is important to note that the Liberal pillar was often used as neutral and default 
option, especially in the ‘20s when the sectoral Roman Catholic and particularly Protestant 
business organisation was relatively underdeveloped and mostly contained opponents to 
statutory extension as illustrated by the previous sections, there are also examples of Liberal 
proponents were this process had already taken place, such as the construction, plasterwork, 
painting, furniture and bakery sectors. The commonality of these instances is that their activities 
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are mainly targeted on the domestic economy. To explain the variation in these business’ 
positions, it is, therefore, needed to use a common explanation of both divergent economic 
interests and ideational differences.  
2.4 An unsatisfying compromise 
Additionally, the list of proponents demonstrates the continuation of business’ positions with 
those of the early statutory extension debate, while the outline of the vote in the Supreme 
Council of Labour shows the importance of the diverging stances of employers as it broke the 
opposition against the mechanism and gave a mandate of broad societal support for the 
instrument in the following years. After the vote in favour of statutory extension with a clear 
majority, the VNW and VNF increased their efforts with heavy campaigning against the 
instrument.220 At the same time, the international financial crisis waned, leading to an upsurge 
in growth in the internationally oriented economy of the Netherlands in consecutive years.221 
The number of members of the labour unions also started to rise while industrial relations and 
socio-economic policies were increasingly shaped by trade unions and employers’ associations 
as the government generally aimed to get their approval.222 Following this trend, the RKSP-
Minister of Labour, Trade and Industry P.J. Aalberse pursued the outcome in the Council on 
the basis of the Commission XII’s work by formulating a proposal for statutory extension which 
he sent back to the institution for evaluation in 1925.223       
 Aalberse’s initiative revitalised the debate on statutory extension within the employers’  
associations and the Supreme Council of Labour. The ARKWV and RKVW immediately 
expressed their satisfaction with the proposal of the Roman Catholic Minister in De R.K. 
Werkgever, only suggesting several small amendments.224 To underline the importance of the 
instrument, both Roman Catholic peak associations wrote an extensive discussion of sectoral 
bargaining spread over several editions of De R.K. Werkgever in which they aimed to 
demonstrate the value of collective labour agreements in promoting industrial peace and the 
contribution of statutory extension to this institution through the undercutting argument.225 In 
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one of the articles, the redaction also aimed to counter the individual contract freedom argument 
of the Liberal employers. Although stating the individual contract freedom was of great value, 
they argued it could be no justification for a small minority to make decent relations and 
agreements between a majority of representatives of workers and employers impossible.226 In 
other words, industrial peace and collaboration for the majority had to be valued over individual 
contract freedom, and the government was able to facilitate this with the statutory extension 
mechanism on request by the social partners. Next, they addressed the other major argument of 
Liberal employers concerning the competitiveness of the export industry by stating that this 
problem was not inherent to the law, but rather dependent on its application.227   
 Later that year, the Federative Board of the ARKWV made up by representatives of its 
five departments discussed its position on the statutory extension proposal. Interestingly, the 
minutes of this meeting signal significant internal opposition within the association against the 
instrument. H.M.J. Blomjous from the department in Den Bosch opposed the mechanism using 
the slippery slope to the PBO and socialism argument, while also pointing to the difficult 
circumstances of the time as a reason to oppose statutory extension.228 Additionally, L. Teulings 
representative of the same area criticised statutory extension on its inflexibility regarding 
differences between firms within an economic sector.229 M.P.L. Steenberghe, from the same 
area and Roman Catholic representative of the textile sector in the RKVW, responded to this 
criticism by refuting the slippery slope argument, presenting the proposed statutory extension 
law as an alternative policy rather than a step towards the undesirable PBO.230 Regarding the 
inflexibility argument, he argued that it was a critique on collective labour agreements as such 
rather than the extension instrument since the required coverage of the contract under employers 
in the proposal before the mechanism could be applied.      
 Ch. Stulemeyer, from the Breda department and representative of the peak association 
in the Supreme Council, postulated that the issue of statutory extension demonstrated the 
fundamental difference between the Liberal and Christian worldview as the latter perspective 
included the principle of solidarity and, thereby, promoted industrial peace.231  He added, 
however, that the mechanism was also favourable from an opportunistic viewpoint as it 
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facilitated mutually beneficial negotiations between workers and employers by promoting an 
alternative to rather than a step towards a Socialist system, thereby contesting the slippery slope 
argument. After this, the rebuttals by Stulemeyer and Steenberghe were extensively backed by 
Kortenhorst with similar arguments.232 The latter stressed that the crux of the debate was the 
ideational question on social affairs which centred on whether workers and employers had to 
determine labour conditions together or not. As statutory extension would facilitate collective 
bargaining, it would lead to lower government interference. The debate within the Federative 
Board ended with a vote indicating that a majority was for the proposal as thirteen counting 
votes were in favour of the law, as well as three advisory votes by the Secretaries Kortenhorst, 
B.J.M. van Spaendonck and A.A.W. Diepenbroeck, while two votes were blank and five were 
against the instrument.233 The outcome of the vote shows significant internal opposition within 
the federative board of the ARKWV, although all negative votes came from the same 
department in Den Bosch. As they had also opposed the mechanism at an earlier stage, though, 
these votes reflected no remarkable change of preferences.     
 The viewpoints on sectoral bargaining remained similar in the VNF as well. Collective 
labour agreements themselves were still questioned by the association234 that disagreed that 
undercutting would harm industrial peace and stated that statutory extension would rather 
constitute a threat, as it was an unallowable impediment on freedom forcing untenable labour 
conditions upon employers trying to sustain their companies.235 Additionally, they argued that 
statutory extension would limit price competition236 and pointed out that uniform wages across 
a sector would be problematic as purchasing power diverges between different geographical 
areas, leading to unnecessary high wages in the countryside.237 The VNW also clung to its 
earlier stance. In 1925, before the concrete advice of the Commisson XII on the statutory 
extension law, De Werkgever was again the platform for a critique by Van der Linden, now 
redactor of the publication. Once more, he stressed the importance of the private contract 
freedom of individual workers and employers who should keep the right to stay out of collective 
 
232 ARKWV, 917, inv.no. 13 ‘Notulen der vergadering van het Federatiebestuur der A.R.K.W.V. op Maandag 16 
November 1925 n.m. 1.30 in “Huize Voorhout” Lange Voorhout 19 Den Haag (1925) 12-3. 
233 ARKWV, 917, inv.no. 13 ‘Notulen der vergadering van het Federatiebestuur der A.R.K.W.V. op Maandag 16 
November 1925 n.m. 1.30 in “Huize Voorhout” Lange Voorhout 19 Den Haag (1925) 16; Hoefnagels, Een eeuw 
sociale problematiek, 204. 
234 VNF, 2.19.103.02, inv.no. 23: ‘De Nederlandsche Nijverheid. 7e Jaargang no.16. Zaterdag 22 augustus 1925’ 
(1925) 244. 
235 Idem, 245-6.  
236 Idem, 245.  
237 Idem, 246. 
 
57 
 
labour agreements238 and stated that statutory extension would be the first step in the process 
of socialisation as pursued by people such as Troelstra rather than an isolated initiative for 
labour market regulation.239         
 The debate also took part in the consultative institutions. On 18 September 1925, the 
Council of peak employers’ associations met and agreed to distinguish between further 
regulation of the collective labour agreement and the statutory extension mechanism.240 The 
representatives of the Roman Catholic employers association, respectively Kortenhorst (metal 
sector), Van Spaendonck (wool sector) and Van Steenberghe (textile sector), still turned out to 
be clear proponents of the mechanism who were in control of their backbenchers.241 Given these 
conditions and the favourable stance of the government towards the mechanism, there was a 
widespread concern within the VNF that statutory extension would be established, moving the 
VNF to organise new protest actions with the CIV and VNW.242 As a response, another protest 
action was organized with the CIV and VNW. After this, the Commission XII also gave its 
view on the proposal. A majority of the advisory body agreed with Aalberse’s law as it placed 
the control over the mechanism in the hands of the Minister of Labour, Trade and Industry, 
while a minority wanted to leave this power to the social partners through the Supreme Council 
of Labour and one member wanted to give it to an independent legal institution.243 
 Like their Roman Catholic counterparts, the Protestant peak employers’ remained in 
favour of the mechanism. On 14 January 1926, the Central Board of the Protestant association 
discussed its position on the concrete proposal. While most speakers argued in favour of the 
extension mechanism, Woldring still strongly opposed the instrument.244 J.F.H. Spier, a 
contractor and estate agent, defended the role of the government in the proposed statutory 
extension process by portraying it as the protector of freely conducted agreements between most 
representatives of workers and employers against undercutting. In the end, a majority of the 
meeting voted for a motion by Chair Van der Bom which stated that the association would 
remain in favour of statutory extension and vote accordingly for the law in the Supreme Council 
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given two conditions that addressed the main counterarguments by Liberal employers. Firstly, 
the number of employers in the sector under the collective labour agreement would need to 
exceed a share that would convincingly demonstrate the willingness of business in the sector to 
declare the contract universally applicable. Secondly, there had to be sufficient guarantee that 
the application of the mechanism would not lead to higher prices or problems for the 
competitiveness of export-oriented companies.245      
 In 1926, after the merger of the VNW, CIV and VNF into the VNW, the newly created 
Liberal peak employer’ association reconfirmed its opposition against statutory extension.246 
The institution motivated its stance by calling sectoral bargaining an impediment on freedom 
and extending the argument that based itself on differences between the domestic- and export-
oriented companies. The latter centred on the idea that statutory extension would establish more 
protection of workers in already sheltered economic sectors which would lead to higher prices 
and possibly even cartelisation. As export-oriented companies would not be able to pay higher 
wages and stay internationally competitive, statutory extension would establish differences 
between these firms and the sheltered companies focused on the domestic market that would be 
able to mutate their prices with limited consequences. Once again, the liberal employers pointed 
to the ‘skewed’ composition of Commission XII with a relatively low number of employer 
representatives who were more positive towards statutory extension than the general business 
population.247 As part of their campaign to turn the societal discussion against sectoral 
bargaining, the Praesidium of the VNW specifically targeted proponents and doubters in the 
employer community before the 1926 vote.248 According to their archives, the employers’ 
associations of farmers and the small- and medium-sized enterprises were finding it particularly 
difficult to determine their positions.       
 The twentieth meeting of the Supreme Council of Labour on 26 April 1926 confirmed 
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this image. The complete gathering was devoted to a comprehensive discussion of the statutory 
extension law of Aalberse and the advice of the Commission, and a vote on the desirability of 
the mechanism.249 The scientific member De Vooys started the debate by arguing that the 
knowledge on the impact of collective labour agreements was too limited to introduce statutory 
extension.250  Still, he suggested that the available spare cases at the time indicated that the 
mechanism tended to increase the level of wages and thereby often limited general economic 
development, increased unemployment and spurred labour unrest due to differences between 
economic sectors. As Liberal representative of the agricultural sector (Koninklijk Nederlandsch 
Landbouw Comité), De Boer also opposed statutory extension. His main complaint was the 
negative effect statutory extension would have on the export of Dutch agricultural products, as 
the sector in The Netherlands was so internationally integrated and the production process 
relatively labour intensive.251         
 Additionally, Waller of the VNW declared that collective labour agreements themselves 
first had to be regulated in more detail before statutory extension should be introduced and 
pointed to the wage-increasing tension of statutory extension which would lead to higher costs 
for firms, harm export and thereby lead to higher unemployment.252  Ch. Stulemeyer of the 
ARKWV, however, supported the proposal with a demonstration of the ideational differences 
of the Liberal and Christian democratic positions. He argued that whereas statutory extension 
constituted an impediment on individual freedom for Liberals, harming social peace because of 
the conflicting nature of individual and society, Christian democrats rather saw statutory 
extension as a mechanism that could align the individual freedom with societal well-being 
through solidarity, social peace and mutually beneficial cooperation between labour and 
business.253 Additionally, Stulemeyer contested the perceived wage-increasing tension of 
collective labour agreements and statutory extension by arguing that they would only lead to 
more stability but not a different level of wages.254 He also declared that collective labour 
agreements would never be declared universally applicable when it is unbearable for firms due 
to the requirement of a request by a large share of the social partners.255 Van der Linden 
countered Stulemeyer’s argument by stating that some Christian democrats also opposed the 
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proposal as they pursued a decentralised negotiation process.256      
 A. Plate, Liberal representative of the shipping companies, agreed with the opposing 
stance of Van der Linden. Although he contended that statutory extension could be beneficial 
for specific cases where undercutting by a small minority was problematic, Plate argued that it 
would lead to economic harm in the long run due to the inflexibility of labour conditions it 
causes, while it is also problematic for companies around the border because of their 
competitiveness.257 J.F.H. Spier of the VCWG, though, argued that statutory extension would 
facilitate the organic development of negotiations between capital and labour, while the 
government would check that the consensus of these groups would not be too much of an 
impediment on the general interest.258 After that, A. Haex, who represented the mining industry 
in Limburg, motivated his opposition by arguing that there was no legal foundation to force 
labour conditions upon a firm which was unable to bear the consequences.259 He also stated that 
the current debate undervalued the interest of consumers who would face higher prices. 
 Table 5 demonstrates the results of the successive vote on the desirability of the statutory 
extension of collective labour agreements.260 J. Muysken, of the VNW, L. Attema, representing 
Protestant small- and medium-sized businesses, (Vereeniging van den Christelijke 
Handeldrijvenden en Industrieelen Middenstand in Nederland), and L.N. Deckers who stood 
for Liberal farmers (Nederlandsche Boerenbond) were absent for the vote, while two present 
members did not vote as shown in Table 6.261       
 
 
 
 
 
256 HRA, 2.15.29, inv.no. 2: ‘Notulen van de twintigste vergadering op Maandag 26 April 1926 in de vergaderzaal 
van de Eerste Kamer der Staten-General.’ (1926) 12. 
257 Idem, 11. 
258 Idem, 12. 
259 Idem, 15. 
260 HRA, 2.15.29, inv.no. 2: ‘Notulen van de twintigste vergadering op Maandag 26 April 1926 in de vergaderzaal 
van de Eerste Kamer der Staten-General.’ (1926) 15; HRA, 2.15.29, inv.no. 1: ‘Jaarverslag over 1926.’ (1927) 9; 
Bölger, Organisatorische verhoudingen, 141; Quint, Twintig jaar Hooge Raad, 50-1; Willem Dercksen e.a., 
Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen, 93; Bruggeman and Camijn, Ondernemers verbonden, 184; Bölger, 
Organisatorische verhoudingen, 141; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 72: ‘Notulen van het verhandelde in de 
vergadering van het bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers op Woensdag, 12 Mei 1926, des 
voormiddags te 11 ure ten kantore van het verbond, Korte Voorhout 12.B te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1926) 6-7. 
261 HRA, 2.15.29, inv.no. 2: ‘Notulen van de twintigste vergadering op Maandag 26 April 1926 in de vergaderzaal 
van de Eerste Kamer der Staten-General.’ (1926) 1.  
 
61 
 
Table 5 Vote of Supreme Council of Labour on statutory extension in 1926262 
Vote Member name Representation Organisation 
For  P.J.M. Aalberse Scientific X 
(21) J.D.J. Aengenent Scientific X 
 P.A. Diepenhorst Scientific X 
 W.H. Nolens Scientific X 
 A. Folmer Public servant X 
 J. Westhoff Public servant X 
 Ch. Stulemeyer Business Algemene R.K. Werkgeversvereniging 
 J.F.H. Spier Business Christelijke Werkgeversvereniging 
 J.A.G.M. van 
Hellenberg Hubar 
Business Nederlandsche R.K. Middenstandsbond op 
Federatieven Grondslag 
 Joh. Brautigam Workers Nederlandsch Verbond van Vakverenigingen 
 P. Danz Workers Nederlandsch Verbond van Vakverenigingen 
 R. Stenhuis Workers Nederlandsch Verbond van Vakverenigingen 
 F. van der Wal Workers Nederlandsch Verbond van Vakverenigingen 
 F. van der Walle Workers Nederlandsch Verbond van Vakverenigingen 
 A.C. de Bruyn Workers R.K. Werkliedenverbond in Nederland 
 J.A. Schutte Workers R.K. Werkliedenverbond in Nederland 
 P.J.S. Serrarens Workers R.K. Werkliedenverbond in Nederland 
 H. Amelink Workers Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond in Nederland 
 K. Kruithof Workers Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond in Nederland 
 M.M. Cohen Workers Algemeen Nederlandsch Vakverbond 
 L. Veenstra Workers Verbond van Vakorganisaties van Hoofdarbeiders in 
Nederland 
    
Against L.P. de Vooys Scientific X 
(15) A. Polak Scientific X 
 H.W. Methorst Public servant X 
 A.L. Scholtens Public servant X 
 C.J.Ph. Zaalberg Public servant X 
 P.W.J.H. Cort van 
der Linden 
Business Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers 
 F.G. Waller Business Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers 
 G.A. Kessler Business  Nederlandsche Maatschappij van Nijverheid en 
Handel 
 A. Plate Business Scheepvaart Vereeniging Noord en Zuid 
 A. Haex 
 
F.V. Valstar 
Business 
 
Business 
Vereeniging tot behartiging van de belangen der 
Limburgsche Mijnindustrie 
Nederlandsche Tuinbouwraad 
 D. de Boer Business Koninklijk Nederlandsch Landbouw Comité 
 J.C. Blankert Business Nederlandsche Middenstandsbond 
 H. Maters Workers National Arbeids-Secretariaat 
 B. Lansink Jr. Workers Nederlandsch Syndicalistisch Vakverbond 
    
No vote F.M. Wibaut Scientific X 
(2) Chr. Van den Heuvel Business Christelijke Boeren- en Tuindersbond in Nederland 
As suggested within the VNW, the Roman Catholic and Protestant representatives of farmers 
and small- and medium-sized enterprises seemed to have had difficulty with the proposal when 
compared with 1923 given their lack of support for the proposal in the vote except the Roman 
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Catholic association of small- and medium-sized employers (Nederlandsche R.K. 
Middenstandsbond op Federatieven Grondslag). Due to the shifts of these organisation rather 
than the peak employers’ associations, eight business institutions voted against in 1926 as 
opposed to four in 1923. As the majority in favour of statutory extension was much smaller and 
the opposition of business much larger in the 1926 vote, the outcome was received with 
enthusiasm by the Board of the VNW.263        
 More importantly, the political window of opportunity had shifted in 1925 and 1926 
despite the consistent rule of the same Christian democratic parties. As the government had 
fallen in 1925, Aalberse was replaced by D.A.P.N. Koolen as Minister of Labour, Trade and 
Industry.  After this, Koolen quickly stepped down in 1926 and the Protestant CHU-Minister 
Slotemaker de Bruine took his place.264 When compared with Aalberse, his two successors were 
far more reluctant to introduce statutory extension.265 Although the Koolen and Slotemaker-de 
Bruine initially declared to await the response by the Council, the latter ignored the small 
majority in the Supreme Council for the law proposal by choosing not to pursue statutory 
extension at that given moment.266 His motivation showed the differences between Roman 
Catholics and Protestants as his arguments were quite similar to those of Liberal employers as 
he used the fundamental point of government interference and pointed to the uncertain link 
between the wage-increasing tension of statutory extension and prices on which he added the 
difficult circumstances of the time as an additional problematic factor.267 Indeed, the CHU was 
the most critical of the religious political parties concerning statutory extension, even more so 
than its Protestant counterpart, the ARP.268       
 He now supported an alternative law for further regulation of collective labour 
agreements to Aalberse’s proposal in which the statutory extension mechanism was no longer 
present. To be sure, the Minister even stated that it was no step towards statutory extension.269 
The law in 1927 would merely establish established equal treatment between organised and 
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unorganised workers within a single firm but not the more significant element of equal 
obligations for employers under and out of the collective labour agreement in a certain 
economic sector which still left the opportunity for unorganised businesses to undercut these 
contracts.270 Notwithstanding the heavy initial opposition to the exclusion of statutory extension 
in parliament, the backlash against the law proposal itself proved to be limited, and the law 
passed both chambers with only a few amendments.271 Despite a preference for statutory 
extension by the Roman Catholics, Socialists (SDAP) and sympathy by the left-leaning Liberals 
(VDB), the RKSP accepted the Minister’s proposal without any amendments, probably to 
sustain the Cabinet with the Protestant CHU and ARP which were much more divided on the 
issue and supported the Protestant Minister.272 The division is shown by the fact that the CNV-
leader Smeenk, who also functioned as an MP for the ARP, consistently advocated for statutory 
extension, before and after the vote.273 During the vote on the 1927 law itself, however, Smeenk 
also did not speak up.          
 To be sure, the right-leaning, economically Liberal Vrijheidsbond structurally opposed 
statutory extension but its share of the seats was relatively small when compared with the parties 
from the Roman Catholic, Protestant and Socialist pillars.274 As part of the discussion on the 
few amendments that actually were postulated, the Roman Catholic MPs Engels and Kuiper 
heavily criticised the Socialists for pushing compulsory trade union membership which is 
typical of the Scandinavian bargaining model.275 The clearly negative stance in the relatively 
left Roman Catholic pillar towards this system explains why it was never really a realistic option 
in the Dutch political context. In the end, the law passed comfortably. Sectoral bargaining was 
not yet established, though. Interestingly, the law decreased the direct benefit of trade union 
membership, as members now had to be treated equally to non-members.276 Even though this 
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regulation was no significant concession for Liberal employers compared with statutory 
extension, since it kept their freedom to choose for either firm-level or sectoral bargaining, their 
tone remained negative. The VNW argued that the sanctions in the law constituted unequal 
treatment between employers and workers in the enforcement of their contracts, but they were 
less assertive out of fear of further reaching reforms.277 The regulation was also not received 
with much enthusiasm by the Daily Board of the ARKWV who argued that it left too much 
vagueness, e.g. for amendments of already existing collective labour agreements, while there 
was also some sympathy for the uneven sanctions argument.278   
2.5 The establishment of sectoral bargaining 
In November 1927, some prominent MPs from Roman Catholic (Kuiper, Kortenhorst and 
Smeenk) and Socialist parties (Van der Waerden) requested the Minister to introduce statutory 
extension quickly but the CHU-Minister continued to refute the mechanism.279 After 
reconfirming its stance on statutory extension on 28 May 1926, the Supreme Council of Labour 
would, therefore, have to await the government’s policy translation for a long time, until 
1936.280 In this period, the instumrent was, therefore, not much of an issue in the institution. 
There were some isolated upheavals in the societal debate, however. In this timeframe, changes 
in the government’s stance on sectoral bargaining were generally followed by more attention 
of the peak employers’ associations for the subject.     
 Between 1929 and 1936, there was enough economic turmoil to establish such political 
shifts. After a period of relative economic stability, the Great Depression, starting in 1929, had 
harsh effects on the international economy from which the Netherlands was not able to 
escape.281 Initially, the influence of the crisis in the country seemed remarkably limited, but 
from 1931 onwards, when Germany heavily reduced its international trade as part of a wider 
protectionist agenda, the impact became more severe. As the Netherlands remained committed 
to the Golden Standard for a relatively long time and, therefore, became comparatively 
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expensive, it was not able to get out of the economic downturn for seven years, resulting in 
gradually increasing unemployment numbers with a peak of thirty-three per cent in 1936.282 
Labour conflict was widespread in the depression period, but the relationship between the 
representatives of trade unions and employers’ associations became better over time as both 
parties saw the need for cooperation in the grim economic tide.283 Politically, instability also 
increased although the changes were still limited considering the economic difficulties. While 
the Cabinet Ruijs de Beerenbrouck III (1929-1933) continued the long-term rule of the RKSP, 
CHU and ARP, they were no longer able to govern on their own during the course of the Great 
Depression due to rising popular discontent and, therefore, also incorporated the right-leaning 
Liberal LSP (previously the Vrijheidsbond) and left-leaning Liberal VDB in Cabinet Colijn II 
(1933-1935) and Colijn III (1935-1937).284        
 Just before the crisis, the government had drafted a new proposal for statutory extension 
which was received with much enthusiasm by the RKVW as it largely followed their 
suggestions.285 Once again, Van der Linden and COAW-Chair J. Goedkoop had pointed to the 
danger of these statutory extension proposals in a meeting of the General Board of the VNW in 
as following the proposal would mean that labour conditions were (partly) established by 
institutions outside of the industrial process.286 Under the new Cabinet Ruijs de Beerenbrouck 
III, Verschuur now became Minister of Labour, Trade and industry and declared in 1930 that 
he was willing to establish statutory extension of collective labour agreements in the short 
term.287 Despite this shift, the VNW consolidated its opposing stance with similar arguments to 
the previous debates. In a General Assembly in 1930, H.P. Gelderman, the new Chair of the 
VNW and Managing director of the textile company H.P. Gelderman & Zonen N.V., used the 
diversity within economic sectors to foster his argument since sectoral agreements would not 
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be able to address all these divergences and, therefore, issue harm.288 The individual contract 
freedom and the competition argument were also still widely used, sometimes using a new 
example.289 To illustrate, De Werkgever used the German potato market to demonstrate that 
statutory extension would limit competition and thereby increase the prices for consumers. 
 When the crisis deepened the attention of the societal debate mainly shifted to another 
statutory extension mechanism, though. In these turbulent times, the focus of social policy was 
strictly on the issue of unemployment, and there was only limited support for the statutory 
extension mechanism of collective labour agreements which was still widely regarded as a 
wage-increasing measure while employers called for lower wages which would enable them to 
increase employment.290  With the new Cabinet Colijn II in 1933, Slotemaker de Bruine came 
in charge of the relevant Ministry again, and the window of opportunity for a general 
mechanism of statutory extension for collective labour agreements disappeared as he stated that 
it was untenable given the economic circumstances of the time.291 Due to the economic tide of 
the time, the government rather started to actively pursue socio-economic policies in the course 
of the 1930s which limited competition and promoted agreements between firms to increase the 
employment and profits of the companies.292 Cartel agreements were, thus, widely accepted 
and even regarded as a measure to soften the impact of the crisis. Illustratively, a new law in 
1935 on cartels gave industry an improved position. The law formalised the role of cartels in 
the Dutch socio-economic system by constituting an extension mechanism of agreements 
between firms in a certain sector to the whole sector to prevent undercutting by other players in 
the market.293           
 This law provides a test case for the genuineness of the more ideational individual 
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contract freedom argument as it involved a similar statutory extension mechanism but one 
which would be beneficial to large, export-oriented companies. The archives of the peak 
employers’ associations largely indicate the consistency of these business organisations’ 
stances to both statutory extension mechanisms. On the one hand, the Board of the VNW and 
a majority of its General Assembly opposed the introduction of this law on cartel agreements 
as it would give the government the power to disentangle established agreements (1), give trade 
unions more influence in economic affairs (2) and an isolated argument that it would constitute 
an impediment on individualism (3).294 For several members, however, practical concerns seem 
to have had more weight than the fundamental ones. Some business’ representatives of the 
Textile industry in Twente were in favour of the statutory extension concerning cartel 
agreements to fight the economic tide.295 The association, therefore, did not oppose all 
cooperation between firms in the extremely difficult economic times, while a significant share 
of the members even backed the law.296        
 On the other hand, there was consensus in a meeting of the Daily Board of the ARKWV 
and the representatives of the different associations under the Roman Catholic employer 
confederation in 1933 on the support of a statutory extension mechanism for economic 
agreements, e.g. on prices and production, to fight the economic crisis by limiting the 
competition between firms.297 Some members also suggested to include the instrument 
concerning collective labour agreements in the proposals, but there was wide sympathy that it 
was a difficult economic moment to introduce such a mechanism although it was desirable 
when the crisis would have gone away. The Law on cartel agreements in 1935 established the 
statutory extension mechanism for economic contracts and was, therefore, warmly welcomed 
by the ARKWV and the Roman Catholic Confederation in their publication De R.K. 
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Werkgever.298           
 According to  authors such as Windmuller and Hoefnagels, the possibility for employers 
to establish collective cartel agreements made it difficult for employers to block statutory 
extension of collective labour agreements as their old economic point of price increases and 
ideational argument of individual contract freedom were no longer sustainable now that such 
government intervention via extension was normalised and prices could be controlled given the 
law of 1935.299 Although this may have been a political reality, there is no such evidence in the 
position of peak employers’ associations as their stances show great consistency with their 
viewpoints in the earlier period. Minister Slotemaker-de Bruine had made clear that he solely 
supported statutory extension of secondary labour conditions such as vacation days and wanted 
to exclude wages from the instrument. When Minister Slingenberg replaced him in the Cabinet 
Colijn III in 1935, however, the new official issued a new proposal for statutory extension, after 
initially refusing to do so because of the economic conditions.300    
 Given these circumstances, the VNW initially decided to consolidate its opposing stance 
towards sectoral bargaining, and thereby the proposed law, which is typical of the remarkable 
stability of the genuine preferences of the peak employers’ associations on this issue.301 As 
might be expected, the right-leaning Liberal LSP was also highly critical of the law.302 
Importantly, the ARP and CHU, in particular, had changed their stance, though, and backed the 
renewed statutory extension proposal next to the Roman Catholic RKSP and left-leaning 
Liberal VDB, making a clear majority favour the law.303 The inclusion of the mechanism to 
disentangle the collective contracts was of particular importance for the CHU in this shift. 
Despite its enthusiasm for statutory extension, the Socialist SDAP was critical of the new law 
proposal because of the inclusion of the mechanism to declare collective labour agreements 
disapplicable.304 As the support for the law proved to be too great, however, the VNW 
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strategically tried to limit the extensity of the statutory extension mechanism by changing its 
stance to just opposing statutory extension of wages and prices instead of the whole instrument, 
despite some internal opposition against this shift.305 If Minister Slingenberg excluded wages 
from the statutory extension of collective labour agreements, the VNW would be available for 
negotiations on a mechanism for the other labour conditions.     
 In the end, the law of 1937 established statutory extension by the Minister of Social 
Affairs (and Employment) in a framework similar to the cartel law of 1935, although the 
Socialists decided to keep themselves from voting.306 The government ignored the VNW’s offer 
and only partly followed the Supreme Council of Labour’s recommendation of 1926. The most 
important adjustment was the inclusion of a mechanism for the government to disentangle 
collective labour agreements, but this was merely controversial with Socialist political parties 
and trade unions instead of business’ representatives who recognised like the Cabinet that it 
was necessary to compensate for the inflexibility of collective labour agreements under extreme 
circumstances such as the recently experienced Great Depression.307 As the Cabinet threatened 
to retract the full proposal when such a mechanism would not be accepted, as it was already a 
compromise for the governing parties, the Socialists abstained from voting on the specific 
instrument, and the law was passed. Statutory extension was now established. Interestingly, the 
LSP tried to follow-up on the idea of the VNW by introducing an amendment to the law that 
would exclude wages from statutory extension, but this was refused by the Dutch parliament.308 
Importantly, the sectoral bargaining framework was shaped in such a way that the government 
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now had the legal instrument to steer the bargaining process.309    
 The reception of the law by business’ representatives shows the differences the peak 
employers’ associations of the Liberal pillar on the one hand and the Roman Catholic as well 
as the Protestant organisations on the other hand. As the final law included the statutory 
extension of wages, the VNW reacted disappointed pointing to the wage- and price-increasing 
tension and the inflexibility of this measure.310 To the contrary, the formal establishment of 
statutory extension was received with great delight by the external publication ‘De Werkgever’ 
of the Protestant employers of the VCWG, using the same title as their Liberal counterparts, 
who praised it as an achievement of Christian social thought.311 The Roman Catholic employers 
of the ARKWV showed a similar stance by expressing their gratitude and relief to Minister 
Slingenberg for the establishment of the statutory extension mechanism for collective labour 
agreements similar to Aalberse’s proposal in the mid-twenties despite consistent opposition of 
the VNW.312      
2.6 Theoretical reflection 
The business positions of the peak employers’ associations show remarkable consistency from 
the early statutory extension debate after 1918 up to the reaction on the final law in 1937, as 
shown by internal discussions and external publications of these institutions as well as their 
voting behaviour. Despite political and economic disruptions as well as internal opposition, 
Roman Catholic and Protestant peak employers’ associations structurally favoured statutory 
extension, while their Liberal counterparts strongly opposed it. The business organisations of 
farmers and the small- and medium-sized enterprises were an exception, however, as the 
viewpoints of the Roman Catholic and Protestant employers’ associations for these groups 
became more negative to the mechanism when comparing the 1923 and 1926 vote in the 
Supreme Council of Labour.         
 Interestingly, a more thorough analysis of the stances of employers in 1923 
demonstrated that the representatives of export-oriented sectors tended to an opposing stance, 
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whereas those organisations in a sector with a domestic focus were generally more favourable 
towards the instrument.  This pattern is not able to explain the full variation in the business’ 
positions in 1923, though. Even the VNW had to concede that the export-oriented industry was 
relatively well-represented in the AWRKV that supported the mechanism ‘for historical and 
political reasons’.313 Indeed, the divide between proponents and opponents makes clear that the 
ideational commitment of employers’ associations also played a major role in addition to 
sectoral divergences. By following their socio-cultural pillar, a large share of Roman Catholic 
and Protestant employers established a certain degree of cross-class solidarity and broke the 
business opposition against sectoral bargaining.      
 Power played a relatively important role in explaining these attitudes. According to the 
existing theoretical perspectives, control over labour would be the major reason for employers 
to oppose sectoral bargaining. Although the formal recognition of trade unions as such and their 
proper role in social affairs (industrial citizenship) was merely still an issue for a small share of 
employers in the study period, Liberal employers’ representatives repetitively pointed to the 
(threat of the) increasing strength of labour as a motivation to oppose statutory extension. They 
often used a slippery slope argument that portrayed statutory extension as the first step towards 
a PBO and a Socialist state in which workers would also have major control over economic 
affairs.            
 In the business’ representatives’ arguments, industrial peace plays an interesting role as 
it is used as a motivation by both proponents and opponents of the statutory extension 
mechanism. Those who favoured sectoral bargaining pointed to the value of collective labour 
agreements to promote industrial peace and the threat of the undercutting of these contracts by 
unorganised workers and employers to the sustainability of this state as the major reason to 
support statutory extension. Those who were against the mechanism argued that it would 
constitute an impediment on the individual contract freedom of employers. By forcing 
(unbearable) labour conditions on these businesses, the government would risk industrial peace 
rather than facilitate it. Interestingly, the industrial peace argument was, therefore, not used as 
a way of strategic accommodation as suggested by the theoretical framework, but instead to 
support the genuine viewpoints of the peak employers’ associations.    
 Concerning strategic accommodation, revolutionary tendencies may have played a role 
in the political agenda-setting of statutory extension, but they were not enough for the creation 
of sectoral bargaining as such and did not prevent Liberal employers from heavily opposing the 
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mechanism from 1918 until 1936. If anything, economic and political circumstances were 
preventing rather than promoting the introduction of the system as contextual factors since there 
was still a lot of uncertainty on its effects, making the governments unwilling to implement the 
instrument in difficult economic times. The only clear case of strategic accommodation was the 
VNW’s effort in 1936 to avert the proposed statutory extension of wages by showing its 
willingness to talk about a more limited instrument for secondary labour conditions when this 
part would be dropped.        
 Business interests were an important motivational factor for opponents of the instrument 
as well. Following theoretical expectations, business’ representatives that were against the 
extension mechanism generally pointed to its (perceived) wage-increasing tension which would 
be particularly problematic for firms that competed on the international market, especially 
during difficult economic times. The limited flexibility of sectoral bargaining was also an 
important motivation to oppose this negotiation system and also the reason that the power for 
the Minister to declare collective labour agreements inapplicable was not so controversial 
among employers after it was clear that statutory extension would be established. Remarkably, 
business interest arguments were no major motivational factor for proponents of statutory 
extension as such.          
 Rather these employers emphasised the importance of ideational factors in combination 
with the earlier presented undercutting argument to make their case. A system of sectoral 
bargaining fitted particularly well in Roman Catholic thought as a middle ground between 
solidarity and subsidiarity.  As statutory extension was framed as facilitating instead of limiting 
self-regulation through the negotiations between business’ and workers’ representatives, it was 
also widely supported by Protestant employers. Liberal employers still saw government 
involvement as a reason to oppose the mechanism, though, and not merely because of power 
concerns. The ideational element of its objection against such interference by the Board of the 
VNW was demonstrated by its negative stance on The law on cartel agreements in 1935 as it 
was an alternative statutory extension mechanism which could economically benefit its 
members in contrast with the instrument related to collective labour agreements.  
 The statutory extension case also demonstrates the significance of contextual  factors. 
The relevance of ideational commitment implicates the importance of knowledge. Ideational 
created the link between statutory extension and the socio-cultural thought in the pillar to make 
it into a favourable arrangement. These actors were particularly active in the Roman Catholic 
pillar. While Veraart is widely mentioned as such a player in the historiography, the role of 
Kortenhorst in providing this linkage for Roman Catholic employers is significantly 
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undervalued. Knowledge and the political environment were also relevant in delaying the 
introducing statutory extension mechanism. Due to the uncertainty on the instruments’ 
economic effects and the change of relevant ministers, it took much longer to establish sectoral 
bargaining than one expects when purely looking at the societal debate. This may also explain 
why proponents of statutory extension were relatively reluctant in using economic arguments. 
The widely perceived wage-increasing tension of statutory extension can also be viewed as an 
example of common knowledge as it led to broad sympathy for delaying the mechanism under 
difficult circumstances. Due to the enormous increase in unemployment during the Great 
Depression, employers could also use their structural power to postpone statutory extension by 
stating that higher wages would harm employment which they had to generate.   
 In addition, a significant role was played by historical regularities, however. The fact 
that the pillarised socio-cultural landscape played a vital role in establishing cross-class 
solidarity underlines the importance of historical regularities for the establishment of sectoral 
bargaining in the Netherlands. The historical experience with collective labour agreements as a 
way of shaping industrial relations provided an important motivation as well. For Roman 
Catholic and Protestant employers it was a motivation to support statutory extension as a means 
to consolidate collective bargaining, and for more radical Liberal employers such as the VNF 
who already disliked these contracts, it was a reason to oppose it heavily.  
3. Centralised bargaining (1944-1954) 
The second chapter of this thesis analyses the debate among the business community on the 
step from sectoral to centralised bargaining between 1944 and 1954. When moving to this case, 
it is important to notice that a world war preceded both collective bargaining steps. When 
evaluating their relevance for the establishment of centralised bargaining, an essential 
difference between these conflicts is their impact on the political and economic circumstances 
of The Netherlands, though. Whereas the economic damage of the First World War to the Dutch 
economy had been largely limited to the reduction of international trade, destruction after the 
Second World War was more widespread and had also severely harmed the country’s physical 
infrastructure and production capacity.314 This impact translated into enormous unemployment 
 
314 F.J.F.M. Duynstee and J. Bosmans, Het kabinet-Schermerhorn-Drees (1945-1946). Parlementaire geschiedenis 
van Nederland na 1945 1 (Assen 1977) 15; Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in 
Nederland, 163-4, 172 204-5; Willem Dercksen e.a., Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen, 25; Wielenga, Geschiedenis 
van Nederland, 330; Prak and Van Zanden, Nederland en het poldermodel, 248; Herman de Liagre Böhl 
‘Consensus en polarisatie. De kwaliteit van de democratie 1945-2000’, in: Remieg Aerts e.a. ed., Land van kleine 
gebaren: een politieke geschiedenis van Nederland 1780-2012 (eighth revised edition; Amsterdam 2013) 283–
 
74 
 
and a structural shortage on its balance of payments in the aftermath of the war,  while the 
Dutch economy also became more limited in terms of natural resources as the Netherlands 
quickly lost control over its colonies.       
 Under these difficult circumstances, the government started a period of strict, centralised 
wage control, guidance of prices and stimulation of industrial production to prevent inflation, 
attract investment, increase export, reduce the current account deficit and promote employment 
after the liberation of the south of the Netherlands in 1944.315 The most remarkable element of 
this agenda was the centrally enforced Guided Wage Policy, which heavily impeded on the 
sectoral bargaining process of employers’and workers’ representatives.316 Given the status quo 
of a centralised bargaining system led by the government, employers debated two major 
questions between 1944 and 1954 concerning the Dutch industrial system: to what extent the 
formation of primary labour conditions had to remain centralised (1) and if so, to what extent 
the government had to stay in charge of this process (2)?317 As this thesis analyses the stances 
of business’ representatives concerning the bargaining level, the first question is the main focus 
of this empirical chapter. As both discussions overlap, the investigation also touches upon the 
second debate, but the discussion as a whole is not essential for solving the research problem 
and is, therefore, not the focus of this thesis.   
3.1 The heritage of Nazi occupation 
When moving to the business debate on the centralised bargaining status quo in the post-war 
period, it is necessary to start by placing the model in its historical context through a reflection 
on the adjustments to the system during and directly after the Second World War. The major 
challenge of this undertaking is that there is relatively little data on the positions of the 
employers’ associations as the creation of the main structure of the post-war bargaining system 
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through the introduction of the Extraordinary Decree on Labour relations (Buitengewoon 
Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen; BBA) by the government in exile happened relatively sudden 
and occurred in a period from which comparatively little archive files are available as 
employers’ representatives had to operate in secrecy. As a consequence, it is difficult to directly 
reconstruct the positions of the employer community regarding these vital systemic changes. 
This thesis applies a two-part strategy to reconstruct employers’ preferences under these 
difficult conditions. Firstly, paragraph 3.1 addresses the development of the Dutch industrial 
landscape during the Second World War and contains a reconstruction of the stances of 
employers’ representatives towards these changes to the extent that this is possible given the 
limitations of the sources. Secondly, the stances of the employer community on the introduction 
of the centralised bargaining system are also indirectly reconstructed through a comprehensive 
analysis of the viewpoints of the employer community in the well-documented post-war period. 
Although it is difficult to determine the genuine preferences of the business community because 
of the strategic incentives created by the new status quo, an elaborate analysis of the 
development of its attitudes between 1944 and 1954 under changing external conditions still 
gives important insights in the (initial) preferences of the employers’ associations.  
 The first part of the investigation starts with the Nazi take-over in 1940. After a short 
period of limited interference in socio-economic life, the new regime severely changed the 
industrial landscape of the Netherlands. Firstly, it aimed to unite employers’ representatives in 
a single institution by pushing the creation of the Board of Directors for labour affairs (Raad 
van Bestuur in Arbeidzaken; RBA) in 1941, in which the VNW, RKVW, VPCW and COAW 
took part.318 On the labour side, the Nazis took control of trade unions or disbanded them.319 
Since there were no longer legitimate representatives of employees in the bargaining process, 
the employers’ associations declared that they would not take part in collective negotiations 
any longer and were also disbanded as a response.320 The reaction of the business associations 
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suggests that at least a majority within these institutions recognised the role of trade unions in 
the collective bargaining system and committed itself to the establishment of labour conditions 
through a process of negotiations with these representatives.  Secondly, the Germans centralised 
the sectoral bargaining model and put the control over this process in the hands of the already 
existing government mediators (rijksbemiddelaars) who had been separately handling specific 
labour disputes under the authority of the Minister of Labour, Trade and Industry (and later 
Ministry of Social Affairs) since the enactment of the Law on labour disputes in 1923.321 As 
they now had a vital collective role in industrial relations, they came to be known as the 
Government Mediation Board (College van Rijksbemiddelaars). This governmental organ also 
got the power to issue binding wage declarations and force wage levels upon the social 
partners.322 In 1942, however, the new rulers decided to align the Dutch bargaining model with 
the German system by moving the wage formation authority from the Government Mediation 
Board to the Gemachtigde voor den arbeid, which was merely one individual instead of a 
collective.323 This situation continued until the liberation of the South of the Netherlands in 
1944.            
 It was only after this regime change that the trade unions and employers’ associations 
were able to pick up their official activities again. During the conflict, the most important 
representatives of the social partners still met regularly in the informal sphere, though, leading 
to the creation of the Labour Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid; StAR) in 1945.324 According 
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to one of the major spokesmen of the Liberal employers at the time, Dirk U. Stikker, Director 
at the brewing company Heineken, there was a sense among representatives of employees and 
employers that industrial relations during reconstruction had to be characterised by mutually 
beneficial cooperation through an institutional framework, again signifying widespread 
acceptance within the employer community of the role of trade unions in the social sphere.325 
There was a dispute among these business’ representatives on the structure of this arrangement, 
however. Whereas the Catholic business’ representatives under the leadership of Kortenhorst 
aimed for a corporatist, public institution to shape such collaboration, prominent members of 
the Liberal employers’ association wanted a solution in the private sphere, less affected by 
government influence and, therefore, also less dependent on the reconstruction of the Dutch 
public administration.326 Rather than the top-down approach of the Supreme Council of Labour 
spurred by government representatives, Liberals wanted the Labour Foundation to function 
bottom-up with a private law basis.327 The VNW-member Molenaar, therefore, proposed to 
start the Labour Foundation as an autonomous and private organisation of employers and 
employees to regulate social issues and proved successful in convincing the other 
representatives.328           
 Despite the debate on the fundamental structure of the institution,  the founders of the 
Labour Foundation agreed that the goals and privileges of the organisation had to be ambitious. 
The willingness to give the Labour Foundation a central coordinative function regarding the 
collective bargaining process including the ability to issue binding decrees determining labour 
conditions, as indicated by the statutes of the organisation, is the clearest example of this state 
of mind.329 For this coordinative function, the statutes established a far-reaching, hierarchical 
control of the Board of the Labour Foundation over the employers’ associations and trade 
unions on the lower level. From the business side, the Board of Directors for Labour Affairs 
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became the overarching institution in this system where the peak employers’ organisations met 
the representatives of the small- and medium-sized enterprises and agricultural employers. 
After the war, this institution continued to be the formal meeting platform of employers, where 
they agreed on their common business stance concerning wage policy and decided whom to 
delegate to the consultative structures with representatives of the trade unions such as the newly 
created Labour Foundation.330 At the same time, the Contact Commission functioned as a more 
informal meeting platform of the peak employers’ associations, similar to the Council of peak 
employers’ associations before the Second World War.331      
 It is important to realise that the statutes of the Labour Foundation were enacted after 
the centralisation of the Dutch bargaining system through the BBA, which is addressed in more 
depth in the next section, and a relatively small share of business’ and workers’ representatives 
was responsible for the creation of the institution. It is, therefore, not possible to conclude from 
the statutes that the employer community showed a genuine interest in the centralisation of the 
Dutch bargaining system under the difficult post-war conditions. At the same time, however, 
the small share of the workers’ and business’ representatives who created the Labour 
Foundation was widely accepted as the leadership of these groups and the ambitious statutes of 
the Labour Foundation indicate that they challenged the leadership of the centralised bargaining 
model by the government under the difficult direct post-war conditions rather than fiercely 
opposing a system of central coordination itself.         
 Up to the creation of the Labour Foundation, there were some other changes in the 
landscape of employers’ associations in between the first and second case that also have to be 
mentioned (see Figure 4). Before the war, the Protestant VCWG changed its name into the 
Association of Protestant-Christian Employers in the Netherlands (Verbond van Protestant-
Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland; VPCW).332 Similar rebrandings occurred in the Catholic 
pillar in this period as the ARKWV turned into the General Catholic Employers Association 
(Algemene Katholieke Werkgeversvereniging; AKWV), while the RKVW became the Catholic 
Confederation of Employer Associations (Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen;  
KVW). In 1945, the COAW was also transformed into the Central Social Employers 
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Confederation (Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-verbond; CSWV), which preserved its 
predecessors’ focus on social affairs, i.e. industrial relations, but controversially now also 
included representatives of the KVW and VPCW next to the VNW, and thereby came to be 
seen as the overarching institution of large businesses with a central role in the RBA.333   
Figure 4 Main peak employers’ associations in 1945334 
 
  
3.2 The consolidation of central socio-economic control 
As mentioned in the previous section, the centralisation of the Dutch bargaining system 
preceded the establishment of the Labour Foundation. Just after the liberation of the south of 
the Netherlands in 1944, the government in London, made up by representatives of the Roman 
Catholic RKSP, Protestant ARP and CHU, Socialist SDAP, left-leaning Liberal VDB, right-
leaning Liberal LSP and non-party members, had already issued the Extraordinary Decree on 
Labour relations (BBA) to structure the new industrial landscape.335 Similar to the model of the 
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German rulers before 1942, this emergency measure enforced a centralised bargaining system 
where the Government Mediation Board controlled the formation of wages and labour 
conditions and was only accountable to the Minister of Social Affairs (from 1951 Minister of 
Social Affairs and Public Health).336 Prices were also heavily regulated to ensure a certain level 
of purchasing power. Through the statutes of the Labour Foundation, the leaders of the peak 
employers’ associations primarily challenged the role of the government in the centralised 
bargaining system through the Mediation Board by presenting the Labour Foundation as the 
alternative central coordinator  rather than opposing central coordination as such. 
 Due to the enormous, far-reaching ambitions of the Labour Foundation, the London 
government responded to the organisational initiative with little enthusiasm. The cabinet feared 
that the Labour Foundation would establish an enormous concentration of power concerning 
socio-economic affairs with very limited to no public control.337 Business’ representatives 
challenged the far-reaching government involvement and the exclusion of the social partners in 
the central coordination process, however. In a meeting of the VNW’s General Assembly, 
VNW-Chair H.F. Gelderman, who had a background in the textile sector, expressed his 
disappointment with the status quo which he saw as a continuation of the heavy impediment on 
the individual, economic freedom of entrepreneurs imposed during the war.338 Despite the 
necessity of a heavier role of the government in the immediate post-war era, he pointed to the 
danger of a permanent consolidation of the system through an agenda of state socialism.339 
According to Gelderman, the government merely needed to play a reserved controlling function 
where business was concerned, leaving employers able to manage their own companies, among 
other things through the Labour Foundation.340      
 After the liberation of the whole country, post-war elections were called, and the four-
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party Schermerhorn-Drees cabinet (1945-1946) was formed, consisting of the RKSP (from 
1946 onwards KVP), ARP, SDAP and VFB (both become part of the PVDA in 1946).341 Due 
to the increasing opposition against the BBA, this new government introduced the adjusted 
BBA which formally recognised the Labour Foundation and gave it a central advisory role 
while emphasising that the measure was only to be temporary until the end of the reconstruction 
period. Whereas the decision power remained in the hands of the Mediation Board as long as 
they followed the broad instructions of the Minister, it was now obliged to convene with the 
Labour Foundation before making its decisions on labour conditions. 342 Leniently, the 
government generally followed its advice, as it wanted to maintain industrial peace. Although 
employers’ associations and trade unions always had to comply with the centrally determined 
declarations, they still engaged in sectoral negotiations about collective labour agreements but 
needed the approval of the Board in order to establish these contracts formally.343 
 The incorporation of the social partners in the centralised bargaining model through the 
adjusted BBA decreased the opposition of workers’ and business’ representatives against the 
system, but the advisory function of the Labour Foundation was still a clear disappointment to 
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the employers’ associations. 344 They argued that the degree of government interference under 
this law was still way too extensive since representatives of employers and employees had to 
be in charge of what they called social affairs. When pressed on the desirability of these 
intruding institutions in a common meeting of the KVW and AKWV, Kortenhorst, for example, 
argued that as the political and economic circumstances required decisive and centralised 
action, it would be either the government or the social partners to take up this task.345 When the 
government left too little room for workers and business’ representatives, opposition by these 
societal players would be a logical consequence. Even though he expressed the willingness to 
temporarily leave the decision power to the Mediation Board, the Labour Foundation would 
have to replace this institution concerning social affairs in the long run which fitted well with 
the Catholic vision on the PBO.346 This again shows that the initial critique of employers’ 
representatives was focused on the primacy of the government in the centralised bargaining 
system instead of the necessity of bargaining on the central level.    
 Under the adjusted BBA, the Labour Foundation turned out to have a relatively broad 
impact, in practice, however, as it not only heavily influenced industrial policies but also had 
an important voice in more general socio-economic discussions.347 The large practical influence 
of the Labour Foundation even became a point of debate in the General and Daily Board of the 
CSWV as J.G.J.C. Nieuwenhuis, Director of the transport company N.V. Rotterdamsche 
Electrische Tramweg Maatschappij, F.C. Bouman, Director of the textile company Palthe’s 
Veredelingsbedrijf N.V., and H. Smidt van Gelder, Commissioner of Van Gelder Zonen N.V.’s 
paper factories, clung to the pre-war position that workers’ representatives had no or a very 
limited role to play in economic affairs, which was violated by this practice.348 These 
discussions suggest that a clear majority in the CSWV was in favour of giving employees 
influence through the Labour Foundation, though.       
 Due to the extraordinary post-war circumstances and incorporation of the social partners 
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in the centralised bargaining system through the Labour Foundation, the majority of business’ 
and workers’ representatives abided by the far-reaching policy agenda of the government in the 
first years of the reconstruction period including the centralised bargaining system with far-
reaching government involvement.349 The Catholic peak employers’ associations even openly 
supported the public policy of wage repression to promote industrial peace (as there was little 
room for negotiations), expand production capacity and increase international competitiveness 
despite its far-reaching government interference.350 At the same time, the Protestant employers 
of the VPCW reaffirmed their highly critical stance on public influence on social affairs under 
normal conditions in their action programme but argued that this was no argument against 
government interference in the exceptional, transitory post-war phase.351 Crucially, the social 
partners severely limited the extent of conflict over the harsh emergency measures until the end 
of the reconstruction period. In 1947, the RBA and the central institution of trade unions (Raad 
van Vakcentralen), for example, both wrote a manifest in which they called for industrial peace 
among workers and employers to support the government in its post-war reconstruction 
effort.352           
 As demonstrated earlier, the opposition of employers’ representatives against the BBA 
was primarily targeted at the role of the government in the centralised bargaining system rather 
than the bargaining level. Employers’ associations and trade unions generally agreed on the 
main targets of socio-economic policy and broadly cooperated, merely debating and negotiating 
the precise wage compensation required due to the fluctuations in the prices of crucial goods 
and services.353 From a strategic point of view, the lack of pushback by employers against 
centralised bargaining itself in the immediate post-war period is not that remarkable as the 
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guided wage policy largely aligned with the economic interests of the large, industrial 
employers due to its promotion of the limitation of wages and consumption to stimulate 
productivity, industrial output and prevent inflation.354 The members of the Praesidium of the 
Protestant peak employers’ association, for instance, were very positive towards the restriction 
of wage increases which they viewed as a last resort option when the government could not 
keep prices of basic goods in check using controls or subsidies and was unwilling to shrink 
income tax. The main reason for the VPCW’s stance on wage moderation was the international 
competitiveness of the industry as its members wanted to keep wages low, particularly when 
compared with geographically close competitors such as England.355 The high degree of 
consensus within the VPCW  on this attitude suggests that tensions between sectors producing 
for the external and domestic market based on differences in economic interests played no large 
role in this association at the time.        
 At first sight, the approach of the trade unions was more surprising from a strategic 
perspective, as they adopted a critical stance towards strikes and did not challenge the primary 
focus of the government on the recovery of industrial production instead of the living standards 
of workers who were obliged to work 48-hour workweeks under the BBA and were only 
allowed to quit their jobs in special circumstances.356 This position was partly caused by the 
experience of the Great Depression combined with a growing working population, which 
spurred concerns about the detrimental effects of (future) unemployment.357 The focus of trade 
unions, therefore, was on increasing industrial output and employment using a centralised, 
institutionalised framework rather than on higher wages. As a result, wage growth was lower 
in the post-war period than in surrounding countries which facilitated a remarkable economic 
recovery even when comparing with other countries in Continental Europe.358  
 Another strategic consideration for the social partners might have been the consistent 
political leadership of Catholics and Social Democrats which backed these policies in the 
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immediate post-war years. After the Cabinet Schermerhorn-Drees, the KVP and PvdA formed 
the Cabinet Beel I (1946-1948) on their own and the Cabinet Drees-Van Schaik in cooperation 
with the Protestant CHU and the newly created, right-leaning Liberal VVD (1948-1951).359 
During these cabinets, the consensus among the Social Democrats, Protestant, Catholics and 
right-leaning Liberals on the strict guidance of wages and prices remained.360 As part of this 
agenda, the government aimed to create similar labour conditions within these sectors through 
the increased use of collective labour agreements and statutory extension which led to a quick 
increase of the coverage of the collective labour agreements during these cabinets, both in 
absolute and relative terms (see Table 6).361  
Table 6 Number and percentage of workers under collective labour agreements in the Netherlands362 
Date Number of workers % of employed labour force 
1 January 1911 23,000 1.0 
1 January 1917 83,000 3.3 
1 January 1920 274,000 10.4 
1 June 1924 286,000 10.4 
1 June 1930 386,000 12.8 
1 June 1934 259,000 9.1 
1 June 1939 323,000 10.1 
1 June 1941 451,000 13.6 
1 January 1951 950,000 24.8 
1 December 1954 1,330,000 33.8 
Notes: the number of workers is rounded up to thousands of people; the employed labour force consists of those 
people between 15 and 65 years of age that work at least 15 hours per week. 
Importantly, however, these political parties disagreed on which long-term policies were 
desirable. The PvdA and NVV preferred a permanent guiding role for the government, while 
the KVP, CHU, ARP, the employers’ associations and the other trade unions only supported 
the centralised bargaining system led by the government as a temporary measure given the 
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extraordinary post-war circumstances.363 Due to the opposing stances, an increase of tensions 
between these groups was merely a matter of time.  
3.3 Permit or mandatory decree? 
The previous section has demonstrated that the peak employers’ associations primarily 
contested the role of the government in the centralised bargaining system rather than the 
bargaining level in the immediate post-war years. Due to the extraordinary post-war 
circumstances and the incorporation of the social partners in the adjusted BBA, the fierceness 
of business opposition was limited and the social partners facilitated a period of relative 
industrial peace. This chapter shows that the the bargaining level of the centralised bargaining 
model became more controversial in the employer community when conditions improved and 
social tensions increased, however, leading to an expansion of business resistance against the 
system.           
 This upsurge in societal pressures on the the centralised bargaining system started in 
1949 and became more severe during the early 50s.364 Due to the successful reconstruction of 
industry, low level of unemployment, positive balance of payments, high economic growth, 
unbalanced performance of different sectors and partial liberalisation of prices, the call for 
higher and more flexible wages increased.365 Within the employer community, wage 
differentiation was the most eminent concern. Under the Guided Wage Policy, the government 
tried to keep wages as low and uniform as possible, only compensating for unpreventable price 
increases in the necessities of living, in order to stimulate industry and employment.366 This 
system merely allowed very limited wage differentiation based on variation in municipality, 
educational attainment, experience, performance and job type.367 It may come as no surprise 
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that the social partners constantly disputed the relatively arbitrary categories used to measure 
these differences. The central wage decrees which usually determined the mutations, excluding 
municipality differentiation, were generally drafted in such a way that there was little flexible 
room for the bargaining process surrounding primary labour conditions on the sectoral level, 
making this level of negotiation relatively unimportant.368 Importantly, these directives could 
either have a mandatory nature simply prescribing a certain wage level or take the form of a 
permit which would allow for sectoral negotiations between employers’ associations and trade 
unions on the height of the mutation within a centrally determined range. Although the 
Government Mediation Board generally used mandatory wage increases, business’ 
representatives increasingly started to ask for more flexibility through the use of permits. This 
signifies that the peak employers’ association were not yet willing to fundamentally challenge 
the centralised bargaining system in this period, but opted for adjustments within the model 
instead by contesting the form of the the system’s output.     
 The trend of increasing opposition against the centralised bargaining level started during 
the wage negotiations of 1949. Here, trade unions called for a mandatory five per cent 
compensation for the price increases resulting from the devaluation of the Dutch guilder.369 
Whereas the peak employers’ associations insisted on the damage a wage increase would bring 
to the international competitiveness of the Dutch economy, the trade unions claimed, and the 
government eventually decided, that abstaining from wage compensation was socially 
unacceptable.370 According to the business organisations, such a wage expansion contradicted 
the initial goal of the devaluation to increase the competitiveness of Dutch companies on the 
international market in order to increase production, recover the balance of payments of the 
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Netherlands and anticipate the end of the Marshall funds.371 Following their argument, a small 
decrease in purchasing power was necessary for achieving these goals. As it became clear that 
a wage increase was unavoidable, employers’ associations strategically changed their attitude 
by trying to achieve a permit of five per cent rather than a mandatory central decree with no 
possibility to account for different sectoral circumstances.372 The Dutch government, however, 
issued a mandatory increase of five per cent, thereby siding with the trade unions.373  
 For the employers’ associations, their difficult position in the negotiations was a wake-
up call, making these organisations realise the necessity of thinking about an alternative 
bargaining model for the future. On 4 October 1950, the Katholieke Werkgever opened by using 
the experience of the wage round of 1949 to argue for more room for sectoral negotiations in 
the bargaining system.374 According to the publication, the combination of strict wage 
regulation with relatively free price formation caused issues which had to be solved by the 
gradual liberalisation of wage bargaining allowing for an adjustment to the different 
circumstances of economic sectors and regions.375 Within the Daily Board of the AKWV, 
B.J.M. van Spaendonck, who also represented the wool manufacturers from Tilburg in the 
RKVW, also called for constrained liberalisation. While mentioning that it was too early for a 
return to free sectoral negotiations, he argued that it was the right time for the government to 
modify its role from steering into one of more modest control.376 F.H. Terwindt, who was in 
charge of the stone factory Rossum N.V., agreed with him on this specific point but emphasised 
the importance of increasing the role of sectoral negotiations over time, which was supported 
by R.A.H.M. Dobbelmann, Managing director of the soap manufacturer with the same name. 
P.J. Spoorenberg, who had a background in the sugar industry, though, problematised the 
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stimulation of such bargaining as the sectoral establishment of wages ran the risk of harming 
labour-intensive sectors.          
 In 1951, Van Spaendonck and J.H. Derksen, Secretary of the AKWV and KVW, 
observed that the centralised bargaining model led to an increasing number of structural 
problems on the sectoral level leading to the conclusion that at least some of the negotiations 
had to move back to this level of negotiations.377 The other Board members of the KVW had a 
similar view on sectoral differentiation in this period. Here, A.M.C.J. Steinkühler, Catholic 
business’ representative of the cigar industry, stated that the rigid centralised bargaining system 
left no room for solving inequities between different economic sectors. He, therefore, proposed 
to centrally introduce wage increases with a significant margin for sectoral negotiations.378 Van 
Spaendonck supported this statement, while H.J.M. van der Ven, who had a scientific 
background and was affiliated with the Catholic business organisation of the metal sector, 
pointed out that such a system would have to include a limited maximum because of the 
difficulty it could bring to labour-intensive firms.379 These debates within the AKWV and 
RKVW suggest that the centralised bargaining model became more controversial within the 
Catholic employer community under the changing economic circumstances, although some 
members were concerned about radical short-term change because of the possible effects on 
labour-intensive firms. Based on the these discussions, it is not possible to conclude that 
differences in the affiliations of the employers’ representatives between domestic and export-
oriented sectors explain who in the AKWV and RKVW expressed their concern about short-
term change, however.          
 In the CSWV-Commission on wages and prices, the system was also debated and 
criticised in this period. Interestingly, these meetings plainly demonstrated the divergence of 
ideational and pragmatic business interests concerning the bargaining model. Whereas the 
business’ representatives in the committee generally ideationally opposed the agenda of the 
NVV to minimise wage differences and viewed the increased influence of employees on 
economic affairs due to the centralisation of the bargaining process as a threat, they argued that 
the system was strategically attractive under the circumstances of 1950 because of the economic 
damage of the war, the tight labour market and the inferior organisational capacity of capital on 
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the sectoral level when compared with labour.380 Additionally, the balance of payments was 
seen as an important macro-economic motivation to delay reform.381 Despite the majority in 
favour of limited short-term change, not all members wanted to postpone fundamental reform 
because of these strategic considerations. S.H. Visser, VNW-Secretary without a sectoral 
affiliation, for instance, used the threat of the increasing influence of labour to back an agenda 
that would directly introduce more flexibility in the bargaining system.382   
 The increasing occurrence of black wages also challenged the centralised bargaining 
model. For the trade unions, the wide usage of these wages was a real threat as they directly 
challenged their legitimacy by showing that some businesses were willing to pay their workers 
more than the centrally determined threshold.383 Workers’ representatives, therefore, became 
more assertive in their call for wage increases, while employees became increasingly annoyed 
as the social partners were unable to reach an agreement. The viewpoints of the members of the 
Praesidium of the VPCW show this rise of industrial tensions between 1949 and 1951. Despite 
concerns about the balance of payments, there was widespread sympathy amongst the 
Praesidium for the trade unions’ demands for compensation in 1949 based on the fact that the 
wage level was far lower than in the other (neighbouring) economically developed countries.384 
This viewpoint was remarkable when compared with the dominating attitudes in the other peak 
employers’ associations at the time. In 1950, the tables turned, however. A clear majority of the 
body was strongly opposed to wage compensation in 1950 for the inflation due to the Korea 
crisis, as they argued that the government had to deal with the decrease in purchasing power 
through a cut of income tax, a further limitation of prices or an increase of subsidies rather than 
wage expansion.385 Only a minority was still willing to tolerate wage compensation in order to 
ensure industrial peace.              
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The Board of the VPCW was still more hesitant about a return to sectoral bargaining than the 
Catholic employer community, though.386 Although a lot of its representatives saw a liberalised 
labour market as the most attractive option in the long term, most were critical of short-term 
reforms given the tight labour market and war destruction. After the result of a mandatory wage 
expansion of five per cent in 1950, trade unions increased their demand for new wage increase 
after another upsurge in prices of ten per cent.387 Employers, however, were unwilling to 
compensate for the full ten per cent. The rigidness of the wage compensation mechanism and 
tough negotiations with the trade unions increased irritation among business’ representatives. 
In the yearly assembly of the VPCW in 1951, Chair A. Borst, who was in charge of the N.V. 
Brood-Unie holding which contained bread and biscuit factories, now openly criticised the 
centralised bargaining system for its forced uniformity but also emphasised the importance of 
caution with the introduction of flexibility in the system.388 Whereas Protestant employers had 
opposed significant change in 1949, they now supported a shift at a limited pace.  
 This upsurge in dissatisfaction with the centralised bargaining system was typical of the 
wider employer community. Increasingly, business’ representatives such as J.G.J.C. 
Nieuwenhuis, who represented the Liberal business association for the transport sector in the 
General Board of the CSWV, felt that continuous central negotiations on wage compensation 
for price increases were unsustainable and employers had to formulate an own alternative way 
of future wage politics.389 In the negotiations of 1951, business’ representatives collectively 
took the stance that they could merely allow wage increases that coincided with productivity 
improvement.390  In his speech for the General Assembly of the VNW in October 1951, Chair 
T.J. Twijnstra, who was in charge of a linseed oil company (U. Twijnstra's Oliefabriek N.V.), 
even showed a glimpse of a more radical stance towards government involvement. After 
recognising the importance of the immense post-war public intervention, he praised the 
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initiatives for stimulating productivity increases and linking them to wage development.391 
According to Twijnstra, this policy had to be part of a larger effort to increase the discretionary 
space of employers and liberalise the formation process, though.392 He even openly showed his 
willingness to return to a system of free collective negotiations. One month later, F.H.A. de 
Graaff, Chair of the CSWV and Director of the paper factories of Van Gelder Zonen N.V., also 
argued in favour of introducing more freedom in the wage formation process during a meeting 
of the General Assembly of the organisation.393 After acknowledging that centralised 
bargaining promoted industrial peace and enabled the possibility to control inflation, De Graaff 
argued that the costs of the system outweighed the benefits as the system did not allow for any 
form of wage differentiation, prevented the reach of a natural equilibrium of demand and 
supply, and imposed a stringent model of price controls based on continuous struggles over 
imprecise indices which were not able to account for more detailed developments.394   
 The concrete negotiations also resembled these calls for sectoral differentiation as 
employers continued their push for wage increases in the form of a permit which would account 
for sectoral differences rather than a binding decree as trade unions desired.395  In the end, trade 
unions showed their leniency in these negotiations as they were only partially compensated 
with a mandatory wage increase of five per cent for the ten per cent price increases which de 
facto meant a controversial real wage decrease of five per cent.396 A discussion on whether this 
partial compensation was justified or rectification was required to ensure full compensation 
following the principles of the bargaining system in the immediate post-war period would 
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continue for years.397 There was no reason for employers to celebrate the outcome as well, 
however. Although the practical damage of these negotiations for the employers’ associations 
was limited, they were still typical for the disappointing achievements of business’ 
representatives in the 1949-1951 period due to the inability of the employers’ associations to 
reach an agreement with the trade unions and their failure to change the standard form of wage 
declarations from mandatory decrees into permits.       
 Although the business’ representatives were relatively unable to realise their goals, the 
stances of the peak employers’ associations showed a significant development between 1949 
and 1951. Next to the role of the government, the bargaining level of the centralised industrial 
system in the post-war period was increasingly criticised within the employer community, 
signifying that they had no genuine interest in maintaining the model in the long run. The model 
was still not fundamentally contested for pragmatic reasons, however, as business’ 
representatives mainly aimed to achieve modest change by turning the mandatory decrees of 
the Mediation Board into permits. Similar to the immediate post-war period, employers’ 
representatives were relatively united in their stance on the centralised bargaining system. 
Sectoral differences played a comparatively small role, but there were some divergences among 
the peak employers’ associations across the different socio-cultural pillars. The Catholic 
employer community was relatively early and vocal with its stance against the centralised 
bargaining model, while the Liberal peak employers’ associations followed and quickly became 
more critical of the system. When compared with its Liberal and Catholic counterparts, the 
Protestant VPCW was more hesitant in challenging the post-war model, but eventually started 
to push an agenda of moderate change in 1951.   
3.4 The system’s fundamentals questioned 
The political status quo was one of the major reasons for the lack of success of the peak 
employers’ associations. The stances of the new cabinets in the early ‘50s showed no significant 
movement regarding the consensus on the centralised bargaining system. After the change of 
government in 1951, the cabinet Drees II (1951-1952) constituted by the PvdA, KVP, CHU and 
VVD as well as the cabinet Drees III (1952-1956) formed by the PvdA, KVP, ARP and CHU 
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continued to push the centralised bargaining model which was initiated and led by the state.398 
This stability is explained by the heavy, consistent support from the PvdA for the guided wage 
policy. The Protestant CHU and ARP as well as the Liberal VVD, openly asked for a more 
liberal wage formation process through sectoral differentiation in Parliament in these years.399 
Notwithstanding a more moderate attitude, the Catholic KVP also clearly showed its 
sympathies towards such reforms (at a limited pace).400 In 1952, the research institute of this 
political party published a report on future wage politics in which it criticised the lack of wage 
differentiation across economic sectors and argued that the economic tide allowed for a more 
liberal bargaining model combined with a consolidation of central control of the government, 
which was received with enthusiasm by the AKWV and KVW.401    
 The most significant developments in this period had been institutional, however. The 
founding of the Social and Economic Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad; SER) in 1950 had 
had a large impact on the consultative structures of the Netherlands. It was designed as a 
tripartite advisory institution under public law with fifteen representatives of employers, fifteen 
members assigned by the government called crown members (kroonleden) and fifteen 
representatives of trade unions.402 Although the SER later came to be known for its socio-
economic advisory role, it was primarily established as the peak organisations of the PBO.403 
The creation of the SER immediately triggered a discussion about the future role of both the 
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SER and the StAR because of its wide working area.404 There was societal consensus that the 
SER had to be in charge of economic advice but disagreement on whether this also had to be 
the the case for social affairs.405 Eventually, the compromise was that the Labour Foundation 
turned into a more technical organ in the social realm which had to tackle the issues that 
confronted the SER with the execution of wage decrees.406 Additionally, the Labour Foundation 
continued to be the meeting platform for negotiations between the social partners on the central 
level and kept an advisory role where policies concerning industrial relations were 
concerned.407 Crucially, though, it had lost its status as the primary socio-economic advisory 
institution for the government to the SER.       
 The new institutional structure was immediately used to tackle the issues with the 
industrial system that had appeared since 1949. Given the increasing social tensions, SER and 
StAR commissions were installed to think on adjustments to the centralised bargaining 
model.408 Of the eight members of the newly created SER-Commission on Wage politics in the 
long run led by the crown member J. Tinbergen, the VPCW, CSWV and KVW all had one 
representative as was the case for the three main trade unions, while two scientific members 
appointed by the government finalised the committee’s composition. In its advice on the wage 
formation model in 1951, the SER advised continuing the central role of the government in 
wage politics in the short term despite the increasing business opposition against the model.409 
As a compromise, the advice of the Council spoke of a constrained wage policy in the next 
years rather than a guided one. This outcome was the result of a debate between employers and 
the Protestant trade union CNV, who wanted more freedom for the social partners in the 
bargaining process, on the one side, and the NVV which aimed to consolidate the central 
guidance of the government on the other side. In practice, the general goal of the policy 
 
404 Van Bottenburg, “Aan den arbeid!”, 101, 103; VPCW, 332, inv.no. 10: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het 
Bestuur van het Verbond van Protestants-Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, gehouden op Maandag, 23 
October 1950, in Restaurant Garoeda te 's-Gravenhage’ (1950) 9. 
405 Albeda, Dercksen and Tros, Arbeidsverhoudingen, 75; Willem Dercksen e.a., Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen, 
127; Drimmelen and Van Hulst, Loonvorming en loonpolitiek, 17; Hemerijck, ‘The Netherlands in Historical 
Perspective:’, 228. 
406 Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 135; Scholten, De Sociaal-
Economische Raad, 61. 
407 Touwen, Coordination in Transition, 153; Hemerijck, ‘The Netherlands in Historical Perspective:’, 229; 
Windmuller, De Galan and Van Zweeden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, 135-6; Willem Dercksen e.a., 
Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen, 127; Mulder, Loonvorming in overleg, 14; Pels, ‘The Development of Collective 
Employment Agreements’, 120. 
408 VPCW, 332, inv.no. 10: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur van het Verbond van Protestants-
Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, gehouden op Maandag, 23 October 1950, in Restaurant Garoeda te 's-
Gravenhage’ (1950) 6. 
409 Willem Dercksen e.a., Vijfendertig jaar SER-adviezen, 470; Scholten, De Sociaal-Economische Raad, 274. 
 
96 
 
remained the same, though, aiming to attract investment, stimulate export and solve the balance 
of payments through the repression of wages.410 The fact that the peak employers’ associations 
abided by this result confirms that they were unwilling in 1951 to fundamentally challenge the 
centralised bargaining system in the short run.       
 In the same year, the trade unions pushed the radical idea of a workers’ share in the 
investments of companies.411 Since the low wage costs enabled the profits of companies in the 
first place, they argued that this would give workers their rightful share and allow them to 
increase their living standards under the system of wage repression. As the major employers’ 
associations commonly denied the claim by employees on a share of the increase in national 
assets given the limited income rises under the guided wage system, these initiatives were 
relatively unsuccessful.412 Meanwhile, the peak employers’ associations were also investigating 
fundamental adjustments to the centralised bargaining system, but for them the major 
motivations were the continuous struggle on the details of wage compensation and the lack of 
possibilities for wage differentiation.413 After the creation of the SER commission on the 
subject, the peak employers’ associations also created their own commission in May 1951 to 
advice on future wage policy and determine their position.414 The Chair of the CSWV, F.H.A. 
de Graaff led this committee, while the members fully consisted of representatives of the 
different peak business organisations.415 Additionally, the KVW formed its own committee in 
December 1951 to add more concrete proposals to the findings of this commission in which it 
was also represented.416          
 In the next years, the different organs of the Liberal employers’ associations became 
ever more outspoken in favour of wage liberalisation. At the end of 1951, the VNW postulated 
in its publication that a healthy economy was merely reachable through the means of more 
economic freedom.417 In 1952, De Graaff repeated his critique on the uniformity of the 
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centralised bargaining system in his speech for the General Assembly.418  He also argued that 
the reforms had to be undertaken with great caution given the threat of possible wage increases, 
though. Under his leadership, the commission of the peak associations on future wage policy 
advocated more flexibility in the wage formation process without returning to completely free 
collective negotiations through a report in the same year.419 Even in the long term, some 
centralised bargaining between workers’ and business’ representatives on the major guidelines 
was necessary according to the committee, however. While the promotion of industrial peace 
and limitation of inflation were the major advantages of the centralised bargaining system,  the 
removal of the responsibility of the social partners by the government, the homogenisation of 
wages ignoring the balance between supply and demand, the shift from trade unions’ demands 
from higher wages to the expansion of other labour conditions such as a share of the 
investments, and the danger of the government enforcing a too high wage level were seen as 
more important motivations, explaining the negative stance towards the status quo.420  
 After this, the committee continued with several suggestions to liberalise this system: 
establish minimum wage increases on top of which differentiation could be possible within a 
certain limit which had to be determined by a classification system (1), create standard wages 
as a result of the bargaining process between the government and the social partners from which 
workers’ and business’ representatives could negotiate a deviation within a certain margin (2),  
use a wage system built upon different scales (3) and finally return to free sectoral bargaining 
as was the case in the pre-war period (4).421 While it generally portrayed liberalisation  as the 
solution, the committee also recognised that this reform would possibly lead to more labour 
conflict as there would be more room for negotiations.422     
 The Daily Board of the CSWV used this report on the long-term wage system to ask for 
the opinion of its underpinning organisations. While most of the underlying institutions stated 
that the post-war bargaining system had been beneficial, there was a clear consensus in favour 
of gradual liberalisation of the negotiation process.423 Interestingly, none of the organisations 
 
418 CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 102: ‘Rede uitgesproken door de voorzitter, de heer Mr F.H.A. de Graaff in de 
Algemene Ledenvergadering op Vrijdag 3 October 1952 te Rotterdam’ (1952) 13-4; Van Peijpe, De ontwikkeling 
van het loonvormingsrecht, 426. 
419 CVV, 2.19.103.08, inv.no. 11: ‘Enkele vraagstukken inzake de loonpolitiek op lange termijn’ (1952) 3, 5; 
AKWV, 917, inv.no. 1419: ‘Rapport van de Commissie Loonpolitiek op lange termijn van het Katholiek Verbond 
van Werkgeversvakverenigingen’ (1952) 1. 
420 CVV, 2.19.103.08, inv.no. 11: ‘Enkele vraagstukken inzake de loonpolitiek op lange termijn’ (1952) 4-5. 
421 Idem, 5-6. 
422 Idem, 6. 
423 CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: ‘Samenvatting van de antwoorden van de bij het C.S.W.V. aangesloten 
werkgeversverenigingen op de discussie-nota van Januari 1952’ (1952) 1; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: Letter 
 
98 
 
backed a sudden return to the free sectoral bargaining process of the pre-war period. The 
employers’ associations saw agreement on the wage compensation for housing rent increases, 
reform of the rigid dismissal procedure, favourable economic circumstances and an improved 
power position of organised employers as conditions that had to be met first before promoting 
more radical change, which suggests that they did not fundamentally challenge the centralised 
bargaining system as a way of strategic accommodation.424 Concerning the other policy options, 
the business’ representatives preferred the usage of minimum wage increases and collective 
labour agreements with statutory extension over a system with a negotiable margin.425  
 They disagreed on whether to sustain maximum increases, however. Despite an 
ideational preference for free collective negotiations and a fear that government intervention 
would structurally increase when sustaining its post-war influence, the metal sector, in 
particular, was concerned that, without a maximum, wages would increase too heavily in the 
short term given the economic circumstances and insufficient power position of business.426 
The Metal Association (Metaalbond) therefore, called for gradual reform with self-restraint, 
indicating an agenda of strategic accommodation. This signifies that sectoral differences in the 
employer community became more relevant to the business stances on the centralised 
bargaining system when the opposition of capital against the model increased. It is not possible 
to conclude, however, whether the distinction between export-oriented and domestic sectors is 
able to explain these divergences. Furthermore, it is important to mention that the sectoral 
differences in business stances on the centralised bargaining system were still relatively small.   
 Up to the elections of 1952, the Cabinet pressed the employers’ associations to take a 
 
from the General Secretary of the Algemene Werkgevers-Vereniging M. Klaassen to the CSWV, 29 February 1952, 
no. S/87 (1952) 1; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: Letter from Metaalbond Director H.Ph. de Kanter to the 
CSWV, 14 March 1952, no. 3000dK/Ko (1952) 1; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: Letter from J.K. Hummel 
(Scheepvaart Vereniging Zuid) to the CSWV, 11 April 1952 (1952) 1; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: Letter 
from Chair W.H. Kruyff and Director Bastet (Scheepvaart Vereniging Noord) to the CSWV, 2 April 1952 (1952) 
1. 
424 CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: ‘Samenvatting van de antwoorden van de bij het C.S.W.V. aangesloten 
werkgeversverenigingen op de discussie-nota van Januari 1952’ (1952) 1; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: Letter 
from Metaalbond Director H.Ph. de Kanter to the CSWV, 14 March 1952, no. 3000dK/Ko (1952) 1-3; CSWV, 
2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: Letter from the General Secretary of the Algemene Werkgevers-Vereniging M. Klaassen 
to the CSWV, 29 February 1952, no. S/87 (1952) 1-2. 
425 CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: ‘Samenvatting van de antwoorden van de bij het C.S.W.V. aangesloten 
werkgeversverenigingen op de discussie-nota van Januari 1952’ (1952) 1. 
426 CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: Letter from Metaalbond Director H.Ph. de Kanter to the CSWV, 14 March 
1952, no. 3000dK/Ko (1952) 1-3; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 35: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks 
Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond gehouden 5 Juni 1952, des voormiddags om 10.30 uur, 
Kneuterdijk 8, te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1952) 5. 
 
99 
 
concrete stance on the liberalisation of the wage formation process.427 These business 
organisations declared that they were awaiting the advice of their committees to formulate their 
specific policy positions. Internally, the Board of the Catholic business confederation had 
already discussed the topic, though. In this meeting, there was a clear majority in favour of 
allowing for limited flexibility in the wage formation process.428 The focus of the debate, 
therefore, moved to how this had to take place. While most of the members backed a vision 
which involved introducing more possibilities for sectoral differentiation with a negotiable 
margin between a maximum and minimum wage increase, some wanted additional bargaining 
freedom on the firm-level with the use of the job classification mechanism, while H.M.C. van 
der Waerden, who represented the Catholic cigar industry, was alone in his plea for immediate 
wage liberalisation.429          
 Later that year, the Commission on long-term wage politics of the same association 
published its final report.430  In this advice, they presented an overview of the up- and downsides 
of introducing more flexibility in the centralised bargaining system. According to the 
committee, the biggest technical arguments against continuing the direct post-war centralised 
bargaining system was its limited capability to deal with particular circumstances and its 
stringent price system, including the labour market, which was no reflection of labour and 
supply, and thereby particularly harmed those people with more human capital.431 Furthermore, 
the report relatively radically mentioned that the centralised bargaining model gave trade unions 
the illusion that they had the right to a certain share of the national product, which could lead 
to higher wages and an expansion of the costs of secondary labour conditions.432 Moreover, the 
commission described the stimulation of economic recovery and the building of mutual 
understanding and trust between workers’ and business’ representatives and thereby the 
promotion of industrial peace as main benefits of the post-war system.433 After this, the 
commission suggested three concrete ways of (limitedly) liberalising the centralised bargaining 
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system: using minimum rather than set wages, allowing for more variation between jobs, 
particularly based on educational attainment, and finally through experience tariffs and merit-
rating.434            
 On 27 August, the Daily Board of the AKWV discussed the report. The meeting 
demonstrates the widespread consensus within the association for introducing more flexibility 
in the centralised bargaining system despite the satisfaction of its Board members with the 
results of the guided wage model in the direct post-war years as underlined by the reactions 
from Dobbelmann (soap manufacturer), N.P.J.M. Daalderop (background in the metal sector 
through the company Koninklijke Metaalwarenfabriek Daalderop), A.M.J.J. Smits van 
Waesberghe (working in the sugar industry at N.V. de Faam) and J.L.J.M. Raymakers (affiliated 
with the textile sector) to the advice.435 Similarly, most of the Board of the VPCW wanted to 
gradually introduce a limited amount of flexibility in the system, while C.J. den Heeten, who 
represented the machine manufacturer G. den Heeten & Co., was a strong proponent of 
immediate liberalisation.436 Meanwhile, Liberal business’ representatives consolidated their 
criticism from the previous years. In 1952, for instance, the Nederlandse Industrie, the new 
external publication of the VNW, opened with a criticism of the centralised bargaining system. 
After recognising the benefits of the model in the direct post-war period, the publication argued 
that the system was too rigid as it did not account for differences between workers, firms and 
economic sectors, thereby limiting a healthy and balanced development of the Dutch 
economy.437 For this reason, the discretionary space on the sectoral level had to increase with 
more influence for the social partners. In the same period, the external publications of the 
CSWV and the AKWV gave similar critiques focused on the lack of differentiation in the 
centralised bargaining system.438 Indeed, the stances of the peak employers’ associations 
showed much similarity in these years.       
 Collectively, the representatives of the peak employers’ associations also argued that 
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the issue of wage compensation for the rising costs of housing rents had to be settled before 
shifting to a new bargaining system for the benefit of the relationship with the trade unions and 
the government.439 These business’ representatives were no supporters of general wage rounds 
anymore, though, now that the tensions surrounding the process had increased and the social 
partners were unable to reach agreements. In October 1952, the Commission on long-term wage 
politics of the peak business organisations, therefore, concluded that the stance of these 
employers would have to be that the wage compensation for increasing housing rents had to be 
the last general wage round, signifying the radicalisation of the attitudes of the peak employers’ 
associations regarding the centralised bargaining system in 1952.440   
 The discussion around the future wage system reached its peak in 1953. though. Early 
in that year, the Commission-de Graaff of the peak business organisations published a small 
report which backed the relatively moderate agenda of gradually introducing more flexibility 
in the rigid bargaining system through a margin.441 In this way, the new system would allow 
for some sectoral differentiation based on economic performance but keep the Mediation Board 
and Labour Foundation in charge of the wage formation process which was agreed upon by the 
Daily Board of the AKWV.442 The NVV and PvdA, however, still opposed the initiatives for 
more wage flexibility. In an extensive response to the report of the Commission-de Graaf within 
the CSWV, Nieuwenhuis, who represented the transport sector and was Director of a tram 
transportation company himself (N.V. Rotterdamsche Electrische Tramweg Maatschappij), 
also opposed the Commission’s viewpoints on practical grounds.443 According to him, the 
liberalisation of the wage formation process was only desirable under the right circumstances. 
Pointing to the difference between sheltered and unsheltered sectors, he argued that these 
conditions were not met. Whereas the right for workers to strike would drive up wages in 
sheltered sectors, similar increases would not be possible in unsheltered industries which were 
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constrained by international competition. As a result, wages for similar work would diverge 
between these sectors, which would harm industrial peace and social justice, while making it 
harder for the unsheltered firms to attract high-quality personnel.444 The pressure on the 
sheltered industries would also make it more difficult to compete in the international market 
leading to higher unemployment. According to Nieuwenhuis, liberalisation, therefore, had to 
take place after a reduction of striking rights. His stance is remarkable as it contradicted the 
Catholic ideal of sectoral bargaining. Nieuwenhuis believed that competition for labour 
between economic sectors would do more harm than the uniformity of a centralised bargaining 
model focused on limiting unemployment given the conditions of the time.445 He stated that the 
introduction of a negotiable margin would not be fundamentally different as it would lead to a 
similar wage-increasing trend with sectoral divergences and the approach, therefore, only could 
be undertaken with great caution for these differences.446     
 The early responses to the document by his fellow CSWV-Daily Board members were 
sympathetic but critical. According to Chair J. van den Berg who also functioned as Managing 
director of a ship repair company (Niehuis & Van den Berg Scheepsreparatiebedrijf N.V.) and 
represented the larger metal sector in the association, Nieuwenhuis’ contribution was an 
expression of the difficult post-war dilemma for business. Whereas employers ideationally 
supported more liberal negotiations, practical concerns forced them to maintain the centralised 
bargaining system.447 Mauritz, who functioned as CSWV-Secretary without a sectoral 
affiliation, also concretely criticised the proposal for focusing too much on the job classification 
mechanism to establish wage differentiation. When Nieuwenhuis repeated his critique in a 
meeting of the General Board of the CSVW a few weeks later, De Graaff responded that the 
employers’ associations had already openly backed the shift to a more liberal wage formation 
system without central decrees.448 Additionally, Mauritz mentioned that the sectoral 
associations had also expressed the desire to use the goal of employment in their negotiations. 
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H.Ph. de Kanter, Director of the Metal Association, noted that the continuation of a centralised 
bargaining model based on promoting full employment would consolidate centralised 
bargaining influence, while it would be impossible to break down already established striking 
rights.449            
 When the Daily Boards of the VNW and CSWV discussed the issue in a common 
meeting, there was again a clear consensus that something had to be changed after settling the 
housing rent issue.450 The employers’ representatives disagreed about how this shift had to 
occur, however. Whereas W.H. Kruyff (CSWV-representative of shipping companies who was 
in charge of a large shipping company (Koninklijke Nederlandse Stoomboot-Maatschappij) 
himself), S.H. Visser (VNW-Secretary), H.J.M. Simonis (Vice-Chair of the VNW and 
Commissioner of cutlery company Gerofabriek N.V.) argued in favour of a more radical stance 
backing free collective negotiations similar to the pre-war period, H.B.N. Ledeboer (CSWV-
representative for the textile sector and Managing director of the textile company Van Heek & 
Co), A.J.R. Mauritz (CSWV) and Van den Berg (CSWV; ship repair company) backed a more 
cautious approach of gradual change.451 This debate shows that the attitude for more radical 
change and, therefore, the internal disagreement with the main consensus was more eminent in 
the Liberal employer community. When looking at the sectoral affiliations of the business’ 
representatives involved in this discussion, there is no convincing evidence that proponents of 
decentralisation of the bargaining system generally produced for the domestic market, while 
opponents were focused on export, which is the expectation based on the theoretical framework. 
The Koninklijke Nederlandse Stoomboot-Maatschappij which Kruyff represented, for instance, 
specialised itself in the transport of goods across international markets, but Kruyff still backed 
the decentralisation of the bargaining model.          
 Meanwhile, the position of the Protestant employer community also became more 
crystallised. The central actor in the VPCW on this issue was J.W. de Pous both theoretical 
economist at the Vrije Universiteit van Amsterdam and Economic advisor as well as Secretary 
in the Board of the VPCW.452 In his academic work, De Pous argued that a centralised 
bargaining model controlled by employers’ associations and trade unions could enable the 
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combination of full employment with a stable price level and free collective wage formation.453 
His argument constituted a response to the suggestion that workers’ demands were causing an 
inflationary tension of wages and prices under the condition of full employment. Particularly, 
social partners with the maturity of the Dutch model would be able to run this model and evade 
inflation through self-restraint. Despite his willingness to give the social partners more 
responsibility, he was unenthusiastic about the idea of introducing a margin as he aimed for 
more radical changes which would not involve binding decrees by the government at all.454  
 In the meeting of the Board of the VPCW, De Pous stated that there were three 
reasonable adjustments that would introduce more flexibility in the system: allowing for more 
variation between sectors through the job classification system, introducing (more) general 
wage differentiation with the criterion of employment and opening the possibility of more 
divergences in secondary labour conditions.455 The Board members of the VPCW were 
generally relatively critical of immediately returning to the pre-war situation.456 They perceived 
a sudden liberalisation of the labour market as something dangerous under the conditions of 
international monetary uncertainty and the recent occurrence of the North Sea Flood, Rather 
they saw an expansion of the job classification mechanism as the best option policy option to 
introduce more flexibility based on performance as opposed to the alternative of significant 
sectoral differentiation which was regarded by T. Slavenburg, Founder and Director of the 
Slavenburg’s Bank N.V., and W.A. van der Velden, Director of the Zuidhollandse Bank N.V., 
as a wage-increasing measure.457         
 Although the VPCW wanted sectoral differentiation, their attitudes were, therefore, 
more moderate in terms of fundamental changes to the centralised bargaining system than their 
Liberal and Catholic counterparts. Notwithstanding the consensus in the employer community 
on sectoral differentiation, the business’ representatives were divided on the way in which this 
had to be established, both across and within the different peak employers’ associations. The 
Liberal employer community, in particular, was split on the desirability of radical short-term 
change. The distinction between affiliations with domestic and export-oriented sectors is not 
convincingly able to explain these divergent stances of business’ representatives as was the case 
for the establishment of statutory extension, however.       
 
453 AKWV and KWV, De Katholieke Werkgever 1953, 221-2. 
454 Idem, 222. 
455 VPCW, 332, inv.no. 10: ‘Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering op Donderdag 19 Februari 1953 te 11.00 uur in 
Hotel Wittebrug, 's-Gravenhage’ (1953) 2. 
456 Idem, 2-3. 
457 Ibidem. 
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3.5 Sectoral differentiation debated in the SER 
The common stance of the peak employers’ associations in favour of more sectoral 
differentiation also had had its effect on the broader societal debate. Under the circumstance of 
the increasing calls for more wage differentiation, Minister Suurhoff had asked the SER for 
advice on the future system of wage guidance in 1952. This recommendation became the task 
of the specific subcommittee on Wage politics in the long run under the leadership of J. 
Tinbergen.458 Given the stances of the peak employers’ associations, the CSWV-representative 
within this commission got the mandate to push an agenda of moderate liberalisation with the 
introduction of a margin as a concrete possibility.459     
 One year later, the SER sent its advice on wage politics to the Minister of Social Affairs 
and Public Health Suurhoff after the Council had spent a whole meeting on an extensive 
discussion of the draft advice of its Commission on Wage politics in the long run.460 The report 
outlined four motives for changing the post-war bargaining system: ideology, labour mobility, 
sectoral differences in performance and the pressures arising from the Benelux partnership.461 
Concerning the first motive, the report stated that a small majority of the Council ideationally 
opposed the status quo as it left too little room for individuals and larger groups of employers 
and employees to have a say in the determination of their labour conditions.462 This group of 
opponents was divided in a part that refuted all post-war general wage rounds and a cohort that 
had previously backed these interventions to guarantee minimum living standards for workers 
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given the extraordinary post-war circumstances but now thought something had to change.463 
At the other end of the debate, one member of the committee argued that the current system 
already contained enough possibilities for differentiation, thereby suggesting that adjustments 
were unnecessary.464           
 The second argument of labour mobility was based on the fact that the rigid post-war 
system restricted the price signals (labour conditions) to workers, pushing them where they 
would be the most useful.465 By allowing for more labour mobility incentives, the report stated 
that employment and national income could increase. The third motive, postulated by a 
significant share of the commission, was that allowing for sectoral differentiation reflecting 
divergences in performance would lead to more efficiency and allow workers to share in these 
successes.466 Finally, the fourth reason to introduce more wage flexibility was to satisfy the 
Benelux partners who were complaining that the Dutch government kept wages way too low, 
harming their international competitiveness.467       
 Given the special economic circumstances of the post-war period in general and the 
aftermath of the North Sea Flood in particular, the Social and Economic Council advised 
leaving the system largely intact for another one to two years with some additional possibilities 
for sectoral differentiation dependent upon the macro-status of employment.468  
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Table 7 Vote of the SER on the introduction of a margin in 1953469 
Vote Member name Representation Organisation 
For J.A. Veraart Crown member X 
(21) G.M. Verrijn Stuart Crown member X 
 T.J. Twijnstra Business Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers 
 A.J.R. Mauritz Business Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond 
 J.H. Derksen Business Katholiek Verbond van 
Werkgeversvakverenigingen 
 J.W. de Pous Business Verbond van Protestants-Christelijke 
Werkgevers 
 D. Swagerman Business Koninklijke Nederlandse 
Middenstandsbond 
 Joh. De Jong Business Christelijke Middenstandsbond 
 G.W. Kampschöer Business Katholieke Nederlandse Boeren- en 
Tuindersbond 
 H.A. Quarles van Ufford Business Organisaties van ondernemers 
 G. van der Wal Business Organisaties van ondernemers 
 A.F. Vas Dias Business Hoofdgroep Verkeer 
 H.T. Asser Business Hoofdgroep Verzekering 
 A.A. van Sandick Business Hoofdgroep Banken 
 J.A. Middelhuis Workers Nederlandse Katholieke Arbeidersbeweging 
 W.D. Lelieveld Workers Nederlandse Katholieke Arbeidersbeweging 
 J.W. van den Akker Workers Nederlandse Katholieke Arbeidersbeweging 
 A.A. Boersma Workers Nederlandse Katholieke Arbeidersbeweging 
 Fr. Dohmen Workers Nederlandse Katholieke Arbeidersbeweging 
 K. de Boer Workers Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond 
 C.J. van Mastrigt Workers Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond 
    
Against J.A. Berger Crown member X 
(19) F. de Roos Crown member X 
 J.J.A. Charbo Crown member X 
 W.F. de Gaay Fortman Crown member X 
 J.H. Kiewiet de Jonge Crown member X 
 J. Tinbergen Crown member X 
 F.J.H.M. Van der Ven Crown member X 
 F. de Vries Crown member X 
 C. Goedhart Crown member X 
 J. Horring Crown member X 
 J.M. den Uyl Crown member X 
 C.Th.E. van Lynden van 
Sandenburg 
Business Koninklijk Nederlands Landbouw-Comité 
 J.J.A. Berger Workers Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen 
 H. Oosterhuis Workers Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen 
 D. Roemers Workers Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen 
 H. Korte Workers Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen 
 A. Vermeulen Workers Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen 
 A.J. Wamsteeker Workers Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen 
 C.W. van Wingerden Workers Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen 
    
Blank W.C.L. van der Grinten Crown member X 
(2) Chr. van den Heuvel Business Nederlandse Christelijke Boeren- en 
Tuindersbond 
    
Absent A. van Oven Crown member X 
(3) Th.S.J. Hooij Business Nederlandse Katholieke Middenstandsbond 
 M. Ruppert Workers Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond 
 
469 SER, 2.06.04, inv.no. 128: ‘Verslag van de twee-en-veertigste vergadering van de Sociaal-Economische Raad, 
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After these years, no one in the committee was arguing in favour of a sudden return to pre-war 
conditions, but a minimal majority, made up by most employers’ representatives, two crown 
members and the confessional trade unions, was in favour of stimulating more sectoral 
differentiation through the use of margins.470 Table 7 shows the exact results of the margin vote. 
In the debate surrounding the vote, Mauritz argued that a margin that accounted for 
macroeconomic conditions could be used to transition from the post-war system to the normal 
free sectoral negotiations of the pre-war system.471 This margin would allow for variation 
surrounding the centrally determined wage guidelines, either under, above or both. The 
vagueness of the discussion point in the SER, i.e. a margin without specification, masked 
significant disagreement among its proponents on the practical form of the margin, though. The 
CSWV-representative Mauritz, for instance, argued in favour of a margin under the centrally 
determined guidelines, while Lelieveld of the main Catholic trade union (KAB) backed a 
margin above this level.472         
 Moreover, a large minority, made up by most crown members appointed by the 
government, all members of the Socialist trade union NVV and the representative of the Liberal 
business organisation of farmers, opposed any margin arguing that it would not have the desired 
effect of higher labour mobility.473 They wanted to keep the current system intact with some 
additional possibilities for differentiation on secondary labour conditions.474 Even though there 
was a majority in favour of the margin, the voting result, therefore, gave no clear advice on the 
issue to the government. Additionally, the SER-members disagreed on whether a margin would 
be effective and lead to other practical outcomes than a general wage round given the unusual 
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economic circumstances of high employment in combination with low wages.475 While the 
proponents of a margin argued that wages would reflect sectoral performance to a greater extent 
and the mechanism would stimulate employment, opponents argued that it could establish a 
threat to unsheltered companies that operated in a very competitive environment, making them 
have to cut their workforce.476 Furthermore, there was a clear sense that the negotiations that 
would be enabled by the introduction of margin were likely to harm industrial peace.477  
 In its external publication, the VNW responded with great disapproval to the report of 
the SER. According to the association, the advice merely consolidated the power of the 
Mediation Board in the short run, which did not reflect the opinion of employers, and did not 
involve a clear, comprehensive vision in the long run.478 The other employers’ associations 
were more positive about the voting result in the SER, however.  In his speech for the General 
Assembly of the CSWV in April 1953, De Graaff stated that the employers had backed the 
margin as it was the most obvious way of introducing slightly more flexibility in the system 
despite fierce opposition by the NVV.479 In a radio-speech, Mauritz reconfirmed the stance of 
the CSVW in favour of more flexibility in the bargaining system and expressed the hope for a 
follow-up on the outcome of the SER with a wider dispersion of wages considering macro-
conditions such as employment.480 The KWV and AKWV also responded to the SER advice 
through a discussion in their common publication. The issue agreed with the (minimal majority 
of the) SER that allowing for more variation would allow for more mobility between shrinking 
and growing sectors, while they criticised the opponents of a margin for their narrow focus on 
its effects on the current situation without any outlook for its structural impact.481 According to 
the publication, the maximum increases under the margin were the likely short-term result given 
the extraordinary circumstances, but there was no reason to suppose this was also the case in 
the long term.          
 Overall, these stances in the SER reconfirmed the positive stance of the employers’ 
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associations towards more possibilities for sectoral differentiation. The previous section 
demonstrated that the peak employers’ associations agreed on the necessity of adjustments to 
the centralised bargaining system, but were internally divided on the nature and rate of short-
term change. The relatively unified stance of the employer community in the SER in favour of 
the margin vote signified the consensus that the bargaining model had to be changed in the long 
run. The fact that D. Swagerman, Joh. De Jong and G.W. Kampschöer, who represented the 
Liberal, Protestant and Catholic associations of small- and medium-sized enterprises which are 
dominated by domestic-oriented companies, also supported the margin in the SER suggests that 
domestic- and export-oriented firms were not divided on this issue. Although a significant share 
of the business’ representatives wanted a more fundamental shift of the system in a shorter 
period, the margin was the most viable option for change in the SER at the time given the fierce 
opposition of the NVV against reform of the centralised bargaining system. Through a cross-
class coalition with the Catholic and Protestant trade unions on the margin, the business 
community was able to establish an SER advice for the government in which a majority 
propagated adjustments to the centralised bargaining system. The vagueness and moderate 
nature of the margin proposal masked the significant differences within this coalition, however. 
3.6 Negotiations on the ‘last’ general wage round   
A comprehensive analysis of the concrete bargaining positions during the wage negotiations of 
1953 gives a detailed insight into these divergences, including the divisions within the employer 
community. The negotiations on wage compensation per January 1954 started in May 1953 
when the trade unions declared that they wanted a wage increase because of higher housing 
rents and the limitation of consumption due to the real wage decrease in 1951.482 With a report 
in June, the trade unions motivated their demand for an increase of five per cent which they 
quickly adjusted to seven per cent afterwards.483 On the business side, there was an increasing 
feeling that this wage round was the right time to speak out in favour of liberalisation of the 
bargaining process, even though they knew that the NVV still heavily opposed such reform.484 
 
482 StAR, 01411, inv.no. 23: ‘Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van 
den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 26 Juni 1953, om 10.15 uur v.m., ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, ‘s-
Gravenhage’ (1953) 5; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: ‘De Onderneming 1953. 3e Jaargang no.19’ (1953) 531; 
AKWV and KWV, De Katholieke Werkgever 1953, 351-2, 359. 
483 CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: ‘De Onderneming 1953. 3e Jaargang no.19’ (1953) 531; StAR, 01411, inv.no. 
23: ‘Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden 
op Vrijdag 26 Juni 1953, om 10.15 uur v.m., ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953) 6. 
484 CVV, 2.19.103.08, inv.no. 1: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van de Contactcommissie der Vier Verbonden, 
gehouden op Vrijdag 5 Juni 1953 te 10.00 v.m. in de Van-Hogendorpzaal, Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953) 
4-5. 
 
111 
 
In terms of the bargaining level, the consensus in May was to leave the central coordination of 
negotiations intact for the time being, although employers’ representatives generally wanted 
more influence at this stage.485        
 In this period, the Netherlands also received an increasing amount of external pressure 
to leave its rigid wage system, especially from Belgium within the Benelux framework which 
had been criticising the Dutch Guided Wage Policy for years.486 Whereas wages had been 
significantly lower in Belgium than in the Netherlands before the Second World War, they had 
become significantly higher during the post-war years and still followed a diverging trend 
which gave firms in the Netherlands an increasing international competitive advantage because 
of more limited productivity differences.487 Given these tensions, the VNW-member F.J. 
Philips, representing the famous lighting company with the same name, argued in favour of 
leaving the Guided Wage Policy in May 1953.488 Within the Daily Board of this association, 
Simonis, Van den Berg and Visser were also vocal proponents of this fundamental shift using 
ideational arguments.489 Mauritz, however, pointed to the margin reform that partly continued 
centralised bargaining system as a moderate way forward.490 Although Chair Twijnstra 
ideationally supported wage liberalisation, his viewpoint in the meeting was also more reserved 
because of the possible effects on the operation of the export, construction and metal sectors.491 
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Using the same argumentation, E.L.C. Schiff, Director of the rubber factory Vredestein, and De 
Graaff, in charge of several paper factories, also opposed more moderate change at the given 
moment, though, which is remarkable given De Graaff’s active promotion of reform in the 
earlier period. The position switch is typical of the difficulty the employer community had to 
take a stable and concrete common stance on short-term reform in this period. Whereas the 
Daily Board of the VNW commonly favoured wage liberalisation on ideational grounds in the 
long term, they were, therefore, still not able to agree on when and how radically this shift had 
to occur because of short-term strategic concerns. Meanwhile, the main socialist political party 
(PvdA) and trade union (NVV) kept on resisting any change, as they wanted to continue the 
centrally enforced Guided Wage Policy.492        
 In the next months, wage liberalisation remained the major issue in business circles. The 
different commissions on the topic continued their activities, while the leadership of the peak 
employers’ associations repeatedly discussed the issue.493 Interestingly, there was a lot of 
sympathy for more radical liberalisation of the labour market in the AKWV given the 
favourable macroeconomic conditions of the time and its part in the negotiations for the 
Benelux agreement. If free sectoral wage negotiations were introduced, the dominating view in 
the AKWV, formulated by the Daily Board members A.H.M. Albregts, Secretary without a 
sectoral affiliation, L.A.J.M. van Heijst, AKWV-Chair with a background in the metal sector, 
Terwindt, representing the Catholic brick manufacturers, and L.F.H. Regout, affiliated with the 
mine industry in Limburg, was that this process would have to be radical by leaving the system 
of central coordination altogether rather than changing the actor in charge of this process.494 
The call for more severe action also increased in the business organisations of the other pillars 
during these weeks. The meeting of the peak employers’ associations on 11 June 1953 where 
they agreed not to engage in any general wage bargaining after this round demonstrates this 
shift.495 From 1954 onwards, the importance of the sectoral negotiations had to increase, 
signifying the willingness to reduce the central control in the collective bargaining system. After 
 
492 AKWV, 917, inv.no. 62: ‘Nota over de gang van zaken bij het beraad over eventuele wijzigingen in de 
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a period of unclarity and repeated changes in concrete positions, the business organisations had 
finally come to a common viewpoint.        
 Building upon this agreement, the main point of debate became to what extent the peak 
employers’ associations had to express this stance externally. In a meeting of the General Board 
of the VNW a few days later, Twijnstra suggested issuing a common statement of business’ 
representatives in favour of a more liberal wage formation process.496 Again, a large share of 
the active members of the VNW took a very reserved stance towards change, though. W.H. van 
Leeuwen, who was in charge of the Koninklijke Nederlandsche Gist- en Spiritusfabriek which 
produced yeast and spirit, De Graaff, W. Bruynzeel, Managing director of the Bruynzeel 
factories that mainly produced floors and kitchens, and M.H. Damme, the former CSWV-Chair 
who represented a machine manufacturer (Werkspoor N.V.), expressed their doubts on such a 
statement by arguing that the status quo functioned pretty well given the circumstances, making 
a shake-up undesirable at the given moment.497 J.M. van den Bosch, Director of a synthetic 
fibre producer (Algemene Kunstzijde Unie N.V.), however, used the lack of wage differentiation 
under the centralised bargaining system to support Twijnstra’s position, while C. van Loon, 
Director of a stearin candle factory (Gouda Apollo), pointed to the threat of black wages as a 
reason to be supportive and Visser argued that the centralised process increasingly gave 
(undesirable) influence to trade unions.498 The minutes of the meeting give a remarkable insight 
in the discussion on wage liberalisation in the Liberal employer community as they contain a 
repetition of the major arguments of the pillar and demonstrate that opportunistic opposition 
based on momentous economic conditions was most eminent within the leadership of the VNW.
 By comparison, the other peak employers’ associations were more positive towards 
changing the centralised bargaining system and issuing a statement than the VNW. They, 
therefore, worked on a proclamation despite the reluctant attitude of the VNW. On 18 June 
1953, the Board of the VPCW discussed the draft version of this statement. Here, De Pous 
expressed his agreement with the statement but pointed out that some centrally determined 
guidance of the centralised bargaining system had to stay for the time being, regardless of the 
initiative for more wage differentiation through sectoral bargaining.499 While Slavenburg 
 
496 VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 3: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Verbond van 
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worried about the statement as he wanted to continue the Guided Wage Policy, most in the 
meeting agreed with De Pous’ viewpoint and adopted the formulation of the proclamation with 
small amendments.500 These viewpoints make clear that there was opposition to change 
motivated by pragmatic considerations in the peak Protestant business’ organisation as well but 
in a much smaller proportion than in the VNW.       
 The willingness for short-term transformation was most eminent among Catholic 
employers’ representatives. During the early discussions on the 1953 wage compensation in the 
Labour Foundation, the KVW representatives Terwindt and Derksen were most assertive in 
announcing that this wage round had to be the last of the era, preluding a time of a more liberal 
bargaining process.501 In the consecutive weeks, discussions within the CSWV led to a wide 
consensus on the need of the common external statement, making the Daily and General Board 
of this institution, as well as the VPCW and the AKWV (with several remarks), adopt a stance 
in favour of a proclamation.502 In the CSWV, more influence for sectoral negotiations in 
combination with central coordination through the SER became the consensus despite criticism 
from both sides of the argument.503 Whereas Nieuwenhuis opposed a larger role for the sectoral 
social partners, J.M. van den Bosch criticised the position for its continuation of central 
coordination.504 As the CSWV now backed the statement, the topic returned to the agenda of 
the General Board of the VNW which had adopted a stance against the document. Here, the 
CSWV-Chair De Graaff defended his change of mind in favour of the drafted statement and 
got support from the VNW-member H.G. Nolen, Director of which produced transformers a 
(Willem Smit & Co’s Transformatorenfabriek).505 Due to the decline of resistance against wage 
differentiation in the short term, Twijnstra was now able to conclude that the VNW agreed with 
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the common statement.506         
 Two days later, on 23 July 1953, the peak employers’ associations took the big step of 
publishing their common statement on the future wage system which had been the result of an 
intense drafting process. In the document, the organisations first declared that the centralised 
wage system had been beneficial, given the special post-war circumstances.507 The collective 
bargaining model had been successful in combining considerations regarding a socially 
acceptable minimum with the stimulation of employment and the recovery of the balance of 
payments. Additionally, the system was beneficial in its coordination of the balance between 
the different economic sectors and its promotion of industrial peace. With the post-war upturn, 
the downsides of the model had become increasingly eminent, however.    
 For the employers’ associations, the responsibility of the wage formation process in the 
hands of the central government was undesirable from an ideational and economic perspective. 
Ideationally, the Guided Wage Policy established a system of far-reaching government 
interference in the operations of the social partners, which were only permissible for employers 
under the special circumstances of the immediate post-war period.508 Economically, the 
business’ representatives criticised the centralised bargaining system for the insufficient link 
between the performance of economic sectors and their wage levels.509 As these downsides now 
outweighed the benefits of the centralised wage system, the employers’ associations were no 
longer willing to cooperate on general wage decrees after the compensation for rent increases 
of 1 January 1954 that was already part of industrial negotiations.510 The peak business 
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associations proposed a shift to a new collective bargaining model instead where the central 
institutions of the social partners would coordinate the wage formation process on the grounds 
of employment and the balance of payments, and leave more discretionary space for their 
sectoral counterparts resulting in wage differentiation across these economic sectors.511  
 In a later meeting of the RBA after the publication, the business’ representatives of the 
farmers and the small- and medium-sized enterprises in the meeting, respectively W.P. 
Hollebrands and N.A. Vaandrager, declared that their associations agreed with the statement 
but were disappointed for being left out of the writing process, again signifying relative unity 
within the employer community between domestic- and export-oriented sectors.512 
Unsurprisingly, the trade unions reacted negatively towards the sudden move of business’ 
representatives and asked them for clarification and adjustments. Despite the criticism of the 
trade unions in the Labour Foundation, the peak employers’ associations kept their stance intact, 
however.513 After the declaration, the political momentum for sectoral differentiation also 
increased. In the Troonrede of 1953, the government declared that it was considering changes 
to the post-war centralised bargaining system.514 Moreover, there was a consensus within the 
Catholic pillar that a new bargaining model with more involvement for the social partners was 
desirable.515 In this system, the SER would draft general guidelines which would leave more 
room for sectoral negotiations on wage increases. This consensus also became influential within 
parliament through increasing pressure from the governing KVP party to introduce more 
sectoral differentiation, while the PvdA was still backing the status quo with the NVV.516 
Consistent with earlier viewpoints, the ARP, CHU and VVD supported these calls of the KVP 
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for reforms of the centralised bargaining system.517      
 Although the major actors in the employer community commonly agreed that something 
had to change and the political moment had increased, there was still significant dispute on the 
form of wage differentiation among and within the different business organisations. In the Daily 
Board of the AKWV, Dobbelmann emphasised the importance of reluctance with the 
introduction of a negotiable margin because of possible inflationary effects.518 After this, the 
idea of replacing the set wages with a minimally required wage level was discussed. Here, H. 
Hollenkamp, part of an eminent family in the textile sector, wanted to adjust collective labour 
agreements to include minimum wages only above which individual companies could decide 
to pay more, while Dobbelmann wanted to leave the question of the minimum to sectoral 
negotiations.519 When the General Board of the CSWV discussed the form of the wage 
negotiations, the suggestion that it could take the form of a permit allowing for sectoral 
negotiations on the exact height of the increase came back to the fore.520 Mauritz declared, 
however, that the wage increase of 1953 was likely to get the form of a mandatory decree.521 In 
this case, some additional wage differentiation could still be established using the mechanisms 
of the status quo based on municipality and job type as Nieuwenhuis advocated.   
 In the Daily Board of the VPCW, most members were still relatively reluctant regarding 
fundamental changes because of international tensions and economic circumstances.522 The 
VPCW’s involvement in the common statement was, therefore, mainly aimed at guiding the 
calls for wage differentiation of the wider employer community, by proposing moderate, 
gradual adjustments to the bargaining system. In the Daily Board, J.H. van Lonkhuyzen, who 
worked for N.V. Sopla Fabrieken which produced cigars, proposed to introduce more 
possibilities for wage differentiation on the grounds of performance, while De Pous expressed 
the willingness to continue the centralised bargaining system under the guidance of the SER 
with more room for differentiation.523       
 Leading up to September, the employers’ associations that were part of the RBA and 
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Labour Foundation developed a common position in favour of a ‘last’ general wage 
compensation for the recent rent increase and the real wage decrease of 1951.524 This wage 
compensation was complemented with an agenda to establish more differentiation by increasing 
the importance of the job type mechanism, decreasing the relevance of municipality and 
introducing more sectoral flexibility. Unsurprisingly, the height of the wage increase was again 
one of the major issues, but there was a lot of willingness to reach a compromise after years of 
unsuccessful negotiations. The final consensus of the Daily Board of the AKWV was to request 
an advice from the SER on this wage increase.525 Interestingly, Dobbelmann, Albregts and 
Spaendonck pleaded for a generous wage increase as a royal gesture given the favourable 
economic tide, while Terwint opposed such a measure.      
 The Daily Board of the VPCW was a bit more critical of generous wage expansion but 
one of its most influence actors, De Pous, argued that there was no point to more liberal wage 
negotiations when workers' and employers' representatives would not be able to reach a 
consensus and, therefore, supported a wage increase of six per cent.526 The meetings of the 
Board of the VPCW suggest that a significant share of the body, H. Smitskamp, Director of the 
bread factory Nieuwe Haagse Broodfabriek,  in particular, argued for a constructive approach 
by business’ representatives, not asking too much from trade unions and allowing for a 
compromise between the demands of capital and labour as they highly valued the industrial 
stability of the post-war period.527 There also were widespread concerns about the bearability 
of these increases for firms in competitive markets, though, most eminently expressed by Vice-
Chair  Slavenburg.                                     
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For Liberal employers’ representatives, the focus of the debate was on the form of the wage 
increase. Once again, the CSWV-Chair De Graaff demanded a wage increase through a permit 
rather than a decree as it would leave room for sectoral negotiations, supported by De Kanter 
and M. Klaassen (Secretary of the Algemene Werkgevers-Vereniging, an employers’ 
association which was dominated by industry) who opposed a uniform wage round as such a 
decree would not consider differences in sectoral circumstances.528 When the RBA also 
discussed the form of the likely wage increase on 11 September, it became clear that the 
employer community disagreed on the subject. As a response to the trade unions’ demand of a 
mandatory decree of at least six per cent, the RBA was split between supporting a small wage 
increase (around three per cent) through a mandatory decree (1), S.J. Hooij’s proposal supported 
by the CSWV of a somewhat larger pay rise (around four per cent) through a permit (2) or De 
Pous’ suggestion of an even larger increase (around five per cent) by a mandatory decree which 
would be partly compensated through tax relief (around two per cent)(3).529 
 Despite repeated discussions in the Labour Foundation in August and September, the 
social partners were again unable to reach an agreement on the required height of the wage 
compensation,530 which eventually led to a mandatory decree of five per cent by the Mediation 
Board on 28 September.531 Although the peak employers’ associations had made significant 
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n.m. om 14.30 uur ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953) 3-5; StAR, 01411, inv.no. 24: ‘Verslag 
van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van den Arbeid, gehouden op Zaterdag 26 
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concessions by offering a mandatory increase of five per cent, which representatives of small- 
and medium-sized enterprises opposed, the trade unions took a harsh line and refuted the offers 
for a compromise below their demand of six per cent.532 After this response, the Mediation 
Board chose to enforce the conditions of the peak’ employers’ associations’ last offer. As the 
decree only contained a limited extension of possibilities for differentiation using the job type 
method already established in the centralised bargaining system, while the negotiations were 
characterised by disagreement on the computation of the required compensation for inflation, 
the wage increase still fitted the post-war pattern.533 Again, the social partners were not able to 
reach a deal, and the CSWV was not able to get a permit.      
 Interestingly, the relatively domestic-oriented associations of the small- and medium-
sized enterprises turned out more radical than the relatively export-oriented peak employers’ 
associations when it came to repressing wage increases during these negotiations which 
contradicts the expectations from the theoretical framework. In general, however, it is important 
to emphasize the relative unity of business stances towards changes to the centralised 
bargaining system in 1953 which is demonstrated by the July statement. In this proclamation, 
the peak employers’ associations refuted future wage rounds and propagated a bargaining 
model with more sectoral influence under the leadership of the social partners.  Similar to the 
period between 1949 and 1951, the Catholic business’ representatives were most assertive in 
demanding reforms of the industrial model. By comparison, the Liberal peak employers’ 
associations were generally more hesitant for opportunistic reasons, while the VPCW proved 
to be the most reluctant as it consistently tried to steer the agenda of the employer community 
to more moderate changes to the bargaining system.  
3.7 To a centrally coordinated bargaining system? 
A discussion of the outcome of the wage negotiations in the external publication of the CSWV 
expressed that the leadership of the association viewed this result as a reconfirmation of the 
idea that something had to change.534 Whereas Minister Suurhoff and some workers’ 
representatives saw the inability to reach an agreement as a reason to abstain from liberalisation, 
the CSWV argued that it showed the necessity of decentralisation. Similarly, the Board of the 
VPCW saw the outcome as a reason to rediscuss the future bargaining model. Most of its 
 
532 StAR, 01411, inv.no. 24: ‘Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van 
den Arbeid, gehouden op Zaterdag 26 September 1953 om 3,15 uur n.m., ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62, ‘s-
Gravenhage’ (1953) 2-3, 6. 
533 AKWV and KWV, De Katholieke Werkgever 1953, 351-2, 359; CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: ‘De 
Onderneming 1953. 3e Jaargang no.19’ (1953) 525-7, 535. 
534 CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: ‘De Onderneming 1953. 3e Jaargang no.19’ (1953) 528. 
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members wanted to establish a more liberal bargaining process in the short term through 
moderate reforms. G.C. van Dam, VPCW-Secretary without a sectoral affiliation, for instance, 
argued that a coordinative system that combined more flexibility with central control 
guaranteed the consolidation of the industrial peace of the post-war centralised bargaining 
system and was more in accordance with the principles of the Protestant business community.535 
Building upon this suggestion, J. de Jong, Director of the car insurance company De Auto 
Onderlinge, stated that such a coordinative institution had to consider employment and the 
balance of payments when formulating the guidelines.536 There was also opposition to this line 
of reasoning in the Board, though. Dooyes asked why the other employers’ representatives in 
the meeting were unhappy with the status quo given the great practical results of the system for 
employers in the form of industrial peace and wage levels.537 According to him, the introduction 
of more flexibilty would only lead to higher wages. The VPCW-Chair Borst replied to this 
critique by arguing that a more liberal system would be better in alignment with the principles 
of the VPCW and could reduce the issue of black wages.538 This interaction was in line with 
the broader pattern: those business’ representatives who wanted to consolidate the centralised 
bargaining status quo tended to use strategic arguments, while those who argued for immediate 
wage liberalisation pointed to ideational concerns and those in between instrumentalised a 
combination of both.          
 An extensive opinionated document by the VNW-Secretary Visser in 1954 shows that 
he also fitted this pattern. After stating that a moderate approach would merely lead to a 
continuation of the centralised bargaining system, he used the ideational argument of 
entrepreneurial freedom as the main reason to propose a more radical liberalisation agenda than 
was backed by the majority of the peak employers’ associations.539 In his model, the 
government played a more limited part, merely guarding special cases relevant to the general 
interest, while an organisation with a PBO structure that incorporated the social partners got the 
coordinative role. Moreover, minimum wages would be established centrally to ensure a certain 
level of social justice while the absence of a maximum created the possibility of significant, 
 
535 VPCW, 332, inv.no. 10: ‘Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering d.d. 21 Januari j.l. in Hotel “Wittebrug” te 
Scheveningen’ (1954) 3-4. 
536 Idem, 4. 
537 Ibidem. 
538 Ibidem. 
539 VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 37: ‘Nota betreffende de loonpolitiek als een der hoekstenen van het beleid der 
ondernemersorganisaties’ (1954) 1; VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 37: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks 
Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 16 Maart 1954 om 11 uur v.m. ten kantore 
Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s- Gravenhage’ (1954) 5-6. 
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free sectoral negotiations.540          
 As a response, Mauritz wrote that a voluntary limitation of freedom through an agenda 
of gradual change was required to enable the limitation of wages under the difficult 
circumstances of the time and to prevent the risk of inflationary tendencies.541 When the Daily 
Board of the VNW discussed these pieces, De Graaff also criticised Visser for missing the 
relevance of the trade unions’ sectoral power position which would cause an upsurge in wages 
under more liberal negotiations, which suggests that strategic accommodation was an important 
motivation for De Graaff’s support for moderate reform.542 The rest of the leadership of the 
VNW disagreed on the issue as Simonis supported Visser in his effort to return to free sectoral 
bargaining, while W.N.H. van der Vorm, C.M. Hage, Director of the N.V. Lijm- en 
Gelatinefabriek Delft which produced bone glue and gelatin, and Schiff agreed with De Graaff 
and Mauritz that the circumstances were not right for such radical change.543 A few days later, 
the same discussion took place in a common meeting with the Daily Board of the CSWV, 
leading to a similar majority for the moderate consensus.544 Despite the comprehensive efforts 
of the more radical wing of the Liberal employer community, the moderate reform agenda, 
therefore, remained the stance of the CSWV and VNW.545     
 Meanwhile, these employers’ representatives had been convening with the trade unions 
in the Wage commission of the Labour Foundation on the design of a new bargaining system, 
building upon the SER advice of March 1953. On 18 March 1954, De Pous mentioned in the 
Board of the VPCW that there was consensus on a coordinated bargaining model in which there 
would be no return to the free collective negotiations of the pre-war period but still more 
opportunity for sectoral differentiation in combination with central coordination.546 The Wage 
commission of the Labour Foundation finished its concept-report in June 1954 which 
consolidated the consensus of moderate liberalisation with a more concrete proposal on the 
future coordinative wage system led by a newly created Wage Council that would be part of 
 
540 VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 37: ‘Nota betreffende de loonpolitiek als een der hoekstenen van het beleid der 
ondernemersorganisaties’ (1954) 5-6. 
541 VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 37: ‘Naschrift bij de nota betreffende loonpolitiek van Ir. S.H. Visser’ (1954) 4-5. 
542 VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 37: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van 
Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 16 Maart 1954 om 11 uur v.m. ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s- 
Gravenhage’ (1954) 6. 
543 Idem, 6-7. 
544 VNW, 2.19.103.05, inv.no. 37: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van de Dagelijks Besturen van het Verbond van 
Nederlandsche Werkgevers en het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op  25 Maart 1954 om 12.30 
uur ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1954) 8-10. 
545 Idem, 9. 
546 VPCW, 332, inv.no. 10: ‘Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering gehouden op 18 Maart j.l. in Hotel Wittebrug te 
Scheveningen’ (1954) 3. 
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the SER.547 Similar to the report of the SER, this document included the possibility for sectoral 
differentiation to account for variation in employment, productivity and profitability.548 The 
result was remarkable given the fierce opposition of the NVV against the liberalisation of the 
centralised bargaining system in the previous period.549 Now that it could not avoid changes to 
the Guided Wage Policy any longer, the NVV adjusted its stance to suggesting that sectoral 
differentiation merely should take place when certain generally agreed guidelines such as a 
certain level of employment were met.550  Interestingly, the Catholic and Protestant trade unions 
were particularly enthusiastic about the report as it combined a consolidation of central 
coordination, now in the hands of the social partners, with the possibilities of sectoral 
differentiation.551 One remaining point of division, though, was the possibility of general wage 
rounds, with the representatives of the peak Liberal and Protestant employers’ associations 
generally arguing in favour of abolition while the trade unions wanted to keep the option.552 
The Catholic AKWV was an exception as it was relatively sympathetic towards retaining the 
possibility for general wage rounds under special circumstances as a compromise between the 
viewpoints of both sides of the social partners.553      
 In the same period, the peak employers’ associations also presented their own report 
based upon the common statement of July 1953 which showed a lot of similarity with the StAR 
proposal except for some details which are not so relevant for this study, such as the voting 
procedure of the overarching Wage Council.554 Importantly, however, the advice suggested a 
 
547 StAR, 01411, inv.no. 410: ‘Nota inzake de toekomstige loonpolitiek’ (1954) 1-2; VPCW, 332, inv.no. 10: 
‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur d.d. Donderdag 17 Juni ‘54 te 11 uur in Hotel “Wittebrug” te ‘s-
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den Arbeid gehouden op Vrijdag 16 Juli 1954 om 10.15 uur v.m te Baarn’ (1954) 9-10. 
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20. 
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inv.no. 3: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Verbond van Nederlandsche 
Werkgevers, welke werd gehouden op 20 Juli 1954 om 2 uur n.m. in de van Hogendorp-zaal, Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s-
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new coordinative model which would allow for more sectoral differentiation. When the General 
Board of the VNW discussed the report, the main discussion point was again the timing of the 
proposed reforms. W.H. van Leeuwen and A.J. Engel, representing a synthetic fibre producer 
(Algemene Kunstzijde Unie N.V.), questioned the introduction of more freedom during a period 
with a tight labour market, but Twijnstra expressed that it would not be right to wait until a time 
of more widespread unemployment to liberalise the system.555 The discussion of the reports by 
the General Board of the CSWV also indicates that employers agreed on the liberalisation of 
the bargaining system but still disputed the timing and pace of this change. While De Kanter, 
who had a background in the metal sector, for instance, feared that the proposal defended by 
Mauritz and De Graaff would establish too little liberalisation, J.H.A.A. Kalff, Director of the 
insurance company Onderlinge Levensverzekering-Maatschappij and representative of the 
insurance sector, thought the reforms went too far, and Nieuwenhuis argued for either a 
continuation of the status quo or radical change rather than a moderate reform agenda.556  
 Despite the ongoing disagreement, there had been a clear development in business 
positions. At the beginning of 1954, the Liberal and Protestant peak employers’ associations 
upheld the spirit of the July statement of 1953 by consistently opposing general wage rounds. 
The AKWV and KVW, however, took a more moderate stance that allowed for general wage 
rounds under exceptional circumstances, which is remarkable given their radical viewpoints in 
the previous years. This attitude was the result of balancing solidarity with the Catholic trade 
union (cross-class) and the employer community. Although changes to the centralised 
bargaining system remained a controversial issue, the short-term reform of the centralised 
bargaining model had become a realistic possibility due to the majorities in the peak employers’ 
associations in favour of moderate change (1), their refusal of future wage rounds through the 
July statement (2), the compromise of the NVV in the Wage commission on adjustments to the 
bargaining model (3), the government which had left an opening for reform (4) and the support 
for modification by the Liberal, Protestant and Catholic political parties (5).  
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3.8 Sectoral differentiation in exchange for real wage improvement 
The momentum for systemic change also played an important role in the wage negotiations of 
1954. On 27 August 1954, the SER unanimously approved its report on the desirable height of 
wages under the new circumstances of the time that had been prepared by its Commission on 
Wages and Prices after a request by the trade unions.557 The trade unions had triggered a new 
bargaining round on 6 July 1954 by arguing that price increases required another wage 
compensation and that the workers had to get their rightful share in the post-war prosperity 
expansion.558  As the government usually called for advice from the SER instead of the social 
partners, the one-sided appeal for an SER report by the trade unions was widely viewed as 
remarkable but nonetheless successful.       
 Importantly, the SER document postulated that there were favourable economic 
circumstances for real wage increases in the short run next to the compensation for housing rent 
increases because of the exceptional development of national income.559 This point is 
noteworthy as the post-war discussion had typically focused on compensation for price 
increases, but the commission, partly consisting of business’ representatives, now also included 
the idea that workers’ had a rightful share in the post-war expansion of national income.560 
Additionally, the report mentioned that a wage increase designed to account for sectoral 
differences was preferable from a purely economic point of view but could cause harm from 
other perspectives such as industrial peace.561 The report, therefore, postulated no clear stance 
on whether the wage increase had to get the form of a mandatory decree or a permit.562 When 
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the Social and Economic Council discussed the draft of the Commission on wages and prices, 
employers’ representatives were remarkably inactive except the VPCW-representative De 
Pous.563 The limited resistance to the document might indicate that business’ representatives 
thought that some sort of real wage increase was unavoidable given the favourable economic 
conditions.            
 In contrast to previous years, the employers’ representatives were relatively divided in 
opinion up to the final part of the bargaining process.564 When discussing the draft version of 
the SER report in the Daily Board of the VPCW, Slavenburg argued that the economic progress 
of the post-war period was mostly due to the Guided Wage Policy and real wage increases could 
harm this development.565 Rather he suggested to aim for wage stabilisation in combination 
with an increase in the workers’ share in the profits. De Pous, however, stated that a limited 
uniform wage increase was problematic due to sectoral differences in performance and a permit 
which could account for these divergences was desirable instead.566 On 1 September, the 
Contact Commission of the peak employers’ associations also discussed the document, where 
the business’ representatives agreed upon the maximum height of the wage increase but 
disagreed on its form.567 Twijnstra, Chair of the meeting, opened the debate with the viewpoint 
of the representatives of the VNW and CSWV who were willing to maintain the spirit of the 
common statement of July 1953, while accepting that a wage increase of some sorts was 
unavoidable given the very tight labour market, widespread occurrence of black wages and 
increasing threat of strikes.568 To reconcile these two elements, these associations wanted to 
pro-actively open up sectoral negotiations on wage increases of zero to five per cent. After this 
statement, Terwindt and Borst who responded for the KVW and VPCW said that these 
organisations were also in favour of pro-actively supporting a wage increase of five per cent at 
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maximum.569 Although slightly contrasting the fundamental thought behind the earlier 
business’ declaration, G.C. van Dam of the VPCW stated that he preferred a wage increase 
through a centrally determined permit to the solution of the VNW and CSWV, as it was more 
likely to lead to a quick agreement with the trade unions in the Labour Foundation.570 Still, the 
KVW and VPCW were relatively reluctant about their exact, definitive position on the form of 
the wage increase given the short time in between the SER report and this meeting.  
 The RBA discussed the same topic on the next day.571 Here, the farmers’ representatives 
P.C. Elfferich and C.S. Knottnerus rejected the consensus of the Contact Commission as they 
opposed any wage increase, while the Liberal association of the small- and medium-sized 
enterprises represented by D. Swagerman pressed the peak employers’ associations to exercise 
extreme caution in the negotiations in the Labour Foundation.572 These associations pointed to 
the economic circumstances to argue that any commitment to a possibility for wage increases 
would immediately lead to an expansion of workers’ income. Interestingly, the VPCW-Chair 
Borst used this meeting to argue that introducing a margin was unattractive as the resulting 
tensions would be a threat for industrial peace which conflicted with the stance of the Liberal 
peak employers’ associations.573 These viewpoints illustrate the divergence among employers 
ranging from a complete rejection of wage increases to facilitating maximised sectoral 
negotiations without a central permit, to a limited central permit for sectoral bargaining, to a 
central mandatory wage increase, to a central decree which combined a mandatory element and 
a permit.574           
 Remarkably, the discussions show a clear difference in positions between the peak 
employers’ associations in this period. Since the common statement, the CSWV and VNW had 
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adopted the stance of refusing further central wage negotiations,575 which was politically 
supported by the VVD.576 Under the pressure of the trade unions, the Daily Board of the CSWV 
was divided between a group that was unwilling to cooperate on any increase and a group that 
backed introducing a possibility for sectoral increases without a decree by the Mediation Board 
to keep the initiative in the bargaining process.577 Given the tight labour market and the SER 
report, the latter business’ representatives saw a refusal of any wage increase as unrealistic and 
eventually were in the majority. At the start of September, the position of the CSWV and VNW, 
therefore, was in favour of sustaining current central wage guidelines in combination with 
introducing the possibility of maximised sectoral negotiations.578 For the CSWV, the essential 
difference between this stance and the central permit was that the first option would only 
constitute a small commitment and stimulate bottom-up regulation through sectoral 
negotiations, while a central permit would formally place the burden of proof in the hands of 
the employers, making them obliged to motivate to the Mediation Board which enforced the 
decree top-down why the maximum allowed by the permit could not be implemented with the 
risk of still having to do so.579 `        
 By refuting the central permit of the Mediation Board next to its mandatory decrees, the 
CSWV and VNW fundamentally challenged the centralised bargaining system for the first time 
in the post-war period in line with the July statement and in contrast with the other peak 
employers’ associations. The fact that the relatively domestic-oriented Liberal association of 
small- and medium-sized enterprises had pressed the peak employers’ associations in the RBA 
to undertake extreme caution with the wage negotiations in the Labour Foundation suggests 
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that the radical stance of the relatively export-oriented Liberal VNW and CSWV is not best 
explained by a distinction between affiliations with domestic- and export-oriented sectors. 
Rather it seems that the division within the employer community in these negotiations was 
structured along socio-cultural lines. As the Protestant and Catholic peak employers’ 
associations had already refuted future general wage rounds in the July statement of 1953, the 
more moderate stance in the wage negotiations of 1954 might be best explained by a pragmatic 
choice for cross-class solidarity with the Protestant and Catholic trade unions which was more 
likely to lead to an agreement.         
 The negotiations in the Labour Foundation also show that the peak employers still tried 
to take a common external stance, however, emphasising their agreement on the refusal of a 
general wage round and the promotion of sectoral differentiation.580 Despite these efforts, the 
difference in viewpoint remained clear in the meetings of the Labour Foundation. Whereas the 
VPCW argued for a permit, the liberal business’ representatives feared that such an increase 
forced economically weaker sectors to pay unaffordable wages and, therefore, merely backed 
the creation of the possibility of more voluntary sectoral negotiations, and the Catholic 
employers did not adopt a concrete attitude.581 From the labour side, there was a willingness to 
agree with a permit when it contained a higher maximum increase than the proposed general 
wage round.582 Meanwhile, the Daily Board of the AKWV still debated the Catholic business 
stance.583 C.J.J. de Wit, in particular, argued against the permit because of its risk to put the 
Mediation Board in a difficult position when there would be no sectoral agreement.584 He lost 
the debate, though, as the Catholic business’ representatives of the KVW announced that they 
backed a permit of five per cent at maximum as well a few days later.585    
 Now that the CSWV was alone in its viewpoint against a permit, its General and Daily 
Board rediscussed this position. Maitland’s stance in the General Board was indicative of a 
majority within both the Daily and General Board of the CSWV. Although the decision to 
negotiate on the sectoral level through either a top-down enforced permit or more voluntary 
 
580 StAR, 01411, inv.no. 25: ‘Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting van 
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581 Idem, 4, 8-9. 
582 Idem, 10, 12. 
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584 Idem, 6. 
585 CSWV, 2.191.03.06, inv.no. 37: ‘Verslag van de buitengewone vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het 
Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag 9 September 1954, des namiddags te 2.00 uur, 
Kneuterdijk 8, te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1954) 2. 
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bottom-up initiative would probably not lead to many practical differences given the low wage 
level, tight labour market and strong sectoral power position of trade unions, he argued that 
there was a vital ideational distinction that favoured the latter option as it would steer towards 
sectoral self-determination.586 The initial conclusion of the meetings of the General and Daily 
Board was, therefore, that the association kept its stance intact.587 The representatives of the 
CSWV still changed their attitude on the next day, however.588 On 10 September, the RBA 
convened and discussed the position of the government on the wage negotiations in anticipation 
of a meeting with the Minister of Social Affairs and Public Health.589 As statements by the 
government made a centrally enforced wage compensation for a rent increase in the short term 
very likely, the CSWV strategically decided to change its mind on its first-order preference in 
order to form a common business block on the more achievable second-order preference in the 
form of a permit. Basing themselves on the SER report, the peak employers’ associations now 
commonly argued in favour of a permit of five per cent which would enable the possibility of 
a real wage increase while also accounting for the future rent increase.590 The small- and 
medium-sized business organisations continued to express their dissatisfaction, however, again 
signifying that they were more critical of wage increases than the more export-oriented peak 
employers’ associations in contrast to the theoretical expectations of this thesis.    
 On 11 September, the business organisations presented this viewpoint in the Labour 
Foundation.591 The main argument for backing a permit rather than a mandatory decree of the 
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business’ representatives was that it could consider sectoral differences and thereby prevent 
harm for sectors in difficult (international) circumstances.592 Consistent with their earlier 
statements, the trade unions responded that they were willing to accept the form of a permit but 
demanded a higher wage increase under these conditions593, which led to another standstill on 
the height of a wage increase.594 On 14 September, the Labour Foundation met again after 
discussing with the Minister of Economic Affairs and Minister of Social Affairs and Public 
Health to break the deadlock.595 Here, the employers’ representatives moved by offering a 
permit of six per cent instead of five, which was agreed upon by the trade unions.596 The difficult 
position of employers’ representatives due to the economic conditions and their wish for 
sectoral negotiations explains the leniency of business in accommodating a (higher) real wage 
increase. Moreover, the representatives of both capital and labour wanted to avoid another top-
down decree from the Mediation Board by reaching an agreement in contrast to the period up 
to that moment from 1949 onwards.597 Subsequently, the business members in the Labour 
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Foundation successfully defended this stance in the RBA in front of the wider group of 
employers’ representatives who now had to convince their backbenchers.598 As both employers’ 
and workers’ representatives were able to persuade their associations, they reached an official 
agreement on a permit of six per cent on 17 September, which was quickly approved by the 
Mediation Board.599          
 The wage increase established a systemic shift in two ways. Firstly, the outcome of a 
real wage increase meant that the result was not merely about (partial) compensation for price 
increases but also involved the possibility of improving the standards of living in contrast with 
the period between 1944 and 1954.600 Secondly, the form of a permit implicated that the central 
government merely established a maximum wage increase based on productivity gains. Within 
the space between the previous central guidelines and this maximum, representatives of 
employees and employers negotiated on the sectoral level, even though the maximum wage 
increase was often the result of these negotiations in the first years because of the relatively low 
general wage level, tight labour market and the strong sectoral power position of the trade 
unions.601 Whereas trade unions wanted the real wage increase, the employers’ associations 
strived to achieve the permit. The agreement, therefore, was as an exchange where trade unions 
got real wage improvement for the allowance of limited sectoral differentiation which business 
desired. In the following years, the collective bargaining process consolidated this outcome of 
sectoral negotiations about a significant part of the centrally determined wage increases.602 
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Paradoxically, the accord was both a consolidation and dissolution of the centralised bargaining 
system from the business perspective. Although employers de facto accepted the new reality of 
centralised wage negotiations through the agreement, the wage increase also constituted a small 
step in the direction of more wage differentiation, making the bargaining system less centralised 
and closer to the pre-war model.603 The moderate outcome was the result of the disagreement 
among and within the employers’ associations during the wage negotiations of 1954 in contrast 
with the relative alignment of business positions in the immediate post-war period. Despite a 
wide consensus in favour of wage differentiation since the early 1950s, the rate of reform was 
still widely disputed in the employer community which prevented a more radical outcome. 
Whereas the Catholic and Protestant peak employers’ associations supported a central decree 
in the form of a permit which allowed for more wage differentiation within the centralised 
bargaining model, only the Liberal business’ representatives fundamentally challenged this 
system in the short run with their initial disapproval of central decrees in any form. The more 
moderate stance of the Catholic and Protestant employer community might be explained by 
cross-class solidarity with the Catholic and Protestant trade unions along socio-cultural lines. 
3.9 Theoretical reflection 
When compared with their earlier stances, the business positions during the wage negotiations 
in 1954 mark the significant changes in the viewpoints of the employers’ associations in the 
second centralised bargaining case.  Whereas the attitudes of the business’ representatives 
were remarkably consistent throughout the first case on sectoral bargaining, there was 
comparatively much development in the stances concerning the bargaining level in the 
immediate post-war period.         
 The relatively limited amount of information on the stances of the employer community 
regarding the introduction of the BBA in 1944 which provided the legal foundation for the 
centralised bargaining system in the post-war period posed a major challenge to reconstructing 
the business attitudes in the immediate post-war period. By combining an analysis of the limited 
data on the business positions regarding the introduction of the BBA with a comprehensive 
investigation of the reactions of employers’ representatives after the establishment of the 
centralised bargaining model, this study was able to establish that the business opposition 
against the centralised bargaining system was mainly targeted at the role of the government in 
this model instead of the bargaining level. Although this study did not find conclusive evidence 
for a genuine interest by the employer community in the creation of the centralised bargaining 
 
603 CSWV, 2.19.103.06, inv.no. 165: ‘De Onderneming 1954. 4e Jaargang no.18’ (1954) 566. 
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model, it is clear that the leadership of the peak employers’ associations were willing to abide 
by a system of central coordination under the difficult circumstances of the reconstruction 
period, as indicated by the statutes of the Labour Foundation. As part of their challenge of the 
government’s role in the system, these business’ representatives proposed to continue the 
centralised bargaining model  under the control of the social partners, which de facto also meant 
the recognition of a role of trade unions in economic affairs. As the initial BBA gave little 
influence to the social partners, the resistance of the peak employers’ associations against the 
model was relatively fierce. When the newly elected Schermerhorn-Drees cabinet introduced 
the adjusted BBA, which incorporated the social partners through the Labour Foundation and 
would be restricted to the reconstruction period, opposition became less severe, however, and 
the business’ representatives tolerated the far-reaching government influence in the immediate 
post-war period.          
 Whereas all peak employers’ associations ideationally favoured a more liberal system 
of wage formation in the long run, suggesting that they had no long-term genuine interest in the 
model, the extreme circumstances of the time made it strategically attractive for them to 
maintain the restrictive centralised bargaining system which established wage moderation. Due 
to this tension, the business opposition conformed to the centralised bargaining system up to 
1949. From 1949 onwards, the peak employers’ associations were still fearful of the effects of 
fundamental changes to the centralised bargaining system, but tried to tackle the inflexibility of 
the centralised bargaining system by changing the practice of mandatory central decrees by the 
Mediation Board into a standard usage of permits. The CSWV, in particular, was pro-actively 
pushing for permits in this period. As the economy recovered, the tensions among the social 
partners increased and the industrial negotiations were repeatedly unsuccessful, the peak 
employers’ associations started to aim for more fundamental changes to the centralised 
bargaining model, again signifying the lack of a structural, genuine business interest in the 
system.           
 Despite a trend of agreement between the peak employers’ associations on the 
centralised bargaining system up to 1954, which was illustrated by their common statement of 
July 1953 and the vote on the introduction of a margin in the SER, Liberal and Catholic 
business’ representatives were consistently more radical in their approach than their Protestant 
counterparts. Interestingly, the Liberal and Catholic peak employers’ associations took turns as 
the most radical employers’ association between 1944 and 1954. In 1954, the divergences 
between the peak employers’ organisations of the different socio-cultural pillars became larger, 
as Liberal business’ representatives kept themselves to the statement and, therefore, were alone 
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fundamentally challenging the centralised bargaining status quo. When the Catholic and 
Protestant employer community proved to be more lenient by advocating a permit rather than 
no central decree at all and the circumstances showed that a central decree was very likely, the 
CSWV and VNW strategically caved in which led to the moderate compromise of a permit of 
six per cent in 1954. The end result was, therefore, a significant adjustment within the 
centralised bargaining system rather than an instance of fundamental change.   
 Despite these trends, there was internal opposition by minorities against these stances 
in all of the peak employers’associations, however, and the leadership of the Liberal employer 
community was opportunistic as well which is shown by their short-term opposition against 
reform and the common statement during the wage negotiations of 1953. In comparison with 
the first case, differences between domestic- and export-oriented sectors were less important in 
explaining the attitudes of business’ representives, though. If anything, the business 
associations of the small- and medium-sized enterprises were generally more radical in 
opposing wage increases than the comparatively export-oriented peak employers’ associations 
which contradicts the theoretical expectations of this thesis.    
 In these debates, proponents of the status quo pointed at the strong sectoral power 
position of labour as a reason to oppose the short-term liberalisation of the wage formation 
process. Moreover, the initial consolidation and later limited reform of the centralised 
bargaining system should be viewed as instances of strategic accommodation. Due to the better 
sectoral power position of trade unions, the tight labour market, relatively low wage level and 
workers’ right to strike, a large share of the business’ representatives chose to tolerate the 
centralised bargaining system and its central decrees as a way to maintain industrial peace and 
prevent more radical wage increases. On the other side of the argument, the opponents 
postulated that this support would lead to the normalisation of the centralised bargaining model, 
structurally sustaining its far-reaching government involvement and substantial influence of 
workers on economic affairs. Furthermore, they stated that maintaining the centralised model 
increasingly gave trade unions the wrong impression that they had the right on a share of the 
national economy.          
 When investigating the importance of business interests, these motivations played a 
much larger role in the second case than in the first one. The most important reasons for the 
employer community to oppose the centralised bargaining system were wage differentiation 
and flexibility. These critics argued that the centralised bargaining model caused inefficient 
allocation in the labour market, illustrated by the increasing eminence of black wages, as the 
wages did not reflect sectoral circumstances and human capital. For these business’ 
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representatives, the lack of adaptability of the centralised bargaining system under swiftly 
changing circumstances due to its limited flexibility also was a widely mentioned concern. On 
the other side of the argument, the wage moderation and control on inflation established by the 
Guided Wage Policy was a vital reason for employers’ representatives to support the status quo. 
Due to the tight labour market and comparatively low wage level, these proponents argued that 
liberalisation would immediately cause significantly higher wages. Moreover, some of them 
added upon this argument that sectoral bargaining under these conditions would lead to wage 
competition between unsheltered and sheltered sectors severely harming the competitive 
position of unsheltered industries. Additionally, administrative efficiency played no important 
role as an argument.          
 Given its extreme nature from a business perspective, there was no prevalent ideational 
motivation for employers’ representatives to support the centralised bargaining system of the 
immediate post-war period. There were important ideational reasons for them to oppose it, 
however. This type of argument was particularly important among Catholic business’ 
representatives who maintained their ideational commitment to sectoral bargaining as part of a 
wider cross-class coalition in the Catholic pillar. For the Liberal employer community, there 
was also a clear ideational component in its opposition to the centralised bargaining model 
because of its impediment on the right of employers to determine their labour conditions. 
Interestingly, the ideational factor played a smaller role in the Protestant peak employers’ 
association where pragmatic arguments tended to dominate concerning the centralised 
bargaining system in this period. Still, the cross-class coalition of the organisations of capital 
and labour in the Catholic and Protestant pillar played an important role in both forcing the 
NVV to break its fierce opposition against any changes in the centralised bargaining system 
and convincing the CSWV and VNW to take a more moderate stance on central decrees, 
allowing the outcome of the wage negotiations of 1954 with an exchange of sectoral 
differentiation for real wage improvement.       
 In terms of the contextual factors, the political environment and historical regularities 
played a major role in the centralised bargaining debate. The political environment played an 
important role through the close ties between the PvdA and NVV who took a common stance 
against adjustments to the centralised bargaining model. The Protestant, Catholic and Liberal 
political parties all openly advocated systemic change in the early 1950s but were initially 
unsuccessful in their efforts due to the crucial role of the PvdA in the post-war governments of 
the Netherlands. Similar to the first case, the cross-class solidarity in the Catholic and Protestant 
pillar shows the relevance of historical regularities in the form of the creation and consolidation 
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of the highly pillarised socio-cultural landscape in the Netherlands up to this period. 
Furthermore, the paradoxical nature of the 1954 outcome demonstrates the importance of policy 
feedback loops concerning the centralised bargaining discussion. While the result was 
undesirable for the business’ representatives from a purely ideational perspective, it was a step 
in the direction of their genuine preferences given the path dependency of the policy process 
which the Nazis had started during the Second World War.    
4. Conclusion 
The research question of this thesis is to what extent the Dutch employer community has shown 
a genuine interest in the shift from firm-level negotiation to sectoral collective bargaining and 
the subsequent step of national centralised bargaining during the first half of the twentieth 
century. To answer the question, this thesis applied a two-step method of causal-process tracing 
and congruence analysis. For the first case on sectoral bargaining, this investigation 
demonstrated significant internal differences within the employer community, with some 
business’ representatives displaying a genuine interest for statutory extension and remarkable 
stability of these divergent positions over time. Arguments based on ideational commitment 
and business interests proved to be particularly important throughout the sectoral bargaining 
discussion.            
 For the second case on centralised bargaining, the employers’ representatives were 
relatively united in their genuine long-term interest to dissolve the centralised bargaining 
system, but their short-term stances on the system were unstable and comparatively disparate, 
particularly due to the extreme nature of the post-war circumstances. Although the limited 
availability of information made it difficult to reconstruct the (genuine) business positions 
regarding the establishment of centralised bargaining in 1944, it is clear that employers’ 
representatives chose to oppose the role of the government in this model rather than the 
bargaining level. As the statutes of the Labour Foundation indicate, the leadership of the 
employer community even supported a continuation of the centralised bargaining system under 
the control of the social partners for the length of the reconstruction period. From this cannot 
be concluded, however, that the wider employer community showed a genuine interest in the 
initial creation of the centralised bargaining system, as the employer community was led by a 
very small group in this period and the centralised bargaining system was established before 
the Labour Foundation which might have led to strategic behaviour in the writing of the Labour 
Foundation’s statutes. In the second case, motivations based on power, business interests and 
ideational commitment all played an important role. Interestingly, though, proponents of the 
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status quo tended to use motivations regarding power and business interests, while opponents 
mostly used arguments regarding business interests and ideational commitment.   
 When looking at the first case in more detail, the consensus of the peak employers’ 
associations from the Catholic and Protestant pillar was consistently in favour of statutory 
extension and these organisations, therefore, showed a genuine interest in sectoral bargaining. 
In stark contrast with the expectations from the theoretical framework, the Catholic peak 
employers’ association evenly pro-actively supported the introduction of the mechanism. The 
Protestant and Catholic business organisations of farmers and the small- and medium-sized 
enterprises did not fully fit this pattern, however, as they became more negative towards the 
instrument over time. Moreover, Liberal employers structurally opposed sectoral collective 
bargaining as expected. Only just before the establishment of statutory extension, they changed 
their stance to limit the labour conditions that would fall under the mechanism which, 
remarkably, was the only major instance of strategic accommodation.    
 The main difference between the attitudes of the peak employers’ associations across 
the pillars is explained by the variation in their ideational commitment. Due to the pillarisation 
of Dutch socio-economic life, the dominant Christian democratic ideas within the Protestant 
and Catholic pillar heavily influenced the positions of their peak business organisations which 
provided the basis for cross-class solidarity. Here, the contextual factor of knowledge played 
an important role as ideational innovators Veraart and Kortenhorst played a vital part by linking 
the wider Christian democratic thought with the introduction of sectoral collective bargaining 
and thereby stimulated the ideational commitment to statutory extension by the Protestant and 
Catholic employers’ representatives. Although a majority of the business’ representatives 
opposed statutory extension, a significant minority, therefore, backed the mechanism. A closer 
look indicates that sectoral differences were of major importance as well, though. The analysis 
of the sectoral business institutions that were in favour and against sectoral collective 
bargaining shows that employers’ associations representing an export-oriented sector were far 
more likely to oppose statutory extension than those of a domestic-oriented sector.  
 Next to Christian democratic ideational arguments, the most important motivation 
postulated in favour of sectoral collective bargaining was that the unorganised workers and 
emlpoyers were undercutting collective labour agreements, thereby making them unsustainable 
and threatening industrial peace. As these collective labour agreements were already highly 
valued by this part of the employer community, it made sense to establish collective bargaining 
through a system based on these contracts which demonstrates the importance of historical 
regularities in this case. The opposing side implemented a wider variety of arguments based on 
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power, business interests and ideational factors. First of all, these employers’ representatives 
feared that statutory extension would increase the power position of labour, which would 
consequently expand its influence even further. Often, this concern culminated in slippery slope 
arguments pointing to the threat of the PBO or the establishment of a socialist state. Another 
influential argument was that sectoral bargaining constituted an impediment on the 
fundamental, individual contract freedom of employers. Economically, opponents argued that 
statutory extension would lead to higher wages, harming the international competitiveness of 
export-oriented companies and the agreement would cause inflexibility leading to severe 
problems when quick adjustments would be needed, e.g. during economic crises. 
 In the second case, the employer community struggled with a dilemma between short- 
and long-run preferences, which had been less apparent in the first case. Given the historical 
regularity of the extreme centralisation of the bargaining system in the immediate post-war 
period, there was a wide consensus within the employer community that the status quo was 
(ideationally) undesirable in the long term, signifying that they had no genuine interest in 
structurally maintaining the model. The major point of debate was when this system had to be 
dissolved, though, because of the difficult post-war conditions and favourable central 
government policies for the business community in this period which made the model 
strategically attractive in the short run. Due to these conditions, the short-term interest of 
business’ representatives changed severely from 1944 to 1954. Initially, all peak employers’ 
associations conformed with the status quo because of the difficult circumstances and wage 
moderation enforced by the government. From 1949 onwards, however, economic conditions 
improved and the call for wage differentiation in the centralised bargaining system increased in 
the form of a request for permits by the Mediation Board rather than mandatory decrees, slightly 
moving the stances of the employer community in the direction of its long-term preferences. A 
combination of further improving economic circumstances, increasing tensions between the 
social partners and their inability to reach agreements on wage mutations caused a radicalisation 
of business’ stances between 1952 and 1954, making them demand more fundamental changes 
to the centralised bargaining model which were closer to their long-term views.   
 Notwithstanding internal opposition and instable viewpoints, the Catholic and Liberal 
business’ representatives were generally more radical in their call for change than their 
Protestant counterparts, while sectoral differences played a less important role in explaining 
divergent stances. In 1954, the Liberal peak employers’ associations were the only one to 
(initially) follow their genuine preferences by fundamentally challenging the centralised 
bargaining model and clinging to the July statement of all the peak employers’ associations to 
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refute future central decrees, but they had to give in as the other peak business organisations 
had strategically moved to their second-order preference by trying to achieve a compromise 
through a permit instead. Here, the Catholic and Protestant peak employers’ associations might 
have been motivated by cross-class solidarity with the trade unions in the same socio-cultural 
pillars. Despite the compromise, the outcome of a permit of six per cent established a first 
significant change to the centralised bargaining system in the post-war period through an 
exchange of wage differentiation for real wage improvement. The lateness of this reform was 
partly caused the political circumstances of the time as the PvdA and NVV strongly opposed 
any reform to the centralised bargaining system until they were forced to leave this position in 
the SER through a cross-class coalition of the Protestant and Catholic pillar which shows the 
importance of the pillarisation as a Dutch historical regularity.    
 In the discussion up to this result, the critics of the centralised bargaining system 
generally used economic and ideational arguments and tended to avoid power-based 
motivations. When they referred the power, the opponents of centralised bargaining stated that 
the sustaining of the centralised bargaining model normalised severe government intervention 
and a significant role of workers in economic affairs, while also giving trade unions a wrong 
idea that employees had a rightful share in the national economy. Regarding business interests, 
they pointed to the lack of wage differentiation under the model by arguing that it did not 
account for (sectoral) differences, thereby not directing labour to the sector where it would be 
the most productive through price signals. Similarly, people’s earnings did not reflect their 
human capital, which led to the issue of black wages as firms were sometimes willing to pay 
more than the centrally determined wage level. Additionally, the rigidity of the centralised 
bargaining system limited its ability to react to swift changes such as economic downturns. 
Ideationally, the peak employers’ associations argued for the desirability of a free bargaining 
process between the social partners on a lower level, consistent with the Christian democratic 
and economically Liberal thought of the respective business institutions.    
 Proponents within the business community of (temporarily) maintaining the bargaining 
model used pragmatic motivations rather than ideational arguments given the extraordinary 
conditions of the time and the extremeness of the bargaining system in the direct post-war 
period. Using power as an argument, representatives of the peak employers’ associations 
repeatedly acknowledged that the organisational capacity of labour on the sectoral level was 
superior to that of capital and a return to negotiations on this level was, therefore, undesirable. 
Combined with the relatively low general wage level and tight labour market maintaining the 
centralised bargaining system was a way of strategic accommodation to limit wage increases 
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and maintain industrial peace. Proponents feared that liberalisation would lead to a quick 
expansion of wages and inflation, caused by the economic circumstances, competition between 
sheltered and unsheltered industries and the workers’ right to strike, which would be 
particularly problematic for those companies operating on the international market.  
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5.2 Archival files 
5.2.1 National Archives of the Netherlands (The Hague) 
5.2.1.1 Vereeniging van Nederlandse Werkgevers (VNW) no. 2.19.103.01 
Inv.no. 7: Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het bestuur der Vereeniging van 
 Nederlandsche Werkgevers. Woensdag, 8 november 1922. Te ’s-Gravenhage.’ (1922). 
Inv.no. 16: ‘Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van de buitengewone algemene
  ledenvergadering der Vereeniging van Nederlandsche Werkgevers. Donderdag, 18 
 januari 1923. Te Amsterdam.’ (1923). 
Inv.no. 24: De Werkgever 1923. 1e Jaargang no.1. 1 Juni 1923’ (1923). 
Inv.no. 24: ‘De Werkgever 1925. 3e Jaargang no.10. 1 October 1925’ (1925). 
5.2.1.2 Verbond van Nederlandsche Fabrikanten Vereenigingen (VNF) no. 2.19.103.02 
Inv.no. 3: ‘Het Eene Noodige. Rede uitgesproken door Simon A. Maas Voorzitter van het 
 Verbond van Nederlandsche  Fabrikanten Vereenigingen in de Algemene Vergadering 
 van dat Verbond op Donderdag 21 December 1922, den Haag.’ (1922). 
Inv.no. 3: ‘Notulen van de Algemeene Vergadering van het Verbond van Nederlandsche 
 Fabrikanten Vereenigingen, gehouden op Donderdag 25 Januari 1923, des namiddags 
 te 2,5 uur, ten Verbondsgebouwe, Nassauplein 36, den Haag.’ (1923). 
Inv.no. 7: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Centraal Bestuur van het Verbond van 
 Nederlandsche Fabrikanten Vereenigingen, gehouden op Donderdag 7 December 1922, 
 ten Verbondsgebouwe, Nassauplein 36, Haag.’ (1922). 
Inv.no. 7: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Centraal Bestuur van het Verbond van 
 Nederlandsche Fabrikanten Vereenigingen, gehouden op Donderdag 8 Juni 1922, des 
 voormiddags te 11 uur, ten Verbondsgebouwe, Nassauplein 36. den Haag.’ (1922). 
Inv.no. 7: ‘Vergadering van het Centraal Bestuur, gehouden op 10 Januari 1922, des namiddags 
 te 2.’ (1922). 
Inv.no. 8: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Centraal Bestuur, gehouden op Vrijdag 25 
 September 1925, des namiddags te 2 uur ten Verbondsgebouwe, Nassauplein 36, den 
 Haag’ (1925). 
Inv.no. 21: ‘De Nederlandsche Nijverheid. 5e Jaargang no.4. Woensdag 28 Februari 1923’ 
 (1923). 
Inv.no. 23: ‘De Nederlandsche Nijverheid. 7e Jaargang no.16. Zaterdag 22 augustus 1925’ 
 (1925). 
5.2.1.3 Centraal Overleg in Arbeidszaken voor Werkgeversbonden (COAW) no. 2.19.103.04 
Inv.no. 2: ‘Verslag van de Algemene Bestuursvergadering van Centraal Overleg. Op 26 Januari 
 1922, in het Scheepvaartshuis te Amsterdam.’ (1922). 
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Inv.no. 2: ‘Verslag van de Algemene Bestuursvergadering van Centraal Overleg op Donderdag 
 15 februari 1923 in het Scheepvaartshuis te Amsterdam.’ (1923). 
Inv.no. 2: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van Centraal Overleg op 20 
 september 1929 des namiddags twee uur in de Industrieele Club te Amsterdam.’ (1929). 
Inv.no. 37: ‘Jaarverslag Centraal Overleg 1921’ (1922). 
Inv.no. 40: ‘Statuten der vereeniging Centraal Overleg in Arbeidszaken voor 
 Werkgeversbonden’ (1920). 
5.2.1.4 Verbond van Nederlandse Werkgevers (VNW) no. 2.19.103.05 
Inv.no. 1: ‘Loon- en Prijs-politiek’ (1950). 
Inv.no. 3: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Verbond van 
 Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 16 Juni 1953 om 2 uur n.m. in de Van 
 Hogendorp-zaal, Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 3: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Verbond van 
 Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 20 April 1954 om 2 uur n.m. in de van 
 Hogendorp-zaal, Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 3: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Verbond van 
 Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 21 Juli 1953 om 2 uur des namiddags in de
 van Hogendorp-zaal, Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 3: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Verbond van 
 Nederlandsche Werkgevers, welke werd gehouden op 20 Juli 1954 om 2 uur n.m. in de 
 van Hogendorp-zaal, Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 3: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Verbond van 
 Nederlandsche Werkgevers, welke werd gehouden op 21 September 1954 om 2 uur n.m. 
 in de van Hogendorp-zaal, Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 32: ‘Kort verslag van het verhandelde van de Algemene Ledenvergadering van het 
 Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op donderdag 26 Juli 1945 des 
 namiddags 1 uur in de Stadsschouwburg te Utrecht’ (1945). 
Inv.no. 32: ‘Notulen van de Algemeene Vergadering van het Verbond van Nederlandsche 
 Werkgevers, op 17 april 1945 te Utrecht gehouden’ (1945). 
Inv.no. 34: ‘Gezamenlijke werkgeversorganisaties inzake de loonsverhoging’ (1951). 
Inv.no. 35: ‘Eigendomsvorming door werknemers in het bedrijfsleven’ (1952). 
Inv.no. 35: ‘Concurrentieverhoudingen in West-Europa’ (1952). 
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Inv.no. 35: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van de Dagelijks Besturen van het Verbond van 
 Nederlandsche Werkgevers en het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op 
 4 September 1952 om 14.00 uur, Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1952). 
Inv.no. 35: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van 
 Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 21 October 1952 te 10 uur v.m. in Hotel Figi 
 te Zeist’ (1952). 
Inv.no. 36: ‘Benelux-bespreking met Prof. G. Brouwers’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 36: ‘De stand van zaken met betrekking to Benelux’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 36: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van de Dagelijks Besturen van het Verbond van 
 Nederlandsche Werkgevers en het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op 
 3 Februari 1953 te 12.30 uur in de Van Hogendorp-zaal, Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s-Gravenhage’ 
 (1953). 
Inv.no. 36: ‘Uit het bedrijfsleven. “De werkgeversverklaring inzake de loonpolitiek”’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 37: ‘Naschrift bij de nota betreffende loonpolitiek van Ir. S.H. Visser’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 37: ‘Nota betreffende de loonpolitiek als een der hoekstenen van het beleid der 
 ondernemersorganisaties’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 37: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van de Dagelijks Besturen van het Verbond van 
 Nederlandsche Werkgevers en het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op 
 25 Maart 1954 om 12.30 uur ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 37: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van 
 Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 16 Maart 1954 om 11 uur v.m. ten kantore 
 Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s- Gravenhage’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 72: ‘Nota, behoorende bij punt 3 der agenda voor de bestuursvergadering van 
 donderdag, 8 april a.s.’ (1926). 
Inv.no. 72: ‘Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het bestuur van het Verbond 
 van Nederlandsche Werkgevers op Donderdag, 11 Maart 1926, des voormiddags te 11 
 ure ten kantore van het verbond, Korte Voorhout 12.B te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1926). 
Inv.no. 72: ‘Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het bestuur van het Verbond 
 van Nederlandsche Werkgevers op Woensdag, 12 Mei 1926, des voormiddags te 11 
 ure ten kantore van het verbond, Korte Voorhout 12.B te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1926). 
Inv.no. 73: ‘Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het bestuur van het Verbond 
 van Nederlandsche Werkgevers op Donderdag 19 December 1929, des voormiddags te 
 11 ure ten kantore van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, Mauritskade 5, ‘s-
 Gravenhage’ (1929). 
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Inv.no. 78: ‘Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het bestuur van het Verbond 
 van Nederlandsche Werkgevers , gehouden op Donderdag 10 December 1936, des n.m.
 1.30 uur, ten kantore van het verbond, Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1936). 
Inv.no. 79: ‘Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het bestuur van het Verbond 
 van Nederlandsche Werkgevers op Vrijdag, 5 November 1937, des n.m. 2.30 uur ten 
 kantore van het verbond, Kneuterdijk 8, Den Haag’ (1937). 
Inv.no. 87: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van 
 Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 16 Juni 1953 om 11.00 uur v.m. ten kantore 
 Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 87: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van 
 Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 19 Mei 1953 te 11 uur v.m. ten kantore 
 Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 87: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van 
 Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 21 Juli 1953 om 11.00 uur v.m. ten kantore 
 Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 87: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van 
 Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 5 Mei 1953 te 10 uur v.m. ten kantore 
 Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 146: ‘Notulen van het verhandelde in de Buitengewone Algemene vergadering van het
 Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers. 20 Maart 1930 te Amsterdam in de 
 Industrieele Club.’ (1930). 
Inv.no. 156: ‘Notulen van het verhandelde in de Buitengewone Algemene Ledenvergadering 
 van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers. Vrijdag, 22 Februari 1935 te 
 Amsterdam, in het Koloniaal Instituut.’ (1935). 
Inv.no. 172: ‘Rede, uitgesproken door de Heer T.J. Twijnstra, Voorzitter van het Verbond van 
 Nederlandsche Werkgevers, op de algemene ledenvergadering van dat Verbond op 18 
 October 1951 te Groningen’ (1951).  
Inv.no. 205: ‘Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het praesidium van het 
 Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers op Vrijdag, 8 October 1926 des voormiddags 
 te 10.15 uur in het gebouw van het verbond, Mauritskade 5, Den Haag’ (1926). 
Inv.no. 205: ‘Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het presidium van het 
 Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, op Woensdag, 7 April 1926 des namiddags 
 te 3 uur, ten kantore van het verbond, Korte Voorhout 12.B te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1926). 
Inv.no. 209: ‘Notulen van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het praesidium en de 
 verbondsdelegatie uit den Nijverheidsraad op Maandag, 11 Juni 1934 des n.m. 9 uur ten 
 kantore van het Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s-
 Gravenhage’ (1934). 
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Inv.no. 209: ‘Kort verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het praesidium op Vrijdag, 
 11 Januari 1935.’ (1935). 
Inv.no. 232: ‘De Werkgever 1926. Jaargang 1926‘ (1926). 
Inv.no. 233: ‘De Werkgever 1927. Jaargang 1927 no.20’ (1927). 
Inv.no. 233: ‘De Werkgever 1927. Jaargang 1927 no.23’ (1927) 
Inv.no. 235: ‘De Werkgever 1930. Jaargang 1930 no.26’ (1930). 
Inv.no. 235: ‘De Werkgever 1930. Jaargang 1930 no.34’ (1930). 
Inv.no. 235: ‘De Werkgever 1931. Jaargang 1931 no.2’ (1931). 
Inv.no. 236: ‘De Werkgever 1932. Jaargang 1932 no.49’ (1932). 
Inv.no. 236: ‘De Werkgever 1933. Jaargang 1933 no.50’ (1933). 
Inv.no. 237: ‘De Werkgever 1936. Jaargang 1936 no.38’ (1936). 
Inv.no. 237: ‘De Werkgever 1936. Jaargang 1936 no.50’ (1936). 
Inv.no. 237: ‘De Werkgever 1937. Jaargang 1937 no.11’ (1937). 
Inv.no. 237: ‘De Werkgever 1937. Jaargang 1937 no.12’ (1937). 
Inv.no. 239: ‘De Nederlandsche Werkgever 1949. Jaargang 1949 no.24’ (1949). 
Inv.no. 239: ‘De Nederlandsche Werkgever 1950. Jaargang 1950 no.18’ (1950). 
Inv.no. 240: ‘De Nederlandsche Industrie 1951. Jaargang 1951 no.23’ (1951). 
Inv.no. 240: ‘De Nederlandsche Industrie 1952. Jaargang 1952 no.13’ (1952). 
Inv.no. 240: ‘De Nederlandsche Industrie 1952. Jaargang 1952 no.14’ (1952). 
Inv.no. 240: ‘De Nederlandsche Industrie 1953. Jaargang 1953 no.9’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 240: ‘De Nederlandsche Industrie 1953. Jaargang 1953 no.11’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 240: ‘De Nederlandsche Industrie 1953. Jaargang 1953 no.16’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 241: ‘De Nederlandsche Industrie 1954. Jaargang 1954 no.18’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 252: ‘Kroniek 1937. Jaargang 1937 no.4. 29 Januari’ (1937). 
Inv.no. 264: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Verbond van 
 Nederlandsche Werkgevers, gehouden op 3 Juni 1952 te 10.00 uur v.m. ten kantore 
 Kneuterdijk 8, Den Haag’ (1952). 
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5.2.1.5 Hoge Raad van Arbeid (HRA) no. 2.15.29 
Inv.no. 1: ‘Jaarverslag over 1920.’ (1921). 
Inv.no. 1: ‘Jaarverslag over 1923.’ (1924). 
Inv.no. 1: ‘Jaarverslag over 1926.’ (1927). 
Inv.no. 1: ‘Jaarverslag over 1932.’ (1933). 
Inv.no. 1: ‘Jaarverslag over 1937.’ (1938). 
Inv.no. 2: ‘Notulen van de twintigste vergadering op Maandag 26 April 1926 in de vergaderzaal 
 van de Eerste Kamer der Staten-General.’ (1926). 
Inv.no. 3: ‘Besluit van den 4den October 1919, tot vaststelling van een algemene maatregel van 
 bestuur houdende instelling van een Hoogen Raad van Arbeid.’ (1919).  
Inv.no. 21: ‘Praeadvies van Commissie XII over een voorontwerp regelende de 
 verbindendverklaring van collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten’ (1926).  
5.2.1.6 Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond (CSWV) no. 2.19.103.06 
Inv.no. 2: Letter from CSWV Secretary A.J.R. Mauritz to General Board CSWV and the
 members of the association, 17 November 1950, no. 8534/Mz/HL (1950). 
Inv.no. 2: Letter from Secretary CSWV C.E.J. Maitland to General Board CSWV and the
 members of the association, 10 December 1949, no. 8297/Mz/LB (1949). 
Inv.no. 2: ‘Mededeling van de opvatting der centrale werkgeversorganisaties’ (31 Augustus 
 1950).  
Inv.no. 2: ‘Notulen van de gezamenlijke vergadering van de Besturen van het Verbond van 
 Nederlandsche Werkgevers en het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op 
 16 Mei 1950, des namiddags 4 uur ten kantore van het Verbond van Nederlandsche 
 Werkgevers te Den Haag’ (1950).  
Inv.no. 2: ‘Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Voorlopig Algemeen Bestuur 
 van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op 6 maart 1946 des n.m. te 
 2 uur ten kantore van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8 te ’s-
 Gravenhage’ (1946).  
Inv.no. 4: Letter from CSWV Secretary A.J.R. Mauritz to General Board CSWV and the
 members of the association, 22 Maart 1951, no. 2431/Mz/HL (1951). 
Inv.no. 4: Letter from CSWV Secretary A.J.R. Mauritz to General Board CSWV and the
 members of the association, 31 January 1952, no. 736/Mz/HL (1952). 
Inv.no. 4: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal 
 Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op dinsdag 13 november 1951, des voormiddags 11 
 uur, in het Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Mauritskade 63 te Amsterdam’ (1951). 
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Inv.no. 5: ‘Enige opmerkingen over de nota van de commissie-de Graaff over Het vrijer maken 
 van de loonvorming’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 5: ‘Het standpunt van de gezamenlijke centrale werkgeversorganisaties inzake 
 loonmaatregelen per 1 januari 1954’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 5: Letter from CSWV Secretary A.J.R. Mauritz to General Board CSWV and the
 members of the association, 17 July 1953, no. 6280/Mz/CB (1952). 
Inv.no. 5: ‘Rapport inzake de toekomstige loonpolitiek’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 5: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal 
 Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op 16 Maart 1953, ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s-
 Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 5: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal 
 Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag, 1 Juli 1954, des namiddags te 2.15 uur
 ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 te ’s-Gravenhage (1e etage)’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 5: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal 
 Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag, 3 September 1953, des namiddags te 
 2.- uur ten kantore van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8 (1e
 étage), te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 5: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal 
 Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag, 9 Juli 1953 ten kantore van het Centraal 
 Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8 te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 5: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal 
 Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag, 9 September 1954, des namiddags te 
 3.30 uur ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 (1e étage), te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 5: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal 
 Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag, 16 September 1954, des namiddags te 
 3.30 uur, ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 (1e étage), te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 5: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal 
 Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Woensdag 16 September 1953 ten kantore 
 Kneuterdijk 8, te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 5: ‘Welvaart en loonvorming’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 30: ‘Besluitenlijst van de vergadering van het Dagelijksch Bestuur Centraal Sociaal 
 Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag 31 October 1946 des n.m. te 2 uur ten 
 kantore van het Verbond’ (1946). 
Inv.no. 34: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal 
 Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag 24 Mei 1951, des namiddags 2 uur ten 
 kantore Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1951). 
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Inv.no. 35: ‘Het vrijer maken van de loonvorming’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 35: Letter from Chair W.H. Kruyff and Director Bastet (Scheepvaart Vereniging Noord) 
 to the CSWV, 2 April 1952 (1952). 
Inv.no. 35: Letter from J.K. Hummel (Scheepvaart Vereniging Zuid) to the CSWV, 11 April 
 1952 (1952). 
Inv.no. 35: Letter from Metaalbond Director H.Ph. de Kanter to the CSWV, 14 March 1952, 
 no. 3000dK/Ko (1952). 
Inv.no. 35: Letter from the General Secretary of the Algemene Werkgevers-Vereniging M. 
 Klaassen to the CSWV, 29 February 1952,  no. S/87 (1952). 
Inv.no. 35: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van de Dagelijks Besturen van het Verbond van 
 Nederlandsche Werkgevers en het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op 
 4 September 1952 om 14.00 uur, Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1952). 
Inv.no. 35: ‘Samenvatting van de antwoorden van de bij het C.S.W.V. aangesloten 
 werkgeversverenigingen op de discussie-nota van Januari 1952’ (1952). 
Inv.no. 35: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal 
 Werkgevers-Verbond gehouden 5 Juni 1952, des voormiddags om 10.30 uur, 
 Kneuterdijk 8, te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1952). 
Inv.no. 35: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal 
 Werkgevers-Verbond gehouden 5 Maart 1953 des voormiddags te 10.30 uur 
 Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 35: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal 
 Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden 8 Januari des voormiddags te 10.30 uur, 
 Kneuterdijk 8, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 36: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal 
 Werkgevers-Verbond op 5 November 1953 des voormiddags te 10.30 uur, 
 Kneuterdijk 8 te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 37: ‘Verslag van de buitengewone vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het 
 Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag 16 September 1954, 
 3.00 uur n.m., ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 37: ‘Verslag van de buitengewone vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het 
 Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Donderdag 9 September 1954, des 
 namiddags te 2.00 uur, Kneuterdijk 8, te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 37: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van het Centraal Sociaal 
 Werkgevers-Verbond, gehouden op Maandag 23 Augustus 1954 ten kantore 
 Kneuterdijk 8, te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1954). 
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Inv.no. 102: ‘Rede Mr. F.H.A. de Graaff gehouden op de Algemene Ledenvergadering op 
 Maandag 24 April 1953’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 102: ‘Rede uitgesproken door de voorzitter, de heer Mr F.H.A. de Graaff in de 
 Algemene Ledenvergadering op Dinsdag 13 November 1951 te Amsterdam’ (1951). 
Inv.no. 102: ‘Rede uitgesproken door de voorzitter, de heer Mr F.H.A. de Graaff in de 
 Algemene Ledenvergadering op Vrijdag 3 October 1952 te Rotterdam’ (1952). 
Inv.no. 165: ‘De Onderneming 1952. 2e Jaargang no.4’ (1952). 
Inv.no. 165: ‘De Onderneming 1952. 2e Jaargang no.12’ (1952). 
Inv.no. 165: ‘De Onderneming 1952. 2e Jaargang no.18’ (1952). 
Inv.no. 165: ‘De Onderneming 1953. 3e Jaargang no.8’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 165: ‘De Onderneming 1953. 3e Jaargang no.11’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 165: ‘De Onderneming 1953. 3e Jaargang no.15’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 165: ‘De Onderneming 1953. 3e Jaargang no.19’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 165: ‘De Onderneming 1954. 4e Jaargang no.17’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 165: ‘De Onderneming 1954. 4e Jaargang no.18’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 165: ‘De Onderneming 1954. 4e Jaargang no.20’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 204: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van de Commissie Centrale Werkgeversorganisaties 
 voor Lonen en Prijzen, gehouden op 2 November 1950, des n.m. om 3 uur, Kneuterdijk 
 8 (1e étage) Den Haag’ (1950). 
Inv.no. 204: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van de Commissie Werkgeversorganisaties Lonen en 
 Prijzen, gehouden op 13 November 1950’ (1950). 
5.2.1.7 Contactcommissie Vier Verbonden (CVV) no. 2.19.103.08 
Inv.no. 1: ‘Notulen van de vergadering d.d. 4 Juni 1952 van de Contactcommissie der Vier 
 Verbonden, gehouden te Tilburg ten kantore van Mr. B.J.M. van Spaendonck’ (1952). 
Inv.no. 1: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van de Contactcommissie der Vier Verbonden, 
 gehouden op 1 September 1954 om 2.00 n.m. in Hotel des Pays-Bas te Utrecht’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 1: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van de Contactcommissie der Vier Verbonden, 
 gehouden op Vrijdag 5 Juni 1953 te 10.00 v.m. in de Van-Hogendorpzaal, Kneuterdijk 
 8, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 11: ‘Enkele vraagstukken inzake de loonpolitiek op lange termijn’ (1952). 
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5.2.1.8 Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidzaken (RBA) no. 2.19.103.10 
Inv.no. 1: ‘Gezamenlijke werkgeversorgansiaties inzake de loonsverhoging’ (1951). 
Inv.no. 1: ‘Kort verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de Raad van Bestuur 
 in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Donderdag, 29 November 1951 des namiddags te 1 uur
 ten kantore van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8(1e étage) te 
 ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1951). 
Inv.no. 1: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van de Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken, gehouden op 
 Donderdag 26 Augustus 1954 om 2.00 uur n.m. ten kantore van het Katholiek Verbond 
 van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, Raamweg 32 te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 1: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur uit de Raad van Bestuur in 
 Arbeidszaken, gehouden op 26 September 1953, des namiddags 1.00 uur ten kantore 
 van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8, 1e etage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 1: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur uit de Raad van Bestuur in 
 Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Vrijdag 10 September 1954 ten kantore Kneuterdijk 8 te ‘s-
 Gravenhage (1954). 
Inv.no. 1: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de Raad van Bestuur in 
 Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Donderdag 2 September 1954 om 1.00 uur n.m., ten 
 kantore Kneuterdijk 8 te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 1: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de Raad van Bestuur in 
 Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Donderdag 20 Augustus 1953 ten kantore, Kneuterdijk 8 te 
 ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 1: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de Raad van Bestuur in 
 Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Vrijdag 11 September 1953 ten kantore van het C.S.W.V., 
 Kneuterdijk 8 te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 1: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de Raad van Bestuur in 
 Arbeidszaken, gehouden op Woensdag 15 Juli 1953, des namiddags om 3 uur, ten
 kantore van het Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, Kneuterdijk 8 te ‘s-Gravenhage’ 
 (1953). 
Inv.no. 6: ‘Betr: Oprichting Raad van Bestuur in Arbeidszaken’ (1941). 
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Inv.no. 6: ‘Een Raad van Bestuur in arbeidszaken’ (1941). 
5.2.1.9 Sociaal-Economische Raad (SER) no. 2.06.064 
Inv.no. 128: ‘Verslag van de twee-en-veertigste vergadering van de Sociaal-Economische 
 Raad, gehouden op Vrijdag 20 Maart 1953 te ’s-Gravenhage’ (1953).  
Inv.no. 128: ‘Verslag van de vierenzestigste vergadering (zevenentwintigste openbare 
 vergadering) van de Sociaal-Economische Raad, gehouden op Vrijdag 27 Augustus 
 1954 te ’s-Gravenhage’ (1954).  
Inv.no. 484: ‘Concept-advies inzake de wenselijkheid van een loonsverhoging’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 487: ‘Advies inzake het in de naaste toekomst te volgen system van loonbeheersing’ 
 (1953). 
5.2.2 Catholic Documentation Centre (Nijmegen) 
5.2.2.1 Algemeene Roomsch Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging (ARKWV) no. 917  
(including the archive of the Roomsch Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen 
(RKVW)) 
Inv.no. 13: ‘Notulen der vergadering van het Federatiebestuur der A.R.K.W.V. op Maandag 16 
 November 1925 n.m. 1.30 in “Huize Voorhout” Lange Voorhout 19 Den Haag (1925).  
Inv.no. 14: ‘Vergadering van het R.K. Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen op 
 Donderdag 8 Maart 1923’ (1923). 
Inv.no. 14: ‘Notulen Vergadering secretarissen R.K. Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen 
 op Dinsdag 9 October 1928, Den Haag’ (1928). 
Inv.no. 14: ‘Gecombineerde vergadering van het Dagelijksch Bestuur der A.R.K.W.V. met de 
 besturen van het bij het R.K. Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen aangesloten 
 patroonsbonden, op Maandag 10 Juli te Tilburg’ (1933). 
Inv.no. 37: ‘Notulen van de Dagelijksch Bestuur der A.R.K.W.V. gehouden op Dinsdag 28 
 December 1926 des voormiddags te half twaalf uur in “Huize Voorhout” te ‘s 
 Gravenhage’ (1926). 
Inv.no. 49: ‘Notulen der vergadering van het Dagelijksch Bestuursvergadering der A.K.W.V. 
 Federatie op Maandag 22 Maart 1937 om 10.30 uur v.m. Lange Voorhout 19, ‘s 
 Gravenhage’ (1937). 
5.2.2.2 Algemeene Katholieke Werkgeversvereeniging (AKWV) no. 917  
(including the archive of the Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen (KVW)) 
Inv.no. 15: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Bestuur van het R.K. Verbond van 
 Werkgeversvakverenigingen, gehouden op 8 November 1950 te 14.15 uur te Tilburg, 
 Willem II straat 47/49’ (1950). 
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Inv.no. 15: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur van het Katholiek Verbond
 van Werkgeversvakverenigingen, gehouden op Woensdag 12 Maart 1952 te 14.00 uur
 in Tilburg’ (1952). 
Inv.no. 16: ‘Notulen van de Gecombineerde Vergadering van het Federatiebestuur der 
 Algemene Kath. Werkgeversvereeniging en van de Besturen der bij het R.K. Verbond 
 aangesloten vakvereenigingen, gehouden op Vrijdag 9 November 1945 te Tilburg’ 
 (1945). 
Inv.no. 59: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V.,
 gehouden op Woensdag 25 October 1950, om 14.00 uur te Tilburg, Willem II-straat 
 47/49.’ (1950). 
Inv.no. 59: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de A.K.W.V.-Federatie, 
 gehouden te ’s Gravenhage, Raamweg 32 op Woensdag 31 Mei 1950, 10 uur v.m.’ 
 (1950). 
Inv.no. 60: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., 
 gehouden op Vrijdag 7 December 1951 om 2.00 uur n.m. te Tilburg ten kantore Willem 
 IIstraat 47/49’ (1951). 
Inv.no. 61: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de Algemene Katholieke 
 Werkgeversvereniging, gehouden op Woensdag 27 Augustus 1952 te 14.00 uur, 
 Willem-II straat 47/49, Tilburg’ (1952). 
Inv.no. 62: ‘Besprekingen loonpolitiek; schets van de gang van zaken tot dusverre; de stand van 
 het ogenblik en de te verwachten procedure’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 62: ‘Kort Verslag van de vergadering van de Commissie Loonpolitiek van de Vier 
 Centrale Werkgeversverbonden dd. 11 Juni 1953’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 62: Letter from AKWV to Minister of Social Affairs and Public Health, May 1953, 
 210/5/53-211/5/53 (1953). 
Inv.no. 62: ‘Nota over de gang van zaken bij het beraad over eventuele wijzigingen in de 
 loonpolitiek’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 62: ‘Notitie inzake verordende bevoegdheden t.a.v. lonen en andere 
 arbeidsvoorwaarden’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 62: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur van de A.K.W.V., gehouden 
 op Maandag 2 Februari, om 14.00 uur in Den Haag, Raamweg 32’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 62: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., gehouden 
 op Maandag 31 Augustus 1953 te 2.00 uur n.m. te Tilburg, Willem-II-straat 47-49’ 
 (1953). 
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Inv.no. 62: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., gehouden 
 op Woensdag 3 Juni 1953 des morgens te 10.00 uur v.m. te Den Haag, Raamweg 32’ 
 (1953). 
Inv.no. 62: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., gehouden 
 op Woensdag 24 Juni 1953 te 10.00 uur v.m. te Utrecht, in het Jaarbeursrestaurant’ 
 (1953). 
Inv.no. 62: ‘Verklaring van het Centraal-Sociaal Werkgevers-Verbond, het Verbond van 
 Nederlandsche Werkgevers, het Katholiek Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen 
 en het Verbond van Protestants-Christelijke werkgevers in Nederland over de 
 loonpolitiek in de nabije toekomst’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 62: ‘Voorlopige conclusies bespreking op 16 Mei 1953’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 63: ‘Nota inzake enkele aspecten van een nieuw loonsysteem’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 63: ‘Nota inzake toekomstige loonpolitiek’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 63: ‘Notitie over “De nota inzake toekomstige loonpolitiek” van de Looncommissie van
 de Stichting van de Arbeid’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 63: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., gehouden 
 op Maandag 3 Mei 1954 t.k.v. Mr. B.J.M. van Spaendonck, Willem-II-straat 47-49 te 
 Tilburg om 14.30 uur’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 63: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., gehouden 
 op Maandag 5 Juli 1954 t.k.v. Mr. B.J.M. van Spaendonck, te Tilburg, Willem-II-straat 
 47-49 te 10.30 uur v.m.’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 63: ‘Notulen van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der A.K.W.V., gehouden 
 op Maandag 6 September 1954 om 10.30 uur in het Victoria-hotel te Amsterdam’
 (1954). 
Inv.no. 63: ‘Schematisch overzicht van de gevoerde besprekingen inzake de loonmaatregelen 
 September 1954’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 374: ‘Notulen van de Gecombineerde Vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur der 
 A.K.W.V. en van Voorzitters en Secretarissen van de bij het R.K. Verbond van 
 Werkgeversvakverenigingen aangesloten organisaties, gehouden op Woensdag 23 
 Augustus 1950, 16.30 uur te ’s Gravenhage, Raamweg 32’ (1950). 
Inv.no. 1419: ‘Rapport van de Commissie Loonpolitiek op lange termijn van het Katholiek 
 Verbond van Werkgeversvakverenigingen’ (1952). 
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5.2.3 Historical Documentation Centre for Dutch Protestantism (Amsterdam) 
5.2.3.1 Vereeniging van Christelijke Werkgevers en Groothandelaren (VCWG) no. 332 
Inv.no. 1: ‘Beginselverklaring en toelichting’ (1921). 
Inv.no. 1: ‘Gecombineerde vergadering van Bestuur der Christelijke Werkgevers.- en 
 Christelijke Middenstandsvereniging. 6 October 1921, ’s namiddags 3 uur in gebouw 
 “De Standaard” Amsterdam’ (1921). 
Inv.no. 1: letter from Mr. Woldring to Secretary ‘Groningen den 27. Dec 1921’ (1921). 
Inv.no. 1: ‘Program van Actie vastgesteld door de Algemene Ledenvergadering van 23 
 November 1921.’ (1921). 
5.2.3.2 Verbond van Protestant-Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland (VPCW) no. 332 
Inv.no. 6: ‘Kort verslag van de praesidiumvergadering van het Verbond van Protestant-
 Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, gehouden 30 Augustus 1950 ten kantore 
 Parkstraat 28, 's-Gravenhage’ (1950). 
Inv.no. 6: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur gehouden op Woensdag 18 
 Augustus 1954 te 1.30 uur n.m. ten kantore Parkstraat 28 te 's-Gravenhage’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 6: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur gehouden op Woensdag 19 
 Augustus te 13.30 uur ten kantore Parkstraat 28, 's-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 6: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur gehouden op Woensdag 20 
 Mei te 13.30 uur ten kantore Parkstraat 28 Den Haag’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 6: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Dagelijks Bestuur, gehouden op Maandag, 14 
 September des avonds 7.15 uur ten kantore Parkstraat 28, 's-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 6: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Praesidium van het Verbond van Protestant-
 Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, gehouden op Dinsdag 16 Januari 1951, 
 Parkstraat 28, 's-Gravenhage’ (1951). 
Inv.no. 6: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Praesidium van het Verbond van Protestant-
 Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, gehouden op Donderdag 19 Juni 1947 in het 
 Verbondsbureau, Parkstraat 28, 's-Gravenhage’ (1947). 
Inv.no. 6: ‘Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het praesidium van het Verbond 
 van Protestant-Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, uitgebreid met enkele in de 
 nabijheid van Den Haag wonende bestuursleden, gehouden op 23 November 1949 
 Parkstraat 28, 's-Gravenhage’ (1949). 
Inv.no. 6: ‘Verslag van het verhandelde op de vergadering van het Praesidium, gehouden op 11 
 November 1947 des namiddags om 2 uur ten kantore Parkstraat 28, 's-Gravenhage’ 
 (1947). 
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Inv.no. 10: ‘Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering d.d. 21 Januari j.l. in Hotel “Wittebrug” te 
 Scheveningen’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 10: ‘Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering d.d. 26 November j.l. in het Kurhaus te 
 Scheveningen’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 10: ‘Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering gehouden op 18 Maart j.l. in Hotel Wittebrug 
 te Scheveningen’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 10: ‘Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering gehouden op Donderdag 18 Juni 1953 te 11.00 
 uur in Hotel Wittebrug, 's-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 10: ‘Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering op Donderdag 19 Februari 1953 te 11.00 
 uur in Hotel Wittebrug, 's-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 10: ‘Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering op Vrijdag 14 November 1952 te 11 uur in 
 Hotel “Wittebrug” te 's-Gravenhage’ (1952). 
Inv.no. 10: ‘Verslag van de Bestuursvergadering, gehouden op 26 September 1953 te 10.30 uur 
 in Hotel “Wittebrug”, 's-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 10: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur d.d. Donderdag 17 Juni ‘54 te 11 
 uur in Hotel “Wittebrug” te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 10: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur gehouden op 15 April 1954 te 10.00 
 uur in Hotel “Wittebrug” te Scheveningen’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 10: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur van het Verbond van Protestants-
 Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, gehouden op Donderdag 27 September 1951 te 
 10.30 uur in Hotel des Pays Bas, Utrecht’ (1951). 
Inv.no. 10: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur van het Verbond van Protestants-
 Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland, gehouden op Maandag, 23 October 1950, in
 Restaurant Garoeda te 's-Gravenhage’ (1950). 
Inv.no. 10: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur, gehouden op Donderdag 22 October  
 te 11 uur in Hotel “Wittebrug” te 's-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 10: ‘Verslag van de vergadering van het Bestuur, gehouden op Donderdag 17 September  
 om 11 uur v.m. in Hotel “Wittebrug” te 's-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
5.2.4 International Institute for Social History (Amsterdam) 
5.2.4.1 Stichting van de Arbeid (StAR) no. 01411 
Inv.no. 16: ‘Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting 
 van den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 9 December 1954, ten kantore Javastraat 2b, ‘s-
 Gravenhage’ (1949). 
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Inv.no. 23: ‘Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting 
 van den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 17 Juli 1953, om 10.15 uur v.m., ten kantore 
 Scheveningseweg 62, te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 23: ‘Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting 
 van den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 26 Juni 1953, om 10.15 uur v.m., ten kantore 
 Scheveningseweg 62, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 24: ‘Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting 
 van den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 18 September 1953, des n.m. om 14.30 uur ten
 kantore Scheveningseweg 62, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 24: ‘Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting 
 van den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 21 Augustus 1953, om 10.15 uur v.m., ten kantore 
 Scheveningseweg 62, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 24: ‘Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting 
 van den Arbeid, gehouden op Vrijdag 4 September 1953, om 10.15 uur v.m., ten kantore 
 Scheveningseweg 62, te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 24: ‘Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting 
 van den Arbeid, gehouden op Zaterdag 26 September 1953 om 3,15 uur n.m., ten 
 kantore Scheveningseweg 62, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1953). 
Inv.no. 25: ‘Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting 
 van den Arbeid, gehouden op 17 September 1954, ten kantore Scheveningseweg 62 te
 ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 25: ‘Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting 
 van den Arbeid, gehouden op Dinsdag 14 September 1954, om 2.30 uur n.m. ten 
 kantore Scheveningseweg 62, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 25: ‘Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting 
 van den Arbeid, gehouden op Donderdag 2 September 1954 om 2.15 uur ten 
 kantore Scheveningseweg 62, ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 25: ‘Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting 
 van den Arbeid gehouden op Vrijdag 16 Juli 1954 om 10.15 uur v.m te Baarn’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 25: ‘Verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van het Bestuur van de Stichting 
 van den Arbeid, gehouden op Zaterdag 11 September 1954 om 2.00 uur n.m. ten 
 kantore Scheveningseweg 62 te ‘s-Gravenhage’ (1954). 
Inv.no. 97: ‘Afschrift 250-A-18’ (1945). 
Inv.no. 410: ‘Nota inzake de toekomstige loonpolitiek’ (1954). 
